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NATHAN S.  CHAPMAN & MICHAEL W. MCCONNELL 
 
Due Process as Separation of Powers 
abstract. From its conceptual origin in Magna Charta, due process of law has required that 
government can deprive persons of rights only pursuant to a coordinated effort of separate 
institutions that make, execute, and adjudicate claims under the law. Originalist debates about 
whether the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendments were understood to entail modern “substantive 
due process” have obscured the way that many American lawyers and courts understood due 
process to limit the legislature from the Revolutionary era through the Civil War. They 
understood due process to prohibit legislatures from directly depriving persons of rights, 
especially vested property rights, because it was a court’s role to do so pursuant to established 
and general law. This principle was applied against insufficiently general and prospective 
legislative acts under a variety of state and federal constitutional provisions through the 
antebellum era. Contrary to the claims of some scholars, however, there was virtually no 
precedent before the Fourteenth Amendment for invalidating laws that restricted liberty or the 
use of property. Contemporary resorts to originalism to support modern substantive due process 
doctrines are therefore misplaced. Understanding due process as a particular instantiation of 
separation of powers does, however, shed new light on a number of key twentieth-century cases 
which have not been fully analyzed under the requirements of due process of law. 
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introduction 
Scholars are showing renewed interest in the original understanding of the 
Due Process Clauses, and especially in whether that understanding supports 
the Supreme Court’s modern substantive due process jurisprudence. Not long 
ago, most scholars accepted John Hart Ely’s clever dismissal of the idea of 
substantive due process as an “oxymoron,” on the order of “green pastel 
redness”1—with those of an originalist bent concluding that substantive due 
process is illegitimate2 and those of a substantive due process bent concluding 
that originalism is wrongheaded.3 Now, with originalist approaches to 
constitutional interpretation gaining greater adherence, even among 
progressives,4 we are seeing more serious attempts to discern the “original 
understanding” of “due process of law.” 
 
1.  JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 18 (1980); see 
also Ellis v. Hamilton, 669 F.2d 510, 512 (7th Cir. 1982) (Posner, J.) (criticizing “substantive 
due process” as an “oxymoron”). 
2.  See, e.g., RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE 
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 249-82 (1977); ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: 
THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 31-32 (1990); Raoul Berger, “Law of the Land” 
Reconsidered, 74 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 29-30 (1979) [hereinafter Berger, “Law of the Land” 
Reconsidered] (concluding that substantive due process does not have “deep historical 
roots”). 
3.  See LAURA KALMAN, THE STRANGE CAREER OF LEGAL LIBERALISM 71-77 (1996); see, e.g., 
RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 134 (1977); MICHAEL J. PERRY, THE 
CONSTITUTION, THE COURTS, AND HUMAN RIGHTS: AN INQUIRY INTO THE LEGITIMACY OF 
CONSTITUTIONAL POLICYMAKING BY THE JUDICIARY 6-7 (1982) (defending judicial 
lawmaking on extraconstitutional, “noninterpretive” grounds); Thomas C. Grey, Do We 
Have an Unwritten Constitution?, 27 STAN. L. REV. 703 (1975) (arguing that courts should not 
rely exclusively on the written constitution); Thomas C. Grey, Origins of the Unwritten 
Constitution: Fundamental Law in American Revolutionary Thought, 30 STAN. L. REV. 843 
(1978) [hereinafter Grey, Origins of the Unwritten Constitution] (arguing on historical 
grounds that there is an unwritten constitution). 
4.  Lawrence B. Solum, District of Columbia v. Heller and Originalism, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 923, 
932 (2009); Keith E. Whittington, The New Originalism, 2 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 599, 605 
(2004) (“Broadly originalist arguments are widespread and are increasingly common ‘in 
liberal and progressive theory.’” (quoting James E. Fleming, Fidelity to Our Imperfect 
Constitution, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1335, 1344 (1997))); see, e.g., Dist. of Columbia v. Heller, 
554 U.S. 570, 636 (2008) (Stevens, J., dissenting); AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S 
CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY (2005); JACK M. BALKIN, CONSTITUTIONAL REDEMPTION: 
POLITICAL FAITH IN AN UNJUST WORLD 228 (2011); Jack M. Balkin, Abortion and Original 
Meaning, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 291 (2007); Jack M. Balkin, Framework Originalism and the 
Living Constitution, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 549 (2009); CONST. ACCOUNTABILITY CTR., 
http://www.theusconstitution.org (last visited Feb. 3, 2012). 
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Scholars who have considered the evidence generally fall into two camps. 
Some argue that “due process” meant nothing more than judicial procedure.5 It 
therefore applied to the courts and, perhaps, to the executive with respect to 
prosecution and the enforcement of court judgments. Under this reading, due 
process did not apply to the legislature. Others contend that “due process of 
law” entailed judicial procedure and natural law norms such as reasonableness, 
justice, or fairness.6 Due process thus applied to legislative acts that failed to 
live up to those norms. 
 
5.  The most important statement of this position is Justice Hugo Black’s dissenting opinion in 
In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 378-82 (1970). See also 2 WILLIAM WINSLOW CROSSKEY, POLITICS 
AND THE CONSTITUTION IN THE HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 1102-08 (1953); ELY, supra 
note 1, at 15; LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINS OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS 248 (1999); ANDREW C. 
MCLAUGHLIN, A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 461 (1935); HERMINE 
HERTA MEYER, THE HISTORY AND MEANING OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 125-26 
(1977); HUGH EVANDER WILLIS, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 705-06 
(1936); Edward S. Corwin, The Doctrine of Due Process of Law Before the Civil War, 24 HARV. 
L. REV. 366, 371 (1911); Frank H. Easterbrook, Substance and Due Process, 1982 SUP. CT. REV. 
85 (arguing that “due process” refers to common law procedures in place in 1791 plus any 
amendments made by the legislature to those procedures); Howard Jay Graham, Procedure 
to Substance—Extra-Judicial Rise of Due Process, 1830-1860, 40 CALIF. L. REV. 483, 484-86 
(1952); Charles Grove Haines, Judicial Review of Legislation in the United States and the 
Doctrines of Vested Rights and of Implied Limitations of Legislatures (pts. 1-3), 2 TEX. L. REV. 257 
(1924), 2 TEX. L. REV. 387 (1924), 3 TEX. L. REV. 1 (1924); Louis Henkin, Privacy and 
Autonomy, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 1410, 1412 (1974); Andrew T. Hyman, The Little Word “Due,” 
38 AKRON L. REV. 1, 2 (2005); Keith Jurow, Untimely Thoughts: A Reconsideration of the 
Origins of the Due Process of Law, 19 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 265 (1975); Alfred H. Kelly, The 
Fourteenth Amendment Reconsidered: The Segregation Question, 54 MICH. L. REV. 1049, 1052 
(1956); Hans A. Linde, Due Process of Lawmaking, 55 NEB. L. REV. 197, 237-38 (1976); Henry 
P. Monaghan, Our Perfect Constitution, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 353 (1981); Richard S. Myers, The 
End of Substantive Due Process?, 45 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 557, 614-15 (1988); Robert P. 
Reeder, The Due Process Clauses and “The Substance of Individual Rights,” 58 U. PA. L. REV. 
191, 201 (1910); Charles Warren, The New “Liberty” Under the Fourteenth Amendment,  
39 HARV. L. REV. 431, 441 (1926); Ralph U. Whitten, The Constitutional Limitations on  
State-Court Jurisdiction: A Historical-Interpretive Reexamination of the Full Faith and Credit and 
Due Process Clauses (pt. 2), 14 CREIGHTON L. REV. 735 (1981); Stephen F. Williams, “Liberty” 
in the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments: The Framers’ Intentions,  
53 U. COLO. L. REV. 117, 126-27 (1981); Christopher Wolfe, The Original Meaning of the Due 
Process Clause, in THE BILL OF RIGHTS: ORIGINAL MEANING AND CURRENT UNDERSTANDING 
213 (Eugene W. Hickok, Jr. ed., 1991). 
6.  See CHESTER JAMES ANTIEAU, THE INTENDED SIGNIFICANCE OF THE FOURTEENTH 
AMENDMENT 351-55 (1997) (citing antebellum cases protecting natural rights); James W. 
Ely, Jr., The Oxymoron Reconsidered: Myth and Reality in the Origins of Substantive Due Process, 
16 CONST. COMMENT. 315 (1999) (arguing that due process was intended to protect property 
rights); Frederick Mark Gedicks, An Originalist Defense of Substantive Due Process: Magna 
Carta, Higher-Law Constitutionalism, and the Fifth Amendment, 58 EMORY L.J. 585 (2009) 
(arguing that “law” in “due process of law” was understood to refer to an act that complies 
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In this Journal, Ryan Williams has recently offered a twist on the two 
prevailing interpretations of the historical evidence. He argues that few at the 
Founding thought that due process applied to the legislature, but that courts 
between the Founding and the Civil War developed a version of “substantive” 
due process. He concludes that the original understanding of the Fifth 
Amendment did not have a “substantive due process” component, but the 
original understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment did.7 This leads to the 
intriguing possibility that, as a matter of original understanding, substantive 
due process is legitimate as applied to state but not to federal legislation. He is 
equivocal about whether the original understanding of the Fourteenth 
Amendment supports modern substantive due process,8 as applied in Roe v. 
Wade,9 Planned Parenthood v. Casey,10 and Lawrence v. Texas.11 
In this Essay we argue, contrary to each of these views, that by the time of 
adoption of the Fifth Amendment, due process was widely understood to apply 
to legislative acts, but that this practice did not resemble modern substantive 
due process. Legislative acts violated due process not because they were 
unreasonable or in violation of higher law, but because they exercised judicial 
power or abrogated common law procedural protections. These applications of 
due process to the legislature were based on common law principles about the 
nature of legislation as distinguished from judicial acts (not “natural law” as 
that term is commonly used), the constitutional separation of powers, and 
specific constitutional limits on the power of the legislature. Courts relied on 
different provisions depending on what constitution governed the case, but 
their decisions were consistently based on the same separation-of-powers and 
 
with natural law); Grey, Origins of the Unwritten Constitution, supra note 3 (purporting to 
provide a historical foundation for “noninterpretive” judicial review); Alfred Hill, The 
Political Dimension of Constitutional Adjudication, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1237, 1270-73, 1322-23 
(1990) (arguing that discerning the Framers’ intentions is a political enterprise); Robert E. 
Riggs, Substantive Due Process in 1791, 1990 WIS. L. REV. 941 (suggesting that substantive 
due process may not be inconsistent with originalism); cf. RODNEY L. MOTT, DUE PROCESS 
OF LAW 34-36, 74-75, 123-24, 159-61 (1926) (detailing the history of due process through 
English and American colonial history); Suzanna Sherry, The Founders’ Unwritten 
Constitution, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1127, 1132 (1987) (noting the Founders’ adoption of a 
doctrine of inalienable natural rights). 
7.  Ryan C. Williams, The One and Only Substantive Due Process Clause, 120 YALE L.J. 408, 411-12 
(2010). 
8.  Id. at 510-11. 
9.  410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
10.  505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
11.  539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
1672.CHAPMANMCCONNELL.1807.DOC 4/10/2012  12:16:28 PM 
the yale law journal 121:1672   2012  
1678 
 
due process logic.12 It is true that not everyone was always persuaded by every 
application of due process to a legislature during this period (for instance, 
Chief Justice Taney’s opinion in Dred Scott v. Sandford13); nor are we. But all of 
them—even the questionable opinions—relied on separation-of-powers logic. 
None of them invalidated a general and prospective statute on the ground that 
it interfered with unenumerated but inalienable rights, was unreasonable, or 
exceeded the police power. It was not until well after the ratification of the 
 
12.  We are not the first to note the importance of the separation of powers in the original 
understanding of due process of law, but not many have given it pride of place, with the 
notable exception of Wallace Mendelson. See Wallace Mendelson, A Missing Link in the 
Evolution of Due Process, 10 VAND. L. REV. 125, 136 (1956) (“Separation with its procedural 
connotations had been a ready, if narrow, bridge between orthodox procedural due process 
and the doctrine of vested interests in an age when legislatures habitually interfered with 
property by crude retrospective and special, i.e., quasi-judicial, measures.”). Mendelson’s 
thesis is that the separation of powers allowed the evolution of due process of law. Id. The 
causal connection may be more complicated than that: a commitment to the law of the land 
enabled colonial Americans to argue that Parliament had overreached well before the judicial 
power had been separated from it. See infra Sections I.B-C. It appears that separation of 
powers and due process of law developed together. See infra Sections I.A-C. Others have 
recognized that the separation of powers was integral to due process but have not 
maintained its centrality to the application of due process against the legislature. See DAVID 
P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME COURT: THE FIRST HUNDRED YEARS,  
1789-1888, at 272 (1985) (“[C]onsiderable historical evidence supports the position that ‘due 
process of law’ was a separation-of-powers concept designed as a safeguard against 
unlicensed executive action, forbidding only deprivations not authorized by legislation or 
common law.”); JOHN V. ORTH, DUE PROCESS OF LAW: A BRIEF HISTORY 48-49 (2003) 
[hereinafter ORTH, DUE PROCESS OF LAW] (“The attempted exercise of [the judicial] power 
by another branch of government could be described as a procedural violation: just as a man 
could not be made a judge in his own case, so one who was not a judge could not make 
judicial rulings.”); Nathan N. Frost, Rachel Beth Klein-Levine & Thomas B. McAffee, 
Courts over Constitutions Revisited: Unwritten Constitutionalism in the States, 2004 UTAH L. 
REV. 333, 382 (“The doctrine of vested rights grew out of a recognition that when 
legislatures act like courts, the potential for abuse grows not only by the omission of some 
particular procedure in question—such as trial by jury—but also by the departure from 
separation of powers.”); John Harrison, Substantive Due Process and the Constitutional Text, 
83 VA. L. REV. 493, 520-24 (1997); Hill, supra note 6, at 1308 (“We may begin by noting that 
if a statute was deemed confiscatory, the statute was said to be void as an attempted judicial 
act because, under separation of powers doctrine, only a court, after ‘trial had . . . and 
judgment pronounced,’ could effectuate the divestment; and also because this was deemed 
to be a fundamental requirement of the law-of-the-land and due process clauses.”); John V. 
Orth, Taking from A and Giving to B: Substantive Due Process and the Case of the Shifting 
Paradigm, 14 CONST. COMMENT. 337 (1997) [hereinafter Orth, Taking from A]; Nicholas 
Quinn Rosenkranz, The Objects of the Constitution, 63 STAN. L. REV. 1005, 1043 (2011) 
(“[T]he who question reveals that the Due Process Clause . . . is essentially a separation of 
powers provision.”); Williams, supra note 7, at 424. 
13.  60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857), superseded by constitutional amendment, U.S. CONST. amend. 
XIV, § 1. 
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Fourteenth Amendment that these notions took hold in the form of what we 
now call substantive due process. The original understanding of due process of 
law does not support it. 
The meaning of “due process of law” and the related term “law of the land” 
evolved over a several-hundred-year period, driven, we argue, by the increasing 
institutional separation of lawmaking from law enforcing and law interpreting. 
From at least the middle of the fourteenth century, however, due process 
consistently referred to the guarantee of legal judgment in a case by an 
authorized court in accordance with settled law. It entailed an exercise of what 
came to be known as the judicial power to interpret and apply standing law to a 
specific legal dispute. Application to the executive came first, and reflected the 
Whiggish contraction of royal prerogative in favor of the supremacy of 
Parliament with respect to lawmaking, and in favor of the judiciary with 
respect to adjudication of the application of law to particular persons and cases. 
Fundamentally, “due process” meant that the government may not interfere 
with established rights without legal authorization and according to law, with 
“law” meaning the common law as customarily applied by courts and 
retrospectively declared by Parliament, or as modified prospectively by general 
acts of Parliament. 
By the time the Fifth Amendment was enacted, everyone agreed that due 
process applied to executive officials and courts. It meant that the executive 
could not deprive anyone of a right except as authorized by law, and that to be 
legitimate, a deprivation of rights had to be preceded by certain procedural 
protections characteristic of judicial process: generally, presentment, 
indictment, and trial by jury. More controversially, we contend that, by this 
time, many informed American legal observers—including Madison, 
Hamilton, Jefferson, Iredell, Chase, and Tucker—also believed that the 
principle of due process extended to acts of the legislature in two narrow and 
specific ways: statutes that purported to empower the other branches to 
deprive persons of rights without adequate procedural guarantees were subject 
to judicial review, and acts by the legislature that deprived specific individuals 
of rights or property were subject to similar challenge, either in the legislative 
forum itself or in the course of subsequent judicial consideration. 
The distinctive aspect of modern “substantive due process,” in contrast, is 
its treatment of natural liberty as inviolate, even as against prospective and 
general laws passed by the legislature and enforced by means of impeccable 
procedures.14 No significant court decision, legal argument, or commentary 
 
14.  See infra Subsections III.C.1-2 (discussing Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), and 
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965)). Under a softer version of substantive due 
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prior to the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, let alone the Fifth, so 
much as hinted that due process embodies these features. With two 
controversial exceptions discussed below, antebellum courts did not assert the 
power to declare that individuals “should have” certain rights that legislatures 
had denied to everyone. Every known application of the principle of due 
process involved the deprivation of rights (usually property rights; there are far 
fewer liberty cases) that had their source in positive law, whether in a written 
constitution, a statute, or the common law. Moreover, with the two exceptions 
noted, every known application of the principle of due process involved claims 
that the imperiled rights were being taken away without adequate process: 
they had been taken away by a court without proper legal procedure, by an 
executive official without prior authorization by a legislature or a court, or by a 
legislature through an act that was effectively a judicial decree. Unlike modern 
substantive due process decisions, courts prior to the adoption of the 
Fourteenth Amendment did not treat rights other than those enumerated in 
positive constitutional law as impervious to prospective and general legislative 
repeal. 
We emphasize that our argument here is confined only to the Due Process 
Clauses, and only to their original meaning. Our argument is not based on any 
jurisprudential skepticism about the desirability of judicially enforceable 
unenumerated rights as a general matter, but solely on the historic 
understanding of “due process.” We take no position here on whether other 
provisions of the Constitution, such as the Ninth Amendment or the Privileges 
or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, empower courts to 
engage in practices akin to substantive due process—namely, the judicial 
recognition of rights originating in something other than positive law, in the 
teeth of legislative enactments to the contrary. Those provisions have their own 
distinctive history.15 We argue only that “due process” entailed no such thing. 
 
process, courts identify “rights” not grounded in positive law, and then determine, on 
philosophic premises, whether the legislature’s reasons for denying those rights are 
sufficiently persuasive. This version is no more legitimate under the original meaning of due 
process than the stronger version. See infra Subsection III.C.4 (discussing Lawrence v. 
Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003)). 
15.  One of us has offered his interpretation of those Clauses elsewhere. See Michael W. 
McConnell, Natural Rights and the Ninth Amendment: How Does Lockean Legal Theory Assist 
in Interpretation?, 5 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 1 (2010) [hereinafter McConnell, Natural Rights 
and the Ninth Amendment] (arguing that the Ninth Amendment recognized a rule of 
statutory construction to avoid reading statutes to abrogate natural rights in the absence of 
evidence of clear and specific legislative intent to do so); Michael W. McConnell, 
Originalism and the Desegregation Decisions, 81 VA. L. REV. 947, 1024-25 (1995) (arguing that 
the Privileges or Immunities Clause, at most, nationalized longstanding and widespread 
traditional liberties originating in state law); Michael W. McConnell, The Right To Die and 
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Part I recounts the history of due process in England and America, and 
then the text and framing of the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause. Part II 
examines the judicial, scholarly, and legislative applications of due process 
between 1791 and Reconstruction, showing that the meaning of due process 
did not change fundamentally from the Fifth to the Fourteenth Amendments. 
Part III analyzes how this original meaning might apply to certain well-known 
and controversial modern cases—in some instances showing that an 
understanding of the historical meaning would have provided stronger support 
for the holding and in some instances showing that it contradicts the holding. 
In particular, we find that it undermines rather than supports modern 
substantive due process. 
i .  the fifth amendment due process clause 
The due process and law-of-the-land clauses of the American state and 
federal constitutions originate in Magna Charta and the English customary 
constitution. This is uncontroversial. What commentators have underemphasized 
is that due process has from the beginning been bound up with the division of 
the authority to deprive subjects of life, liberty, or property between 
independent political institutions. In modern parlance, due process has always 
been the insistence that the executive—the branch of government that wields 
force against the people—deprive persons of rights only in accordance with 
settled rules independent of executive will, in accordance with a judgment by 
an independent magistrate. Magna Charta eliminated the King’s power to 
deprive his subjects of rights without authorization by existing law and 
adjudication by a court. This provision gained new vitality in the hands of Sir 
Edward Coke, whose influence on early American lawyers was unparalleled. 
Coke insisted that the King was subject to the common law as expressed by 
custom and parliamentary declaration.16 Thus, subjects could be deprived of 
rights only with the participation of Parliament and the courts. The Petition of 
Right, championed in Parliament by Coke and Sir John Selden, declared in no 
uncertain terms that the executive could deprive persons of rights only 
according to existing law. This argument gained new resonance against 
legislatures more than a hundred years later when Whigs in England and in the 
 
the Jurisprudence of Tradition, 1997 UTAH L. REV. 665 [hereinafter McConnell, The Right To 
Die] (arguing that the Court’s tradition-based due process analysis in Washington v. 
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997), is more plausible under the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
Privileges or Immunities Clause). 
16.  Americans would add colonial charters to the list of laws the King could not unilaterally 
abrogate. See infra Section I.C. 
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American colonies accused Parliament of depriving subjects of rights without 
due process of law by failing to give them adequate common law procedures. 
Due process thus entered American constitutionalism as one of the key 
principles for which the Revolutionaries fought. 
A. English Origins of Due Process of Law: Magna Charta and Coke 
Since its origins in Magna Charta, due process of law has gone hand in 
hand with the checks on the unilateral exercise of power that scholars now call 
“separated powers.” Chapter 29 of Magna Charta provided that “[n]o free man 
shall be taken, imprisoned, disseised, outlawed, banished, or in any way 
destroyed . . . except by the lawful judgment of his peers [or/and] by the law of 
the land.”17 This did not guarantee absolute rights, but instead subjected the 
Crown to the power of other institutions both procedurally and substantively. 
Procedurally, the King could no longer deprive a freeman of his life, liberty, or 
property without the application of general rules to the case by a tribunal of the 
freeman’s “peers.” The substance of the rule of decision would be the “law of 
the land,” which at this time referred to standing law that governed all of the 
King’s subjects in England. A 1354 statute first used the phrase “due process of 
law,” stating that “no Man of what Estate or Condition that he be, shall be put 
out of Land or Tenement, nor taken, nor imprisoned, nor disinherited, nor put 
to Death, without being brought in Answer by due Process of the Law.”18 It is 
not known whether, or how, the meaning of this language was understood to 
differ from the “law of the land” provision of Magna Charta. Perhaps they were 
 
17.  MAGNA CARTA ch. 29, reprinted and translated in A.E. DICK HOWARD, MAGNA CARTA: TEXT 
AND COMMENTARY 43 (1964). The Latin conjunction can be translated as either “and” or 
“or.” Some scholars believe that it meant “and” to the parties of the original Charter. See 
WILLIAM SHARP MCKECHNIE, MAGNA CHARTA: A COMMENTARY ON THE GREAT CHARTER OF 
KING JOHN 381-82 (photo. reprint 2000) (2d ed. 1914). Sir Edward Coke translated it as 
“or,” however, and most American constitutions that included a law-of-the-land clause 
opted for the “or” construction. MOTT, supra note 6, at 3 n.8. At least one court considered 
whether the disjunctive construction meant that the government may deprive someone of a 
right under a “law of the land” even without a trial by a jury of his peers. See Zylstra v. Corp. 
of Charleston, 1 S.C.L. (1 Bay) 382, 391-92 (Ct. Com. Pl. 1794). 
18.  28 Edw. 3, c. 3 (1354), reprinted in 1 THE STATUTES OF THE REALM 345 (photo. reprint 1963) 
(London, Dawsons of Pall Mall 1810). Three years earlier, a statute used a similar phrase, 
“by the Course of the law,” in a similar context. 25 Edw. 3, c. 4 (1351), reprinted in 1 THE 
STATUTES OF THE REALM, supra, at 321; see MOTT, supra note 6, at 4 n.11; see also Jurow, supra 
note 5, at 268 (noting that, while “no other statutes enacted during Edward’s reign referred 
to ‘due process of law,’ . . . several . . . expressed a similar understanding of ‘process of 
law’”). 
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two ways of saying the same thing, as Coke would later conclude.19 Or the 
term “process” may have had a narrower procedural focus akin to modern 
“service of process”—meaning, in effect, that the government had to proceed 
according to the appropriate common law writ.20 The “law of the land” appears 
to point to a broader conception of the rule of law, with more emphasis on the 
source of legal authority—common law or statute—than on the procedures for 
carrying it out. Because common law remedies were inseparable from their 
corresponding writs,21 however, it is probably a mistake to draw any sharp 
distinction. 
The individual-rights implications of Magna Charta are well appreciated, 
but not enough attention has been paid to their connection to the separation of 
powers. Indeed, those rights may be best understood not as a guarantee of a 
certain definition of liberty or property, or of abstract principles of “fairness”—
notice and the opportunity to be heard, as in modern procedural due process 
jurisprudence—but as a guarantee of judgment by an independent institution 
according to procedures designed to take the case out of the hands of the King. 
Magna Charta interposes an independent body of decisionmakers, a jury of 
one’s peers, between the Crown and the subject. Before a subject may be 
punished, taxed, or otherwise deprived of his rights, the Crown must convince 
a body of lay citizens that the subject violated the settled or established law of 
the land, meaning either longstanding common law or a statute enacted by 
Parliament. This is how the principle that evolved into modern separation of 
powers entered English law: the Crown could deprive subjects of rights only 
through institutional coordination. 
The core violation of Chapter 29 occurred when the King or Parliament 
deprived someone of life, liberty, or property without judgment by a common 
law court applying settled law. It was not enough for the King or even the 
King-in-Council to provide a hearing in advance of the deprivation. A 1368 
statute, for example, provided that “no Man [shall] be put to answer without 
Presentment before Justices, or Matter of Record, or by due Process and Writ 
original, according to the old Law of the Land”; the law expressly forbade 
 
19.  EDWARD COKE, THE SECOND PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 50 (photo. 
reprint 2002) (London, W. Clarke & Sons 1817) (1642). 
20.  Jurow, supra note 5, at 267 (stating that the statute “appears to demand that judgment and 
execution were not to be rendered against any man unless and until he was brought 
personally before the court by the appropriate writ”). 
21.  Daniel J. Hulsebosch, Writs to Rights: “Navigability” and the Transformation of the Common 
Law in the Nineteenth Century, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 1049, 1051 (2002) (observing that the 
writ system of jurisdiction and forms of pleading did not evolve into a substantive 
jurisprudence until the nineteenth century). 
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adjudications by the King’s councils instead of the common law courts.22 The 
same year, when a royal commission purported to authorize two men to seize 
and imprison another and to take his property, a court determined that it was 
“against the law, to take a man and his good without indictment, suit of a 
party, or due process.”23 From the very start, then, due process required 
judgment by an independent court pursuant to the system of remedial writs. 
Most of the historical evidence calls exercises of this power “judicial,” whether 
it was done by the King, Parliament, or courts. For clarity, we will call it 
“quasi-judicial.” 
The history of due process of law was bound up with the seventeenth-
century struggle of the common law courts to assert their jurisdiction over 
local, ecclesiastical, and prerogative courts, thereby extending the reach of the 
“law of the land.”24 Insofar as this centralized power into courts that applied 
English law and were appointed by the King, it bolstered royal power. Insofar 
as it encroached on the jurisdiction of courts where the King asserted power to 
personally exercise judgment, however, it effectively separated from the Crown 
the power to deprive persons of rights without the consent of a quasi-independent 
tribunal. 
Under the influence of early Stuart-era common law lawyers, especially 
Coke,25 the requirement of due process came to limit the prerogative powers of 
the Crown, in defense both of courts and of an emerging parliamentary 
supremacy over the content of law. Coke’s views were a chief source of early 
American constitutionalism.26 
 
22.  42 Edw. 3, c. 3 (1368), reprinted in 1 THE STATUTES OF THE REALM, supra note 18, at 388. 
23.  Y.B. 42 Edw.3, fol. 258b, pl. 5 (1368), reprinted in YEAR BOOKS: LIBER ASSISARUM, 1327-1377, 
at 258 (photo. reprint 2007) (London, George Sawbridge 1678-1680) (translated from the 
law French by the authors). 
24.  See LOUIS A. KNAFLA, LAW AND POLITICS IN JACOBEAN ENGLAND: THE TRACTS OF LORD 
CHANCELLOR ELLESMERE 134 (1977); Daniel J. Hulsebosch, The Ancient Constitution and the 
Expanding Empire: Sir Edward Coke’s British Jurisprudence, 21 LAW & HIST. REV. 439, 451 
(2003). 
25.  For the classic biography of Sir Edward Coke, see CATHERINE DRINKER BOWEN, THE LION 
AND THE THRONE: THE LIFE AND TIMES OF SIR EDWARD COKE, 1552-1634 (1957). For a good 
study of Coke’s early career, see ALLEN D. BOYER, SIR EDWARD COKE AND THE ELIZABETHAN 
AGE (2003). For a good study of his later career in Parliament, see STEPHEN D. WHITE, SIR 
EDWARD COKE AND “THE GRIEVANCES OF THE COMMONWEALTH,” 1621-1628 (1979). 
26.  See, e.g., 11 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, at iv (Albert Ellery Bergh ed., 1907) 
(noting that Coke on Littleton, a compilation of the first four volumes of Coke’s Institutes, 
“was the universal law book of students, and a sounder Whig never wrote, nor of 
profounder learning in the orthodox doctrines of the British Constitution, or in what was 
called British liberties”); see also JAMES HAW, JOHN AND EDWARD RUTLEDGE OF SOUTH 
1672.CHAPMANMCCONNELL.1807.DOC 4/10/2012  12:16:28 PM 
due process as separation of powers 
1685 
 
Coke spent much of his career defending the supremacy of “the common 
law,” sometimes called “lex terrae [law of the land],” over the “divers lawes 
within the realme of England.”27 The common law, he maintained, had 
developed organically through the adjudication of the courts since time 
immemorial,28 as well as through certain declaratory acts of Parliament, which 
themselves were believed to articulate principles with an ancient origin. This 
customary law predated the rule of any English King, and therefore, the King 
was subject to the law.29 He devoted little attention to legislation in the modern 
sense, meaning the enactment of new rules to govern future behavior, but there 
is no reason to doubt he regarded laws enacted by the King-in-Parliament as 
part of the law of the land. As stated by Sir John Selden, Coke’s ally in the 
debate over the Petition of Right, England’s first legal historian, and then a 
member of Parliament: “All the law you can name, that deserves the name of 
law, is reduced to these 2: it is either ascertained by custom or confirmed by act 
of parliament.”30 The law of the land came to be at once a substantive and an 
institutional check on the King’s power to seize property, imprison individuals, 
or otherwise deprive subjects of their rights. Substantively, the King could 
deprive subjects of their rights only pursuant to customary law or an act of 
Parliament, and not by unilateral executive decree. Institutionally, the King 
could deprive persons of rights only in coordination with institutions not 
entirely under his control, such as Parliament, common law courts, and juries. 
In the Case of Proclamations, for instance, Coke held that the Crown could 
make new law only with Parliament’s consent. Without such consent, on his 
own authority, James I issued two proclamations prohibiting “new Buildings 
in and around London” and “the making of starch of wheat.”31 The question 
was whether, as James maintained, the Crown’s “prerogative to rule was 
 
CAROLINA 9 (1997) (noting that John Rutledge called Coke’s Institutes “almost the 
foundations of our law”). 
27.  1 EDWARD COKE, THE FIRST PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWES OF ENGLAND 11b (photo. 
reprint 1999) (London, J. & W.T. Clarke 1823) (1628); see DANIEL J. HULSEBOSCH, 
CONSTITUTING EMPIRE: NEW YORK AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF CONSTITUTIONALISM IN 
THE ATLANTIC WORLD, 1664-1830, at 31 (2005) (“Coke and others elevated the common law 
above other sources of law within England.”). 
28.  See J.G.A. POCOCK, THE ANCIENT CONSTITUTION AND THE FEUDAL LAW 39-40 (1987). 
29.  See id. at 37-39; see also Michael W. McConnell, Tradition and Constitutionalism Before the 
Constitution, 1998 U. ILL. L. REV. 173, 177 (“Coke . . . locate[d] an authority higher than  
the King . . . in the immemorial laws and customs of the people of England, reflected in the 
common law and constituting ‘the ancient constitution’ of the realm.”). 
30.  POCOCK, supra note 28, at 296 (quoting 3 COMMONS DEBATES 1628, at 33 (Robert C. Johnson 
et al. eds., 1977)). 
31.  Case of Proclamations, (1610) 77 Eng. Rep. 1352 (K.B.) 1352; 12 Co. Rep. 74, 74. 
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absolute.”32 In court, Coke and his great judicial antagonist, Lord Chancellor 
Ellesmere,33  took characteristically opposite views. Ellesmere argued that the 
judges should “maintain the power and prerogative of the King,” urging that 
“in cases in which there is no authority and [precedent],” the judges should 
“leave it to the King to order it according to his wisdom.”34 This was an 
argument that the King could act wherever custom or statute did not forbid 
it.35 Ellesmere believed, based on the divine-right theory of monarchical 
government, that “the giving of new customs and laws [w]as part of the 
personal privileges of the monarch.”36 Coke, then Chief Justice of the Court of 
Common Pleas, maintained that the King could not lawfully “change any part 
of the common law, nor create any offence by his proclamation, which was not 
an offence before, without Parliament.”37 Coke was not arguing that the 
government could not prohibit making starch from wheat or erecting new 
buildings in London; rather he was asserting that the King could do so only in 
coordination with Parliament.38 
Modern readers will recognize this as a form of the separation of powers 
between the legislative and executive branches of government: only the 
legislature can make law that deprives persons of rights; the executive merely 
enforces it. To Coke, however, the case turned fundamentally on the 
subordination of the Crown to the common law, which could be expounded 
only by the common law courts or the King-in-Parliament. His concern was 
the rule of law; the requirement that the King act in concert with Parliament 
simply followed from that commitment. 
Coke also undertook to protect the separation between executive and 
judicial. In the course of a jurisdictional dispute between common law and 
ecclesiastical courts,39 now called the Case of Prohibitions, King James asserted 
 
32.  KNAFLA, supra note 24, at 65. 
33.  Thomas Egerton, Lord Ellesmere, was Elizabeth’s Lord Keeper and James I’s Lord 
Chancellor. See id. at 29-36. 
34.  Case of Proclamations, 77 Eng. Rep. at 1353, 12 Co. Rep. at 75. 
35.  For a parallel between these arguments and the approach of the modern Court, see Justice 
Jackson’s opinion in the Steel Seizure case. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer,  
343 U.S. 579, 635-38 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring); infra Subsection III.B.1. 
36.  KNAFLA, supra note 24, at 72; see Ellesmere, A Coppie of a Wrytten Discourse by the Lord 
Chauncellor Elsem0re Concerning the Royall Prerogatiue (c. 1604), reprinted in KNAFLA, supra 
note 24, at 197. 
37.  Case of Proclamations, 77 Eng. Rep. at 1353, 12 Co. Rep. at 75; see PHILIP HAMBURGER, LAW 
AND JUDICIAL DUTY 199-202 (2008); McConnell, supra note 29, at 177. 
38.  HAMBURGER, supra note 37, at 199-202. 
39.  See KNAFLA, supra note 24, at 135-37. 
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the authority to decide the jurisdictional dispute personally.40 According to 
Coke’s account,41 James claimed that “the Judges are but the delegates of the 
King, and that the King may take what causes he shall please to determine, 
from the determination of the Judges, and may determine them himself.”42 
Coke insisted that the ancient customs of the realm required the King to leave 
the decision of cases to his judges, who are trained in the law. In response to 
James’s claim that his faculty of reason equaled that of his judges, Coke 
famously replied that “causes which concern the life, inheritance, or goods, or 
fortunes” of English subjects “are not to be decided by natural reason but by 
the artificial reason and judgment of law, which law is an act that requires long 
study and experience, before that a man can attain to the cognizance of it.”43 
When the King insisted that there was no inconsistency between their 
positions because the King was the source of English law, Coke put a fine point 
on his position: citing Bracton, he asserted that though the King be under the 
authority of no man, he was under the authority of God and the law.44 Coke’s 
position was based on an almost mystical reverence for the ancient law of the 
land, but it held the kernel of what became the separation of the executive from 
the judicial power. 
Parliament soon had occasion to resolve a similar controversy. In 1627, 
King Charles I, strapped for cash and unwilling to call a Parliament, 
unilaterally imposed a tax—a forced loan—without parliamentary consent. Five 
nobles refused to pay the forced loan, and Charles ordered them imprisoned. 
Upon petition by the recalcitrant knights, the King’s Bench issued writs of 
habeas corpus to decide whether the government had cause to imprison 
them.45 The Attorney General argued that the King had the prerogative power 
under martial law to preliminarily commit the accused by “special command” 
(with no estimated date for a specific charge of unlawfulness and trial).46 The 
 
40.  Prohibitions del Roy (Case of Prohibitions), (1607) 77 Eng. Rep. 1342 (K.B.) 1342; 12 Co. Rep. 
64, 64, reprinted in 1 THE SELECTED WRITINGS AND SPEECHES OF SIR EDWARD COKE 478-81 
(Steve Sheppard ed., 2003). 
41.  For an account of the history of the prohibitions controversy that tends to cast Lord 
Chancellor Ellesmere in a more favorable light, see KNAFLA, supra note 24, at 138-41. 
42.  Case of Prohibitions, 77 Eng. Rep. at 1342, 12 Co. Rep. at 64. 
43.  Id. 
44.  Id., 12 Co. Rep. at 64-65; see 1 HENRICI DE BRACTON, DE LEGIBUS ET CONSUETUDINIBUS 
ANGLIAE 39 (Travers Twiss ed. & trans., London, Longman & Co. 1878) (“[T]he king 
himself ought not to be subject to man, but subject to God and to the law, for the law makes 
the king.”). For a dramatic account of this conflict, see BOWEN, supra note 25, at 301-06. 
45.  WHITE, supra note 25, at 215. 
46.  Id.  
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knights’ counsel argued that his clients were entitled under Magna Charta’s 
“law of the land” provision to a formal charge and to be released on bail. The 
court denied bail and remitted the knights to prison for an indeterminate 
period.47 The episode was an effective victory for Charles. 
Not long afterward, the King found it necessary to summon a Parliament 
to raise money. Coke, who by this point had been elected a member of the 
House of Commons, proposed a bill to make clear that the Crown had no 
power to unilaterally incarcerate subjects. Any power the King might have to 
imprison a subject under martial law, he maintained, was subject to the 
authority of the common law courts to determine the legality of the act.48 
Parliament endorsed Coke’s theory by enacting the bill as the Petition of 
Right,49 which became “instantly a part of the constitutional canon.”50 The 
Petition of Right asserted that subjects could be deprived of rights only 
according to “the Law of the Land,” “due processe of Lawe,” or “by the lawfull 
Judgment of his Peeres.”51 Each of these phrases was a way of expressing the 
same two institutional checks on the King’s power to deprive persons of rights: 
only pursuant to positive law (common law or parliamentary statute) and only 
after judgment by a common law court. The “substantive” side of due process 
was positive, standing law; the “procedural” side was adjudication by a court. 
The former entailed the separation of the lawmaking function, and the latter 
the separation of the adjudicatory function, from the King’s personal power. 
When Coke stated in a later commentary that Chapter 29’s “law of the land” 
provision was equivalent to the phrase “due process of law”52—the commentary 
relied on by early Americans to equate the two constitutional guarantees53—he 
was summarizing these two aspects of the rule of the common law, which were 
at once designed to wrest lawmaking and judicial power from the King. 
 
47.  3 THE SELECTED WRITINGS AND SPEECHES OF SIR EDWARD COKE, supra note 40, at 1225. 
48.  See id. at 1251 (“Two laws will never stand in England: if the courts be open, no martial 
law.”); id. at 1262 (“The question must be determined by the law of England, and the 
martial law is bounded by it.”); id. at 1263 (“[A rebel] may be slain in the rebellion, but after 
he is taken he cannot be put to death by the martial law. . . . [W]hen the courts are open 
martial law cannot be executed.”). 
49.  For the full story of the bill’s enactment, see WHITE, supra note 25, at 216-74. 
50.  HULSEBOSCH, supra note 27, at 32. 
51.  Petition of Right, 1628, 3 Car. 1, c. 1, §§ III, IV. 
52.  2 COKE, supra note 19, at 50. 
53.  Williams, supra note 7, at 429. 
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Some scholars have argued that Coke believed that the sovereign acts of the 
King-in-Parliament were limited by “fundamental law.”54 They point, for 
example, to Coke’s argument that monopolies are “against this great charter, 
because they are against the liberty and freedome of the subject.”55 This 
misunderstands Coke’s position. He meant that the King could not unilaterally 
grant monopolies; as in the Case of Proclamations, he could issue such 
monopolies only with Parliament’s consent.56 This was a separation-of-powers 
argument, not an argument that a higher law prohibited monopolies. 
The source most often invoked to support the thesis that Coke believed in a 
judicially enforceable “higher law” is his decision in Bonham’s Case.57 The 
Court of Common Pleas held that the Royal College of Physicians in London 
could not imprison doctors who practiced without a license, even though, 
according to the college, two acts of Parliament and the college charter gave it 
the authority to do so. The court disagreed. In later commentary on the case, 
Coke explained that the college could not have been given the authority to 
collect and keep fines from nonmembers, because that would make it a judge in 
its own case, in violation of customary law. This further dicta has spurred 
academic and legal commentary ever since: “[W]hen an Act of Parliament is 
against common right and reason, or repugnant, or impossible to be 
performed, the common law will controul it, and adjudge such Act to be 
void.”58 
 
54.  See Gedicks, supra note 6, at 600; see also ORTH, DUE PROCESS OF LAW, supra note 12, at 29 
(arguing that Coke thought there were “things that . . . even the king in Parliament, could 
not lawfully do”). 
55.  COKE, supra note 19, at 47; see also Case of Monopolies, (1602) 77 Eng. Rep. 1260 (K.B.);  
8 Co. Rep. 84 b (arguing that “Monopoly” is “against the Common Law”); Gedicks, supra 
note 6, at 604-05 (describing the Case of Monopolies). 
56.  See Thomas B. Nachbar, Monopoly, Mercantilism, and the Politics of Regulation, 91 VA. L. REV. 
1313, 1334 (2005) (“[T]he common law was quite amenable to exclusive trade privileges that 
did not emanate from the Crown.”); Williams, supra note 7, at 430-31. 
57.  Dr. Bonham’s Case, (1610) 77 Eng. Rep. 638 (C.P.); 8 Co. Rep. 107 a; see JAMES R. STONER, 
JR., COMMON LAW AND LIBERAL THEORY: COKE, HOBBES, AND THE ORIGINS OF AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTIONALISM 51 (1992) (citing scholarly debates about whether Coke announces “a 
principle supporting judicial invalidation of statutes that violate higher law”); Edward S. 
Corwin, The “Higher Law” Background of American Constitutional Law (pt. 3), 42 HARV. L. 
REV. 365, 370 (1929) (“‘Common right and reason’ is, in short, something fundamental, 
something permanent; it is higher law.”); Gedicks, supra note 6, at 600, 602-11. 
58.  Bonham’s Case, 77 Eng. Rep. at 652, 8 Co. Rep. at 118a (citation omitted). 
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Scholars have long debated Coke’s meaning.59 Some argue that Coke’s 
assertion that “the common law will controul [the Act]” means that courts 
should construe statutes in light of common law principles and reject 
interpretations that would abrogate those principles, on the presumption that 
the legislature likely did not intend to do so—a strong version of the later 
maxim that statutes in derogation of the common law should be narrowly 
construed. Others maintain that “common right and reason” amounted to an 
endorsement of a law higher than ordinary legislation, and that such higher 
law is controlling.60 
The weight of modern scholarship tends toward the former interpretation.61 
As R.H. Helmholz explains: “[I]f one assumed . . . that the legislator had not 
in fact intended to stray from [natural law principles], then a decision in the 
case could be made in accordance with a reading of the statute that allowed 
natural justice to be done. That is what happened in Bonham’s Case.”62 To be 
sure, Coke’s use of the word “void” has the ring of judicial review to modern 
ears, but in context it likely was nothing more than a statement of the 
conclusion that the language of the statute did not govern the case. Under this 
 
59.  See, e.g., GLENN BURGESS, ABSOLUTE MONARCHY AND THE STUART CONSTITUTION 193 
(1996); Grey, Origins of the Unwritten Constitution, supra note 3, at 855; William Michael 
Treanor, Judicial Review Before Marbury, 58 STAN. L. REV. 455, 468 (2005). These disputes 
are not new. See CHARLES GROVE HAINES, THE AMERICAN DOCTRINE OF JUDICIAL 
SUPREMACY 51-53, 72 (1914); R.A. MacKay, Coke—Parliamentary Sovereignty or the Supremacy 
of the Law?, 22 MICH. L. REV. 215 (1924). 
60.  The classic statement is Theodore F.T. Plucknett, Bonham’s Case and Judicial Review,  
40 HARV. L. REV. 30 (1926). Edward Corwin conflated these two interpretations. Corwin, 
supra note 57, at 373 (“At the very least, therefore, we can assert that in Bonham’s Case Coke 
deemed himself to be enforcing a rule of construction of statutes of higher intrinsic validity 
than any act of Parliament as such.”). 
61.  The classic statement is S.E. Thorne, Dr. Bonham’s Case, 54 LAW Q. REV. 543, 548-49 
(1938). See also HAMBURGER, supra note 37, at 622-30 (arguing based on contemporary 
meanings of “void” and “control” that Coke’s holding was one of “equitable interpretation” 
and did not “elevat[e] judicial power”); HULSEBOSCH, supra note 27, at 31 (arguing that, 
“[a]lthough Bonham’s Case was not an early instance of . . . judicial review . . . Coke 
construed a statute so strongly . . . that it has understandably been interpreted as advocating 
something close to judicial review”); R.H. Helmholz, Bonham’s Case, Judicial Review, and 
the Law of Nature, 1 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 325, 339 (2009) (citing Bonham’s Case for the 
proposition that “[j]urists took it for granted . . . that the legislator had wished to act in 
accordance with the principles of natural and divine law”). 
62.  Helmholz, supra note 61, at 339 (citation omitted); accord HAMBURGER, supra note 37, at  
622-30; Charles M. Gray, Bonham’s Case Reviewed, 116 PROC. AM. PHIL. SOC’Y 35, 36 (1972) 
(arguing that an earlier manuscript based on Coke’s oral statements from the bench strongly 
suggests that the holding was based on statutory interpretation); Thorne, supra note 61, at 
548-49. 
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reading, Bonham’s Case is not an example of “judicial review” but of equitable 
interpretation, and it is entirely consistent with parliamentary supremacy. 
Indeed, it is not much different from Blackstone’s later view that “[w]here 
some collateral matter arises out of the general words, and happens to be 
unreasonable; there the judges are, in decency, to conclude that this 
consequence was not foreseen by the Parliament.”63 It is unsurprising that 
Blackstone “rejected the broad interpretation of Bonham’s Case in favor of the 
narrow one: [it] merely involved statutory construction, not judicial review.”64 
Though the American Founders who championed a robust judicial review 
often cited Bonham’s Case as precedent,65 Larry Kramer convincingly argues 
that most of the Founders believed Bonham’s Case was about statutory 
construction.66 
Furthermore, the position that courts should read statutes narrowly to 
conform to the common law is a far cry from an assertion that courts may 
strike down positive law because it does not conform to a universal higher law. 
Coke expressly says that the form of law that would “controul” and “adjudge 
such Act” of Parliament is “the common law.” This was not a “higher law” or 
“the law of nature,” but the law of the land that the common law courts, 
including the House of Lords in its judicial capacity, had a duty to apply. Coke 
knew the difference between “the law of nature” and the common law. He 
acknowledged that the law of nature was, along with the common law, one 
source of law in England,67 but based on his practice he apparently thought the 
“law of nature” was relevant only where positive law was silent: he relied on it 
in only one significant case where there was no English positive law on point.68 
 
63.  1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *91. 
64.  HULSEBOSCH, supra note 27, at 40 (citing 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *54). 
65.  Hulsebosch, supra note 24, at 440. 
66.  LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL 
REVIEW 19-22 (2004). 
67.  1 COKE, supra note 27, at 11b (stating that “[t]here be divers lawes within the realme of 
England,” the third being the “law of nature” and the fourth being “the common law of 
England sometime called Lex terrae, intended by our author in this and the like places”). 
68.  Calvin’s Case, (1608) 77 Eng. Rep. 377 (K.B.) 391-94; 7 Co. Rep. 1a, 14a-b (holding that a 
person born in Scotland after King James IV of Scotland acceded to the throne of England 
owed his allegiance under the “law of nature” to James and was therefore a natural-born 
subject of England, despite the fact that the two kingdoms had not yet been merged in 
union). Coke stated repeatedly that there were no common law precedents on point (though 
there was of course law on the subject of aliens and natural-born subjects of the King). See 
id. at 381, 7 Co. Rep. at 4 a (“I find a mere stranger in this case . . . . In a word, this little plea 
is a great stranger to the laws of England . . . .”); id. at 399, 7 Co. Rep. at 18 b (“[F]or want 
of an express text of law . . . and of examples and precedents in like cases (as was objected by 
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In sum, Coke and other early Stuart common lawyers worked to subject the 
King to law, which required the Crown to coordinate governance involving 
deprivations of rights with Parliament and the common law courts.69 The 
Magna Charta requirement that subjects be deprived of rights only by the law 
of the land was understood to prohibit the Crown from depriving persons of 
rights without the authority of standing law, and the court maintained the 
jurisdiction to review the King’s authority to do so. This was early modern due 
process of law, a precursor to modern separation of powers. 
B. Pre-Revolutionary English Disputes About Parliament’s Power 
Parliament emerged from the civil wars of the seventeenth century 
supreme, although eighteenth-century politicians and lawyers from time to 
time asserted that one house acting alone—or even the King-in-Parliament—
was subject to the English constitution.70 Parliament increasingly acted as a 
legislative body, and the common law gradually became a set of default rules 
rather than the bedrock of legality.71 Although courts regularly reviewed the 
acts of executive officials and corporate bodies—including colonial 
 
some) we are driven to determine the question by natural reason . . . .”). But see KEECHANG 
KIM, ALIENS IN MEDIEVAL LAW: THE ORIGINS OF MODERN CITIZENSHIP 178-81 (2000) 
(arguing that Coke, Francis Bacon, Ellesmere and others deliberately distanced themselves 
from the rationale established by Sir John Fortescue that allegiance was based on the 
relationship created between the ruler and subject by positive law, not by a natural 
relationship of allegiance). For general background on the case, see Hulsebosch, supra note 
24, at 447-49, 454-58. 
69.  See HULSEBOSCH, supra note 27, at 34 (“Today the rule of law primarily defines the boundary 
between the public and the private, but early modern Britons invoked it as a defense when 
one part of the social order overreached, vertically across social lines or horizontally across 
space, to trespass on the liberties of another.”); see also W.B. GWYN, THE MEANING OF THE 
SEPARATION OF POWERS: AN ANALYSIS OF THE DOCTRINE FROM ITS ORIGIN TO THE ADOPTION 
OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 35-36 (1965) (arguing that by the mid-seventeenth 
century a consensus had emerged that the rule of law demanded parliamentary approval of 
the King’s actions); M. Elizabeth Magill, The Real Separation in Separation of Powers Law, 86 
VA. L. REV. 1127, 1191 (2000) (arguing that “this rule-of-law rationale” for the separation of 
powers “is concerned with the conflict of interest presented when a single entity can both 
make the rules and apply them”); Paul R. Verkuil, Separation of Powers, the Rule of Law and 
the Idea of Independence, 30 WM. & MARY L. REV. 301, 305-06 (1989) (noting that “the rule of 
law rationale for separation of powers . . . has deep historical roots” going back to Coke and 
Locke). 
70.  See J.W. GOUGH, FUNDAMENTAL LAW IN ENGLISH CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 174-91 (1955). 
71.  See DAVID LIEBERMAN, THE PROVINCE OF LEGISLATION DETERMINED: LEGAL THEORY IN 
EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY BRITAIN 13-16 (1989). 
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legislatures—for their repugnance to British law,72 Parliament’s acts were 
subject to no such review. It was the highest court in the land and the final 
expositor of the content of the law of the land. 73 As Blackstone put it, “if the 
parliament will positively enact a thing to be done which is unreasonable, I 
know of no power in the ordinary forms of the constitution, that is vested with 
authority to control it.”74 Citing Coke’s Institutes, Blackstone wrote that “[t]he 
power and jurisdiction of parliament . . . is so transcendent and absolute, that it 
cannot be confined, either for causes or persons, within any bounds.”75 
Even as Parliament gained supremacy, the individual rights of British 
subjects became more thoroughly ensconced in the British constitution. In the 
Petition of Right of 1628, the Bill of Rights of 1689, and the Act of Settlement 
of 1701, Parliament elaborated on the content of English rights and duties, 
including the right of due process of law.76 From the Restoration through the 
Hanoverians, several important common lawyers, including Matthew Hale and 
Chief Justice Holt, insisted that Parliament, too, was limited by the English 
constitution.77 These limits were for the most part strictly institutional in 
nature. As Holt wrote in Ashby v. White, “the people” elected their 
representatives in Parliament with “power and authority to act legislatively, not 
ministerially or judicially.”78 By the last third of the eighteenth century, 
however, few believed that Parliament’s legislative power was limited by the 
constitution.79 Parliament not only had the power to legislate, but it also 
regularly heard appeals from British common law courts and directly 
 
72.  See, e.g., JOSEPH HENRY SMITH, APPEALS TO THE PRIVY COUNCIL FROM THE AMERICAN 
PLANTATIONS 523-25 (1950); Mary Sarah Bilder, The Corporate Origins of Judicial Review,  
116 YALE L.J. 502, 539-41 (2006); Alison Gilbert Olson, Parliament, Empire, and 
Parliamentary Law, 1776, in THREE BRITISH REVOLUTIONS: 1641, 1688, 1776, at 289, 292 
(J.G.A. Pocock ed., 1980). 
73.  The classic study of Parliament’s power as a court is CHARLES HOWARD MCILWAIN, THE 
HIGH COURT OF PARLIAMENT AND ITS SUPREMACY: HISTORICAL ESSAYS ON THE BOUNDARIES 
BETWEEN LEGISLATION AND ADJUDICATION IN ENGLAND (1910). 
74.  1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *91. 
75.  Id. at *160. 
76.  HULSEBOSCH, supra note 27, at 35. 
77.  Id. at 36-37 (discussing Hale); R. v. Paty, (1704) 92 Eng. Rep. 232 (Q.B.) 236; 2 Ld. Raym. 
1105, 1111-12 (describing Holt’s position). 
78.  THE JUDGEMENTS DELIVERED BY THE LORD CHIEF JUSTICE HOLT IN THE CASE OF ASHBY V. 
WHITE AND OTHERS, AND IN THE CASE OF JOHN PATY AND OTHERS 60 (London, Saunders & 
Benning 1837). 
79.  HULSEBOSCH, supra note 27, at 7 (noting “that Parliament as a legislature reigned supreme 
above other sources of constitutional authority at home, and perhaps overseas too”). 
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adjudicated a wide range of legal disputes between British parties,80 and 
adjudicated a number of matters as the sole judge of the law and customs of 
Parliament.81 
As we show in the following Section, in the 1770s only a handful of Whig 
members of Parliament argued that it lacked the power to deprive subjects of 
rights without common law procedures. Across the Atlantic, however, 
American colonists argued that Parliament had violated the law of the land by 
depriving them of local jury trials and of directly depriving them of charter 
rights without providing common law judicial procedures. These due process 
claims often get lost amidst colonial arguments that Parliament lacked any 
authority to levy a disproportionate tax on the colonies because they were not 
represented in that institution, but in light of subsequent developments, these 
arguments anticipate both ways in which due process would be held to apply 
against the legislative branch in the early Republic: to prohibit legislative acts 
that directly deprive specific persons of rights, and to prohibit legislative acts 
that reduce common law court procedures. 
1. The Expulsion and Disqualification of John Wilkes 
In a notorious episode, the House of Commons expelled John Wilkes for 
publishing seditious and obscene libel, and then disqualified him when the 
constituents of Middlesex persisted in reelecting him (four times in all). The 
background to Wilkes’s disqualification is a complicated tale of politics, law, 
and populist propaganda,82 but it need not detain us here. By 1768, the 
Commons agreed that Wilkes had to go, but they disagreed about the proper 
procedure. There were three positions. Some, including Blackstone, then a 
member of the House of Commons, thought that whatever procedure the 
House used would be per se in accordance with the custom and law of 
Parliament—lex parliamenti83—and beyond constitutional reproach. As 
 
80.  3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *411 (noting that the “house of lords [is] the 
dernier resort for the ultimate decision of every civil action”). 
81.  MCILWAIN, supra note 73, at 244-46 (noting that the houses of Parliament acted as the courts 
of first instance on issues of the law and customs of Parliament). 
82.  See generally JOHN BREWER, PARTY IDEOLOGY AND POPULAR POLITICS AT THE ACCESSION OF 
GEORGE III 163-200 (1976) (describing Wilkes’s use of propaganda and publicity); PETER 
D.G. THOMAS, JOHN WILKES: A FRIEND TO LIBERTY 27-108 (1996) (discussing the 
disqualification). 
83.  For a good discussion of lex parliamenti, see JOSH CHAFETZ, DEMOCRACY’S PRIVILEGED FEW: 
LEGISLATIVE PRIVILEGE AND DEMOCRATIC NORMS IN THE BRITISH AND AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTIONS 27-36 (2007). 
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Blackstone said in a speech to the Commons, “there is no appeal from [the 
House’s] competence to the law of the land. There are cases in which the other 
House is competent: if the House of Lords . . . should determine contrary to 
the law of the land, what is the remedy?”84 His point was that there was no 
external institution with authority to stop a house of Parliament from doing as 
it liked. 
The second position was a bit more moderate. It was represented by 
George Grenville, who, despite being Wilkes’s political adversary, had 
constitutional scruples about the procedures used for expelling him. Like 
Blackstone, Grenville agreed that the House of Commons was competent to 
expel a member but insisted that when it did so, “acting in our judicial 
capacity,” the members should “found [our] judgment” “upon specific facts 
alleged and proved according to the established rules and course of our 
proceedings,”85 i.e., according to lex parliamenti. Grenville thought the 
procedure employed by the House was flawed. The motion to expel him did 
not specify any charges, which meant that he could be stripped of his seat in 
the Commons based on the aggregate of votes of various members based on 
different theories, which was contrary “to the usage and law of parliament, to 
the practice of any other court of justice in the kingdom, [and] to the 
unalterable principles of natural equity”86 by lumping a number of distinct 
allegations against Wilkes into one charge, which at common law would have 
been separated into multiple charges and adjudged separately.87 In addition, 
the House had already expelled Wilkes, years before, for one of the seditious 
libels listed in the charge; the common law would have protected Wilkes from 
double jeopardy.88 The sum total of Grenville’s arguments was that the House 
should not provide less procedural protection for one of its own members than 
the common law courts would provide to a criminal defendant. 
 
84.  3 JOHN PHILLIP REID, CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION: THE 
AUTHORITY TO LEGISLATE 25 (1991) (alteration in original) (quoting Speech of Sir William 
Blackstone, 16 PARL. HIST. ENG. (1770) 802). This argument, which prevailed in the 
Commons, was interpreted in an anonymous letter to the Duke of Grafton as nothing less 
than a claim by the Commons to “an exclusive jurisdiction without appeal in all matters of 
election.” Id. 
85.  16 PARL. HIST. ENG. (1768) 561. 
86.  Id. at 550. 
87.  Id. at 553-54. 
88.  Id. at 555-56 (“There is not a rule more sacred in the jurisprudence of this county, than that a 
man once acquitted or condemned, shall not be tried or punished again by the same 
judicature for the same offence.”). 
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Grenville’s arguments failed, and the House expelled Wilkes on the basis of 
a complicated set of allegations. Middlesex promptly reelected him. He was 
expelled again, and again reelected. The House then voted to permanently 
disqualify him from membership.89 The debate over disqualification only 
intensified Grenville’s concerns. When houses of Parliament act as “courts of 
judicature,” they “only have the power of declaring” existing “restraints,” and 
“in the use of that [judicial] power are bound by the law as it stands at the time 
of making that declaration.”90 Otherwise, a “resolution of the House” could 
become “the law of the land by virtue of its own authority only.” Instead, the 
opposition contended, the House when acting as a court of judicature was 
bound by the law of the land as embodied by “like restraints adjudged in other 
cases by all the courts of law; and confirmed by usage.”91 This was not quite a 
full-throated argument that the House was bound to operate according to the 
law of the land when it sat as a court, but it came close. 
Forty-seven members of the House of Lords took the third position. They 
protested the Commons’ disqualification of Wilkes, “in defense of the law of 
the land”: 
[W]e conceive ourselves called upon to give that proposition the 
strongest negative; for, if admitted, the law of the land (by which all 
courts of judicature, without exception, are equally bound to proceed) 
is at once overturned and resolved into the will and pleasure of a 
majority of one House of Parliament, who, in assuming it, assume a 
power to over-rule at pleasure the fundamental right of election, which 
the constitution has placed in other hands, those of their constituents.92 
Blackstone’s position won the day. There was no institutional check on the 
Commons’ power to discipline members, and therefore as a practical matter it 
 
89.  See REID, supra note 84, at 22. 
90.  16 PARL. HIST. ENG. (1768) 589-90. 
91.  Id. at 590. These constitutional arguments were unsurprisingly mixed with arguments that 
might today be considered to touch matters of political expediency: 
That the House of Commons has the right, incidental to its judicature, of 
declaring what incapacities are legal. But it behoves the House to take care, that, 
instead of exercising the powers which it has, it assume not those which it has 
not; that from the temperate and judicious use of a legal power, . . . it swell not to 
the utmost pitch of extravagance and despotism, and make the law, under 
pretence of declaring it. 
Id. at 591. 
92.  REID, supra note 84, at 25-26 (alteration in original) (quoting Protest of the Lords,  
31 January 1770, 16 PARL. HIST. ENG. (1770) 821). 
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could proceed however it liked. At the same time, however, a number of the 
members of both houses articulated the view that each house, when sitting as a 
court, was obligated to proceed according to the law of the land. This notion 
soon expanded to cover cases where Parliament as a whole acted to deprive a 
specific party of its statutory or charter rights. Wilkes came to be a symbol of 
the democratic aspirations of the age, with “Wilkes and Liberty” the rallying 
cry in Boston as well as in London. 
2. The East India Company Debates 
In the early 1770s, the East India Company was in a state of crisis.93 By late 
1772, “[t]he [government’s] attempt to co-operate with the Company in its 
own reform broke down,”94 and Parliament passed a series of bills, culminating 
in the Regulating Act of 1773, which unilaterally amended the company’s 
charter and had the effect of delegating power over company affairs to the 
Crown.95 The first of these, the Restraining Bill, was passed in late 1772 to 
prevent the company from sending new commissioners to India for a period of 
six months.96 The bill was a minor imposition on the company’s charter 
compared to the subsequent Regulating Act.97 However, as a precedent for and 
a barometer of the positions that various factions in Parliament would take in 
the broader debates, the battle over the Restraining Bill was, as Edmund Burke 
later observed, “[i]n Truth, the Battle for power”98 over Parliament’s authority 
to alter the company charter.99 
In addition to expressing concerns about increasing the Crown’s influence, 
the company and its supporters in Parliament argued that the Restraining Bill 
violated the law of the land by depriving the company of charter rights without 
due process of law. The bill “did not state any delinquency in the Company, 
though it invaded their chartered rights, the right of managing their own 
 
93.  The crisis had a number of causes, some due to mismanagement (and downright 
malfeasance) and some due to external forces. See H.V. BOWEN, REVENUE AND REFORM: THE 
INDIAN PROBLEM IN BRITISH POLITICS 1757-1773, at 119-32 (1991); LUCY S. SUTHERLAND, THE 
EAST INDIA COMPANY IN EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY POLITICS 218-35 (1952). 
94.  SUTHERLAND, supra note 93, at 230. 
95.  Tea Act, 1773, 13 Geo. 3, c. 44; East India Company Act, 1773, 13 Geo. 3, c. 63-64. 
96.  Restraining Bill, 1772, 13 Geo. 3, c. 9; see BOWEN, supra note 93, at 148-50. 
97.  1773, 13 Geo. 3, c. 63; see BOWEN, supra note 93, at 169-86. 
98.  Letter from Edmund Burke to the Marquess of Rockingham (Jan. 7, 10, 1773), in 2 THE 
CORRESPONDENCE OF EDMUND BURKE 403 (Lucy S. Sutherland ed., 1960); see also BOWEN, 
supra note 93, at 149-50 (citing Burke’s letter). 
99.  17 PARL. HIST. ENG. (1772) 673 (Burke’s speech decrying the Restraining Bill). 
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affairs within the bounds of law and their charter,”100 which “the continuation 
thereof, have been purchased by their predecessors from the public for a 
valuable consideration, and repeatedly confirmed by several acts of 
parliament.”101 The company’s counsel argued that it was “the happiness of 
this country to be governed by fixed and known laws, not by ex post facto acts 
passed upon the spur of a particular occasion.”102 
A small group in the House of Lords entered a protest against the bill 
because it “[took] away from a great body corporate, and from several free 
subjects of this realm, the exercise of a legal franchise, without any legal cause 
of forfeiture assigned.”103 The “legal rights and capacities” of the company, its 
electors, and its elected supervisors would be “taken away by a mere act of 
arbitrary power, the precedent of which leaves no sort of security to the subject 
for his liberties.”104 They lamented the passage of “temporary occasional and 
partial acts of parliament, which, without any consideration of their conformity 
to the general principles of our law and constitution, are adopted rashly and 
hastily on every petty occasion.”105 Furthermore, they argued, “parliament is as 
much bound, as any individual, to the observance of its own compacts; else it is 
impossible to understand what public faith means, or how public credit can 
subsist.”106 
These arguments were based, fundamentally, on the idea that a unilateral 
revocation of a particular company’s charter rights was akin to a judicial 
decision without an adequate basis in general and prospective law. As John 
Phillip Reid has explained, “The constitutional theory was that the 
government, by granting a charter, vested in a company, colony, or individuals 
certain inviolable privileges and securities of property that, if not immutable, 
were answerable only at common law, not to legislative whim and caprice.”107 
The proper way to amend the charter, opponents argued, was either to obtain 
the company’s consent or to prevail in a common law action for breach of 
charter privileges. These arguments did not prevail, but they were soon 
repeated by American patriots who claimed that violation of their rights under 
 
100.  Id. at 651 (speech of the counsel for the East India Company). 
101.  Id. at 646 (petition of the East India Company). 
102.  Id. at 651 (speech of the counsel for the East India Company). 
103.  Id. at 682 (protest entered by the Duke of Richmond and four other Peers). 
104.  Id. 
105.  Id. at 682-83 (emphasis added). 
106.  Id. at 683. 
107.  4 JOHN PHILLIP REID, CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION: THE 
AUTHORITY OF LAW 31 (1993). 
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colonial charters was contrary to the rights of Englishmen and the law of the 
land, and they would later echo in state due process and federal Contracts 
Clause jurisprudence. These arguments by members of Parliament on a matter 
unrelated to Parliament’s power over the American colonies and colonial 
charters suggest that the American arguments about Parliament’s power to 
alter their charters were not merely arguments about nonrepresentation or the 
scope of the imperial constitution; they were of a piece with British arguments 
about the power of even the supreme judicial and legislative body of the land to 
deprive specific parties of their rights without the procedural and institutional 
protections of the common law. 
C. Revolutionary Arguments That Parliament Violated the Law of the Land 
The American arguments made against British policies in the years 
preceding the Revolution were legal, indeed constitutional, in nature. The 
patriots complained that various acts of Parliament violated rights—such as the 
right of trial by jury and the right against taxation without representation—
that pertained to all Englishmen and were guaranteed specifically to the 
colonists by means of colonial charters. These pre-Revolutionary arguments 
thus formed an important bridge between the Whiggish arguments of the 
Stuart period, which sought to bring royal power into subordination to law, 
and the Whiggish arguments of the American Revolutionaries, which applied 
similar logic to Parliament. By the end of the Revolutionary period, most 
Americans were prepared to reject the Blackstonian model of a legislature that 
was above the law. They instead subjected legislatures to written constitutions, 
which derived authority as the supreme law of the land from ratification by the 
people themselves. 
The question of Parliament’s power to deprive colonists of their rights 
under the law of the land first arose upon passage of a series of acts that 
abridged common law criminal procedures. For instance, the Stamp Act 
authorized trial of violations by vice-admiralty courts, which operated under 
admiralty law, not common law, procedures.108 The Dockyards Act deprived 
colonists of the right to trial by local jurors by removing prosecutions for 
certain crimes to England.109 Both statutes were intended to circumvent the 
practice of colonial juries who refused to convict patriots for acts of rebellion or 
for refusal to pay taxes popularly regarded as illegitimate. This practice, based 
 
108.  1 JOHN PHILLIP REID, CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION: THE 
AUTHORITY OF RIGHTS 178-79 (1986). 
109.  Id. at 191-92. 
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on the right of trial by a jury “of the vicinage,” had rendered unpopular 
imperial laws unenforceable. Parliament was faced with a choice: either 
abrogate common law procedural protections for Bostonians or accept that the 
imperial writ did not run in Massachusetts.110 These controversies raised a 
question of application of due process to the legislative branch that we have not 
yet encountered: Does an act of Parliament that purports to abrogate the 
procedural protections of customary law violate due process? Or is such an act 
by definition the “law of the land” and hence constitutionally unobjectionable? 
The colonists’ answer to these questions—that Parliament lacks the authority 
to deprive them of core procedural protections—was the seed of what has come 
to be known in the American constitutional tradition as procedural due 
process. 
Passage of the Coercive Acts of 1774 (“Intolerable Acts,” to Americans), 
which asserted parliamentary sovereignty over the American colonies and 
punished Massachusetts for the Boston Tea Party, raised American outrage to 
the boiling point.111 The Boston Port Act closed Boston Harbor to all civilian 
traffic “until it shall sufficiently appear to his Majesty that full satisfaction has 
been made [for the tea] by or on behalf of the inhabitants of the said town of 
Boston” to the East India Company.112 Its advocate, Lord North, did not mince 
words. According to one summary of Lord North’s statement, the Act was to 
“punish Boston, compensate the East India Company, protect the customs 
officers, prevent smuggling, and preserve British trade.”113 Creative lawyers 
(and there were many of them among the Americans) characterized the acts as 
deprivations of rights without adequate forms of judicial procedure—usually a 
notice, a hearing, and a trial by peers. 
The Boston Port Act could be seen as a legislative usurpation of the 
essentially judicial function of resolving a legal dispute between two parties. 
The statute was effectively a judgment against the people of Boston, and it 
delegated the task of determining whether the town had made “full 
satisfaction” for the cost of the destroyed tea to “his Majesty.” Thus, liability 
was determined by Parliament and damages by the executive, when it should 
have been handled (according to the Americans) as a tort suit, with liability 
and damages determined by a jury. The First Continental Congress put it this 
way: 
 
110.  See 4 REID, supra note 107, at 13. 
111.  Id. at 9-12, 41-42. 
112.  Id. at 9 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Boston Port Act, 1774, 14 Geo. 3, c. 19). 
113.  Id. at 10. 
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Even supposing a trespass was thereby committed, and the Proprietors 
of the tea entitled to damages.—The Courts of Law were open, and 
Judges appointed by the Crown presided in them.—The East India 
Company however did not think proper to commence any suits, nor did 
they even demand satisfaction, either from individuals or from the 
community in general. The Ministry, it seems, officiously made the case 
their own, and the great Council of the nation descended to 
intermeddle with a dispute about private property.114 
As Thomas Jefferson put the point in his A Summary View of the Rights of 
British America: “[W]ithout calling for a party accused, without asking a proof, 
without attempting a distinction between the guilty and the innocent, the 
whole of that antient and wealthy town is in a moment reduced from opulence 
to beggary.”115 
Parliament compounded the colonists’ grievances by adopting the 
Massachusetts Acts, which changed the terms of the Massachusetts Charter to 
give the Crown more direct control.116 Among other things, it replaced 
Massachusetts’s elected council with one appointed by the Crown, gave 
authority to the Crown-appointed Governor to appoint most judges, and gave 
Governor-appointed sheriffs the authority to appoint grand and petit juries.117 
These measures raised the same constitutional questions raised by acts 
regulating the East India Company, but the Massachusetts Act was worse: 
colonials regarded the Massachusetts Charter as a binding contract. They had 
braved the American wilderness to form a British society there in reliance on 
the assurance that they would be accorded the rights of self-government listed 
in the charter. The First Continental Congress assailed the Act as a deprivation 
of the rights of Massachusetts against the law of the land: “Without incurring 
or being charged with a forfeiture of their rights, without being heard, without 
being tried, without law, and without justice, by an Act of Parliament, their 
 
114.  Address to the People of Great Britain (Oct. 21, 1774), in 1 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL 
CONGRESS, 1774-1789, at 81, 86 (Worthington Chauncey Ford ed., 1904). 
115.  Thomas Jefferson, A Summary View of the Rights of British America, in THOMAS JEFFERSON: 
WRITINGS 105, 113 (Merrill D. Peterson ed., 1984). 
116.  See 4 REID, supra note 107, at 12-23. In addition to the Massachusetts Government Act, 1774, 
14 Geo. 3, c. 45, Parliament adopted the Administration of Justice Act, 1774, 14 Geo. 3, c. 39, 
which temporarily allowed British officers alleged to have violated the law in Massachusetts 
to be tried in Britain, and the Quartering Act, 1774, 14 Geo. 3, c. 54, which provided for the 
quartering of British troops in colonial barns and other uninhabited buildings. See 4 REID, 
supra note 107, at 17-23. 
117.  4 REID, supra note 107, at 16.  
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charter is destroyed, their liberties violated, their constitution and form of 
government changed.”118 
The Intolerable Acts prompted the First Continental Congress to send a 
petition of constitutional grievances to the Crown.119 This was essentially a list 
of ancient rights and liberties held by all Englishmen and guaranteed to the 
colonists by charter, but violated by the recent parliamentary acts, including 
the right to trial by jury, the right to offer a defense, the right of the consent of 
the governed to legislation regulating their affairs, and the rights of property 
and taxation only with representation.120 In short, “we claim all the benefits 
secured to the subject by the English constitution.”121 And in words that closely 
resembled Jefferson’s complaint about the Coercive Acts, the petition asserted 
that English history lacked a “single instance of men being condemned to 
suffer for imputed crimes, unheard, unquestioned, and without even the 
specious formality of a trial; and that too by laws made expres[s]ly for the 
purpose, and which had no existence at the time of the fact committed.”122 
Even some prominent British figures agreed with the general thrust of these 
complaints. Three years later, in the ashes of the Revolutionary War, William 
Pitt, the Earl of Chatham, chided the House of Lords: 
You condemned a whole province without hearing, without even 
demanding satisfaction for the injury sustained. . . . [Y]ou deprived 
them, my Lords, of their most valuable privileges of the unalienable 
birth right of an Englishman, the trial by Jury; the trial of the vicinage, 
of Judges acquainted with the parts, the offence, the provocation, and 
the measure of punishment.123 
In addition to their well-known complaints about the scope of Parliament’s 
power under the imperial constitution to regulate colonial affairs, and their 
arguments against the constitutionality of taxation without representation in 
the House of Commons, American colonists couched their grievances against 
 
118.  Address to the People of Great Britain, supra note 114, at 87. 
119.  Sullivan’s Draught Resolves and Declarations (Oct. 14, 1774), in 1 JOURNALS OF THE 
CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, supra note 114, at 63, 73. 
120.  Address to the People of Great Britain, supra note 114, at 81-83. 
121.  Id. at 83. 
122.  Id. at 86. According to the First Continental Congress, the Boston Port Act reduced Boston 
“to the necessity of gaining subsistence from charity, till they should submit to pass under 
the yoke, and consent to become slaves, by confessing the omnipotence of Parliament, and 
acquiescing in whatever disposition they might think proper to make of their lives and 
property.” Id. 
123.  4 REID, supra note 107, at 33 (quoting Lord Chatham). 
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Parliament’s interference in their chartered rights in the terms of the English 
right of due process of law. Their complaint was two-fold, and it foreshadowed 
the two doctrines of due process that apply to the legislature in American 
constitutional law. First, the colonists argued that Parliament lacked the 
constitutional authority to alter certain basic procedural protections of the 
common law. Second, the colonists argued that Parliament, no less than  
the Crown, lacked the power to unilaterally alter their charter rights without 
the application of law in the course of a fair hearing. The problem with the 
Boston Port Act and Massachusetts Government Act was that, as the Lords 
who protested the East India Acts put it, they “[took] away from a great body 
corporate, and from several free subjects of this realm, the exercise of a legal 
franchise, without any legal cause of forfeiture assigned”124 through 
“temporary occasional and partial acts of parliament.”125 In other words, due 
process did not permit Parliament to deprive specific parties of their 
established property rights by special decree. 
D. Early State Experiments with Legislative Supremacy 
In the heady flush of Revolutionary republicanism, Americans flirted with 
the idea that governmental structure should be simple, allowing the 
unmediated will of the people to be transmuted into public policy.126 The 
dominant theory of government during and after the war regarded  
the legislatures, and particularly the lower houses, as the most representative 
voice of the people. Accordingly, though they to some extent separated the 
executive and judicial powers from the legislature, early state constitutions 
provided few institutional checks on legislative power. And the constitutions 
themselves were acts of ordinary legislation that provided a framework for 
government, which could themselves be amended by ordinary legislation. 
Even at the time, this experiment with legislative supremacy won critics. 
Thomas Jefferson, commenting on the Virginia Constitution of 1776, which 
had been adopted as ordinary legislation and therefore could be amended by 
ordinary legislation, complained that the lack of separation of powers 
undermined liberty and legality: 
The judiciary and executive members were left dependent on the 
legislative, for their subsistence in office, and some of them for their 
 
124.  17 PARL. HIST. ENG. (1772) 682. 
125.  Id. at 682-83. 
126.  See HERBERT J. STORING, WHAT THE ANTI-FEDERALISTS WERE FOR 53-63 (1981). 
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continuance in it. If therefore the legislature assumes executive and 
judiciary powers, no opposition is likely to be made; nor, if made, can it 
be effectual: because in that case they may put their proceedings into 
the form of an act of assembly, which will render them obligatory on 
the other branches. They have accordingly, in many instances, decided 
rights which should have been left to judiciary controversy . . . .127 
Jefferson asserted that placing these powers “in the same hands is precisely the 
definition of despotic government.”128 
By the mid-1780s, the 1776 belief that a government could rest upon the 
freely exercised republican virtues of the people through a more or less direct 
democracy gradually yielded to calls for a more robust separation of 
powers129—in no small part because of the exercise by state legislatures of 
powers that many believed should be reserved to an independent judiciary. 
Moreover, the perception that faction-ridden, unchecked state legislatures 
disregarded “public and personal liberty” and “private rights” in the service of 
“an interested and overbearing majority”130 led many Americans to recognize 
that legislatures, no less than executive officials, must be controlled by the force 
of law. Beginning with the Massachusetts Constitution of 1780, Americans 
began to endorse basic frameworks of government established by an act of 
popular sovereignty, such as a constitutional convention elected by the 
 
127.  THOMAS JEFFERSON, NOTES ON THE STATE OF VIRGINIA 161 (Trenton, N.J., Wilson & 
Blackwell 1803). 
128.  Id. at 160; see also GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776-1787, 
at 454 (2d ed. 1998) (“‘When the assembly leave the great business of the state, and take up 
private business, or interfere in disputes between contending parties . . . they are very liable 
to fall into mistakes, make wrong decisions, and so lose that respect which is due to them, as 
the Legislature of the State.’” (quoting A. Freeman, PA. PACKET & DAILY ADVERTISER, Sept. 
2, 1786, at 7)). 
129.  See FORREST MCDONALD, NOVUS ORDO SECLORUM: THE INTELLECTUAL ORIGINS OF THE 
CONSTITUTION 178-79 (1985) (“The lesson [from Shay’s Rebellion and other social unrest 
following the Revolution] was that the American public did not possess a sufficient stock of 
virtue to sustain a republic, as republics had traditionally been conceived.”); id. at 202; 
WOOD, supra note 128, at 446-53; id. at 432 (“‘At the commencement of the revolution,’ 
Americans were telling themselves in the eighties, ‘it was supposed that what is called the 
executive part of a government was the only dangerous part; but we now see that quite as 
much mischief, if not more, may be done, and as much arbitrary conduct acted, by a 
legislature.’” (quoting Thomas Paine, Number V. On the Affairs of the State, PA. PACKET & 
DAILY ADVERTISER, Sept. 21, 1786, at 9)). 
130.  THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 77 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). 
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people.131 Written constitutions thus came to be superior to mere legislation as 
a more direct exercise of sovereignty by the people themselves. Two central 
features of 1780s constitutional reform were the replacement of legislative 
supremacy with a more definite separation of legislative, executive, and judicial 
powers, and the adoption of structural guarantees of judicial independence 
such as life tenure and stable (and sufficient) pay. Enhancing the constitutional 
independence of courts had a clear implication for the meaning of “law,” and 
hence of “law of the land” and “due process of law.” Just as Coke had used due 
process to prevent the Crown from exercising legislative or judicial functions, 
the new American constitutions sought to prevent legislatures from exercising 
executive and judicial functions. 
Furthermore, the majority of state constitutions expressly provided that the 
government could deprive persons of rights only by the law of the land or a 
judgment of their peers. By 1780, all but two states (Connecticut and Rhode 
Island) had adopted a written constitution,132 and most of them included a bill 
of rights;133 all but two of these (New Jersey and Georgia) adopted law-of-the-
land provisions.134 Four states—New York, Delaware, Maryland, and New 
Jersey—expressly incorporated the English common law, along with those 
statutes of Parliament that had been applied by colonial courts, into their 
constitutions.135 Additionally, though neither Connecticut nor Rhode Island 
adopted an express constitution, both states retained their charters, and thus 
maintained life, liberty, and property by the standards of the common law.136  
During this period there may have been nothing that so undermined faith 
in legislatures as a guardian of popular liberty as legislative acts that abrogated 
the common law right to jury trial. According to custom, disputes for more 
than forty shillings fell under the jurisdiction of a common law court and 
almost always entailed factual determination by a twelve-member jury; smaller 
 
131.  See, e.g., THE POPULAR SOURCES OF POLITICAL AUTHORITY: DOCUMENTS ON THE 
MASSACHUSETTS CONSTITUTION OF 1780, at 19-23 (Oscar Handlin & Mary Handlin eds., 
1966). 
132.  WILLI PAUL ADAMS, THE FIRST AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONS: REPUBLICAN IDEOLOGY AND THE 
MAKING OF THE STATE CONSTITUTIONS IN THE REVOLUTIONARY ERA 3-4 (Rita Kimber & 
Robert Kimber trans., Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., expanded ed. 2001) (1980). 
133.   Id. at 299. 
134.  Williams, supra note 7, at 437. 
135.  See ADAMS, supra note 132, at 4; MCDONALD, supra note 129, at 153. 
136.  See Charter of Connecticut—1662, reprinted in 1 FRANCIS NEWTON THORPE, THE FEDERAL 
AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS: COLONIAL CHARTERS, AND OTHER ORGANIC LAWS OF THE 
STATES, TERRITORIES, AND COLONIES NOW OR HERETOFORE FORMING THE UNITED STATES 
OF AMERICA 529 (1909); Rhode Island Charter—1663, reprinted in 6 THORPE, supra, at 3211. 
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disputes typically were under the jurisdiction of a justice of the peace.137 State 
legislatures, however, occasionally passed statutes either dispensing with jury 
trial in certain kinds of actions, or raising the forty-shilling jurisdictional floor. 
This posed the question whether a statute could violate the “law of the land.” 
As we explain below, some early courts refused to enforce these statutes. 
Because courts at this time did not typically publish their opinions, we are left 
to guess their ultimate reasoning, but they were likely based on the idea that 
the jury trial is an essential feature of the law of the land, protected since 
Magna Charta. Courts also were reluctant to enforce ex post facto laws, or to 
interpret statutes to operate retrospectively. A South Carolina court, for 
example, declined to convict a recent immigrant of importing slaves when he 
had begun his transatlantic voyage before the prohibition had been enacted.138 
These decisions fell short of declaring the laws unconstitutional, however; 
instead, the courts engaged in equitable interpretation to construe statutes to 
avoid abrogating basic due process norms. 
Likewise, courts invalidated attempts by the executive to enforce laws in a 
way that would have denied the defendant the benefits of the law of the land. 
For instance, a Maryland court prohibited the executive from depriving a 
woman of her liberty as a result of her parent’s suspect marriage (one of them 
had allegedly been a slave) in the absence of a jury determination of the fact.139 
Principally, however, it was legislative—not executive—acts abrogating the trial 
by jury that attracted the most attention during the decade of constitution-
making. 
1. Isaac Austin’s Case 
Pennsylvania’s Constitution of 1776 was regarded as the most democratic in 
the nation, with the fewest checks on popular enthusiasm.140 Most strikingly, it 
vested the “Supreme Legislative Power” in a unicameral legislature, the House 
of Representatives, whose members served one-year terms and were elected by 
all taxpayers and sons of freeholders, with no upper house to provide a 
check.141 The constitution provided for no supreme judicial body,142 and judges 
 
137.  HAMBURGER, supra note 37, at 410. 
138.  See Ham v. McClaws, 1 S.C.L. (1 Bay) 93, 97-98 (1789). 
139.  See Butler v. Craig, 2 H. & McH. 214 (Md. 1787). 
140.  ADAMS, supra note 132, at 75-76. 
141.  PA. CONST. of 1776, § 24, reprinted in 5 THORPE, supra note 136, at 3081, 3088. 
142.  Id. 
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were allowed terms of only seven years.143 In lieu of a genuinely independent 
judiciary, the constitution created a Council of Censors, elected every seven 
years, to “enquire whether the constitution ha[d] been preserved inviolate in 
every part; and whether the legislative and executive branches of government 
have performed their duty as guardians of the people, or assumed to 
themselves, or exercised other or greater powers than they are [e]ntitled to by 
the constitution.”144 The Council was given the power to call a constitutional 
convention and “to recommend to the legislature the repealing [of] such laws 
as appear to them to have been enacted contrary to the principles of the 
constitution.”145 
The Council sat for the first time from 1783 to 1784,146 and identified a 
number of legislative acts that violated the constitution. One of these was a 
1784 “Act To Vest in Isaac Austin a Certain Messuage, Wharf, Ferry and Ferry 
Landing, Situated on the Northeastern Side of Mulberry Street, at the 
Easternmost Extremity Thereof, in the City of Philadelphia, Late the Property 
of William Austin, Attainted of High Treason.”147 At the time the act was 
passed, Austin was involved in a lawsuit over ownership of this property. The 
statute was an attempt to resolve this dispute legislatively, rather than through 
the course of law. 
According to the Censors, the “flagrant . . . infringement of the sacred 
rights of a citizen to trial by jury, and so manifest, and withal so wanton a 
violation of the constitution of this commonwealth, calls for the severest 
censure of the people and of this council.”148 The Council recommended 
repealing the act as exceeding the legislature’s constitutional power to redress 
grievances,149 and as a violation of the jury trial clause in the state bill of 
 
143.  Id. § 23, reprinted in 5 THORPE, supra note 136, at 3081, 3088. 
144.  Id. § 47, reprinted in 5 THORPE, supra note 136, at 3081, 3091. 
145.  Id., reprinted in 5 THORPE, supra note 136, at 3081, 3092. On the general history of the 
Council, see Lewis H. Meader, The Council of Censors, 22 PA. MAG. HIST. & BIOGRAPHY 265 
(1898). 
146.  A record of the Council’s decisions is contained in THE PROCEEDINGS RELATIVE TO CALLING 
THE CONVENTIONS OF 1776 AND 1790: THE MINUTES OF THE CONVENTION THAT FORMED THE 
PRESENT CONSTITUTION OF PENNSYLVANIA, TOGETHER WITH THE CHARTER TO WILLIAM 
PENN, THE CONSTITUTIONS OF 1776 AND 1790, AND A VIEW OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE 
CONVENTION OF 1776, AND THE COUNCIL OF CENSORS, pt. III (Harrisburg, Pa., John S. 
Wiestling 1825) [hereinafter PROCEEDINGS]. 
147.  Id. at 87; Chapter MCIII (Aug. 6, 1784), reprinted in 11 THE STATUTES AT LARGE OF 
PENNSYLVANIA FROM 1682-1801, at 352 (James T. Mitchell & Henry Flanders eds., 1906). 
148.  PROCEEDINGS, supra note 146, at 88. 
149.  Id. at 92. It is not entirely clear that this is about the same legislative act, for the Council 
dates this as April 10, 1781. It is unclear whether this was the date of Austin’s petition, of the 
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rights.150 A year later, “convinced of their error,” the House passed an act to 
repeal the special bill and return the parties to the status quo ante.151 The repeal 
act stated that, “had not the act aforesaid been passed,” Baker’s suit against 
Austin “might have been tried by due course of law.”152 It formally accepted the 
Council’s constitutional claim, at least with respect to the trial-by-jury 
guarantee. In a much later suit brought by Austin to recover the same estate, 
the state supreme court, in dicta, agreed that the 1784 statute vesting the land 
in Austin had been a violation of the state constitution.153 In short, every 
branch of the Pennsylvania government concluded that the special and 
retrospective act that deprived Baker of his day in court by vesting disputed 
property in Austin was beyond the legislature’s constitutional power—even 
under what was perhaps the most majoritarian of the early state constitutions. 
2. Holmes v. Walton 
In 1778 the New Jersey General Assembly passed a law allowing “any 
person or persons whomsoever to seize and secure provisions, goods, wares 
and merchandize” carried from territory held by the British to New Jersey.154 
They could seek title to the goods, regardless of their value, according to a 1785 
statute that gave jurisdiction for small claims to a justice of the peace and a jury 
of six, with no right of appeal.155 
 
“report[] of the committee[] of grievances,” id. at 90, or of an act of the legislature prior to 
the 1784 act. 
150.  Id. at 87; see PA. CONST. of 1776, art. XI, reprinted in 5 THORPE, supra note 136, at 3081, 3083 
(“[I]n controversies respecting property, and in suits between man and man, the parties 
have a right to trial by jury, which ought to be held sacred.”). 
151.  Chapter MCXXXIV, An Act To Repeal an Act of Assembly, Entitled “An Act To Vest in 
Isaac Austin a Certain Messuage, Wharf, Ferry and Ferry Landing, Situate on the North 
Side of Mulberry Street, at the Easternmost Extremity Thereof, in the City of Philadelphia, 
Late the Property of William Austin, Attainted of High Treason,” and To Restore the 
Possession of the Real Estate Therein Mentioned to George Adam Baker (Feb. 18, 1785), 
reprinted in 11 THE STATUTES AT LARGE OF PENNSYLVANIA FROM 1682-1801, supra note 147, at 
441, 441-44. 
152.  Id. at 442. 
153.  Austin v. Trs. of the Univ. of Pa., 1 Yeates 260, 261 (Pa. 1793). 
154.  Austin Scott, Holmes vs. Walton: The New Jersey Precedent: A Chapter in the History of 
Judicial Power and Unconstitutional Legislation, 4 AM. HIST. REV. 456, 456 (1899). 
155.  For a full overview of the facts and procedural history of the case, see HAMBURGER, supra 
note 37, at 407-22. The classic studies of the case are 2 CROSSKEY, supra note 5, at 948-52; 
Louis B. Boudin, Precedents for the Judicial Power: Holmes v. Walton and Brattle v. Hinckley, 
3 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 173 (1929); and Scott, supra note 154. 
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In Holmes v. Walton,156 the petitioner argued that the abrogation of a 
twelve-person jury was “contrary to Law,” “contrary to the constitution of New 
Jersey,” and “contrary to the Constitution, practices, and Laws of the Land.”157 
The New Jersey Constitution did not have a law-of-the-land clause, but it did 
have a clause incorporating English common law and a clause providing for 
trial by a jury of an unspecified number of members.158 The New Jersey 
Supreme Court invalidated the statute without a written opinion. While it is 
impossible to know the court’s specific reasoning, the court must have 
concluded that the legislature was prohibited by law—either by the 
constitution, common law, or both—from abrogating the customary right to 
trial by a twelve-member jury.159 It must have been a holding that the 
legislature did not have free rein to make laws that would infringe traditional 
rights of due process. 
3. Trevett v. Weeden 
Nearly a decade later in 1786, in the midst of nation-wide inflation and 
devaluation of paper money,160 the Rhode Island legislature passed a series of 
 
156.  There probably was no written opinion in Holmes v. Walton. Scott, supra note 154, at 459. 
The case was first recounted by the New Jersey Supreme Court in an 1802 case raising a 
constitutional question about when a state official had vacated a prior position before taking 
legislative office. See State v. Parkhurst, 9 N.J.L. 427, 444 (1802). 
157.  Wayne D. Moore, Written and Unwritten Constitutional Law in the Founding Period: The Early 
New Jersey Cases, 7 CONST. COMMENT. 341, 352 (1990) (quoting N.J. Archives, Envelope No. 
18354). 
158.  N.J. CONST. of 1776, art. XXII, reprinted in 5 THORPE, supra note 136, at 2594, 2598 (“That 
the common law of England, as well as so much of the statute law, as have been heretofore 
practised in this Colony, shall still remain in force, until they shall be altered by a future law 
of the Legislature; such parts only excepted as are repugnant to the rights and privileges 
contained in this Charter; and that the inestimable right of trial by jury shall remain 
confirmed as a part of the law of this Colony, without repeal, forever.”). 
159.  Scott, supra note 154, at 459-60; see also Moore, supra note 157, at 352 (citing N.J. Archives, 
Envelope No. 18354). New Jersey’s history with invalid six-person-jury statutes may have 
played into the court’s opinion. Before the Revolution, the Crown’s Privy Council had 
likewise invalidated another New Jersey statute, which had attempted to increase the 
jurisdiction of the justice of the peace and an optional six-person jury from civil suits under 
six pounds to those under ten pounds, thereby decreasing the common law jurisdiction of 
the traditional twelve-person jury for small claims. The Privy Council believed that the 
reduction of the twelve-person jury’s jurisdiction was at best imprudent. HAMBURGER, supra 
note 37, at 411 n.29. 
160.  For general background on the paper-money crisis of 1786, see Janet A. Riesman, Money, 
Credit, and Federalist Political Economy, in BEYOND CONFEDERATION: ORIGINS OF THE 
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acts making paper money legal tender, requiring merchants to accept it at face 
value, and authorizing buyers to bring qui tam actions against merchants that 
rejected it.161 Such actions were to be subject to the jurisdiction of a special 
court, and trial was to be held “without any jury, by a majority of the Judges 
present, according to the Laws of the Land.”162 The act thus presented a bit of a 
puzzle. It purported to comply with the “Laws of the Land,” but it dispensed 
with trial by jury, which was a quintessential feature of that law. 
In Trevett v. Weeden,163 a merchant who was sued under the statute argued 
that the Rhode Island charter was “declaratory of, and fully confirmed to the 
people the Magna Charta, and other fundamental laws of England” and that 
“[t]he revolution hath made no change in this respect, so as to abridge the 
people of the means of securing their lives, liberty, and property.”164 Moreover, 
he argued, the very language of the act was nonsense: by authorizing judges to 
“proceed to trial without any jury according to the laws of the land” the act 
was, by its own terms, “impossible to be executed,” because the law of the land 
necessarily included a right to trial by jury.165 
The court, made up of judges appointed by the legislature for one-year 
terms, agreed. A newspaper reported that 
Judge HOWELL . . . declared . . . the penal law to be repugnant and 
unconstitutional, and therefore gave it as his opinion that the Court 
could not take cognizance of the information.—Judge DEVOL was of the 
same opinion.—Judge TILLINGHAST took notice of the striking 
repugnancy in the expressions of the act, “Without trial by jury, according 
to the laws of the land”—and on that ground gave his judgment the same 
way.—Judge HAZARD voted against taking cognizance.—The Chief 
Justice [Mumford] declared the judgment of the Court, without giving 
his own opinion.166 
 
CONSTITUTION AND AMERICAN NATIONAL IDENTITY 128, 142-56 (Richard Beeman, Stephen 
Botein & Edward C. Carter II eds., 1987). 
161.  See HAMBURGER, supra note 37, at 437. For a full account of the political, economic, and 
personal events surrounding the acts and the subsequent legal challenges to it, see id. at  
435-49. 
162.  Id. at 439 (quoting Act of August 1786). 
163.  Trevett v. Weeden (R.I. 1786), in 1 THE BILL OF RIGHTS: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 417 
(Bernard Schwartz ed., 1971). 
164.  JAMES M. VARNUM, THE CASE, TREVETT AGAINST WEEDEN 15, 23 (Providence, R.I., John 
Carter 1787). 
165.  Id. at 31. 
166.  Correspondence, GAZETTE (Providence, R.I.), Oct. 7, 1786. 
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This remarkable decision suggests how deeply the right to jury trial was 
embedded in the idea of the law of the land, as understood by American 
judges. As Judge Tillinghast’s reported remarks, in particular, indicate, the 
judges were unable to square the idea of the “laws of the land” with the 
statutory abolition of trials by jury; this smacked of a “striking repugnancy.” 
The aftermath of the decision suggests that popular opinion was not of the 
same ilk, at least in democratic Rhode Island. The legislature formally rebuked 
the judges for this decision, and elected all new judges the following spring.167 
4. Bayard v. Singleton 
North Carolina, like most states, systematically confiscated Tory property 
during the Revolution. In 1784, victims of this confiscation, the Bayards, sued 
the subsequent buyer, Singleton, for recovery of their property.168 The 
legislature intervened in favor of the buyer, passing a statute requiring courts 
to dismiss suits against purchasers of forfeited Tory estates “upon the motion 
or affidavit of the defendant.”169 
Some members of the legislature opposed the act on constitutional 
grounds. They advanced three arguments. First, “it is an ex post facto law . . . 
and therefore contrary to the constitution,”170 which had a clause expressly 
prohibiting retrospective criminal laws.171 Second, “a bill depriving all persons 
deriving their titles under obnoxious or incapacitated persons . . . is a violation 
even of the forms of justice, and as an unconstitutional law is nugatory.”172 
Though not entirely clear, this may have been an argument that the bill, by 
“depriving” persons of certain property without adherence to “the forms of 
 
167.  MARY SARAH BILDER, THE TRANSATLANTIC CONSTITUTION: COLONIAL LEGAL CULTURE AND 
THE EMPIRE 191 (2004). 
168.  See HAMBURGER, supra note 37, at 450-52. 
169.  Id. at 452 (quoting Act of Dec. 29, 1785, reprinted in THE LAWS OF THE STATE OF NORTH-
CAROLINA, PASSED AT NEWBERN, DECEMBER 1785, at 12-13 (Newbern, N.C., Arnett & Hodge 
1786)). 
170.  Id. at 452 & n.150 (quoting Protest (Dec. 28, 1785), in THE JOURNALS OF THE GENERAL 
ASSEMBLY OF THE STATE OF NORTH-CAROLINA 51, 51 (2d pagination series, Newbern, N.C., 
Arnett & Hodge 1786)). 
171.  N.C. CONST. of 1776, art. XXIV, reprinted in 5 THORPE, supra note 136, at 2787, 2788 (“That 
retrospective laws, punishing facts committed before the existence of such laws, and by 
them only declared criminal, are oppressive, unjust, and incompatible with liberty; 
wherefore no ex post facto law ought to be made.”). 
172.  HAMBURGER, supra note 37, at 452 n.150 (quoting Protest (Dec. 28, 1785), in THE JOURNALS 
OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE STATE OF NORTH-CAROLINA 51, 51 (2d pagination series, 
Newbern, N.C., Arnett & Hodge 1786)). 
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justice,” would violate the state constitution’s law-of-the-land clause.173 Third, 
the dissenting legislators argued that the law of the state must be generally 
applicable to all citizens, and laws that effectively deprive some citizens of the 
rights usually enjoyed by all would be “a denial of the known and established 
rules of justice.”174 This third argument suggests that the dissenters believed 
that the law of the land prohibited the legislature from adjudicating individual 
legal disputes. In these arguments we see the transmutation of new notions of 
separation of powers into individual rights claims based on the “law of the 
land.” Consider the dissenting legislators’ full argument: 
[T]he laws of this state . . . must apply to all ranks of citizens; nor do 
we conceive it possible under the present bill to preclude any subject 
from the benefit of law by a denial of the known and established rules 
of justice, which protect the property of all citizens equally, nor to place 
any of them under the adjudication of the General Assembly, whose 
desire to redress the grievance may be fluctuating, uncertain and 
ineffectual.175 
This appears to be one of the earliest examples of the argument, which became 
increasingly common, that legislation depriving individuals of their property is 
illegitimate if it operates retroactively (as opposed to operating by “known and 
established rules of justice”) and is insufficiently general (because it applied 
only to the confiscated lands of Tories). This is an argument that the General 
Assembly is to make law, which is to be generally applicable, to “protect the 
property of all citizens equally,” and not to engage in an “adjudication” to 
“redress [a] grievance.” The latter is the exclusive function of the courts. The 
contours of this argument suggest that “general law” interpretations of state 
law-of-the-land and due process clauses are not as different in basic rationale 
from the “procedural” or “vested rights” interpretations as some commentators 
have suggested.176 As early as the 1780s, American constitutional actors (here, 
legislators) interpreted constitutional law-of-the-land provisions to require 
legislative acts to be generally applicable. 
 
173.  N.C. CONST. of 1776, art. XII, reprinted in 5 THORPE, supra note 136, at 2787, 2788. 
174.  HAMBURGER, supra note 37, at 452 (quoting Protest (Dec. 28, 1785), in THE JOURNALS OF THE 
GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE STATE OF NORTH-CAROLINA 51, 51 (2d pagination series, 
Newbern, N.C., Arnett & Hodge 1786)). 
175.  Id. 
176.  See, e.g., Ely,  supra note 6, at 336-38; Harrison, supra note 12, at 506-10; Williams, supra 
note 7, at 424-25. 
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The North Carolina legislature rejected these arguments, but the Bayards 
pressed their claim in district court. Singleton’s lawyers urged the classic 
positivist argument that “all acts of Assembly were laws, and their execution 
could not be prevented.”177 The court unanimously concluded that the statute 
was unconstitutional: “[B]y the constitution every citizen had undoubtedly a 
right to a decision of his property by a trial by a jury,” and if “the Legislature 
could take away this right” “[i]t might with as much authority require his life 
to be taken away without a trial by jury . . . [or] without the formality of any 
trial at all.”178 The Court “ordered, that the suits in question should stand for 
trial in the next term, according to the course of the common law of the 
land.”179 
An exchange of letters after the decision between its principal proponent, 
James Iredell, future Associate Justice of the United States Supreme Court, and 
its principal opponent, Richard Dobbs Spaight, North Carolina delegate to the 
1787 Constitutional Convention, demonstrates that the dispute was primarily 
over the propriety of judicial review rather than the merits. Spaight was willing 
to concede that the statute “militat[ed] . . . against the constitution,”180 but 
complained of the judges’ “usurpation of the Authority” to “declare[] void” 
acts of the legislature.181 This was the position that Blackstone had articulated 
with reference to acts of Parliament. Iredell responded simply that judges had a 
duty to decide cases according to the law of the land, including a written 
constitution.182 
5. Alexander Hamilton’s Understanding of Due Process of Law 
One of the New York legislature’s first acts upon the liberation of 
Manhattan was to pass a bill stripping “Persons therein described”—the 
description was of Loyalists—of their citizenship.183 Alexander Hamilton, in a 
 
177.  HAMBURGER, supra note 37, at 453 (quoting Newbern (N.C.) June 7, PA. PACKET & DAILY 
ADVERTISER, July 1, 1786). 
178.  Id. at 459 (quoting Newbern, June 7, VA. INDEP. CHRON., July 4, 1787). 
179.  Id. 
180.  Id. at 471 (quoting Letter from Richard Dobbs Spaight to James Iredell (Aug. 12, 1787), in  
3 THE PAPERS OF JAMES IREDELL 298 (Donna Kelly & Lang Baradell eds., 2003)). 
181.  Id. at 472. 
182.  Id. at 475 (citing Letter from James Iredell to Richard Dobbs Spaight (Aug. 26, 1787), in  
3 THE PAPERS OF JAMES IREDELL 308-10 (Donna Kelly & Lang Baradell eds., 2003)). 
183.  The bill did not become law. It was vetoed by the Council of Revision, which presented its 
objections to the legislature in January 1784, the same month Hamilton’s letter was 
published. See 3 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 483-84 & n.1 (Harold C. Syrett & 
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letter to the public as Phocion, opposed the act as violating the treaty with 
Britain and “contrary to the law of the land.”184 He acknowledged that “[i]f 
there had been no treaty in the way, the legislature might, by name, have 
attainted particular persons of high treason for crimes committed during the 
war.”185 He argued, however, that “independent of the treaty it could not, and 
cannot, without tyranny, disfranchise or punish whole classes of citizens by 
general descriptions, without trial and conviction of offences known by laws 
previously established declaring the offence and prescribing the penalty.”186 To 
do so, he argued, would violate “[t]he 13th article of the constitution,” which 
provided “that no member of this state shall be disfranchised or defrauded of 
any of the rights or privileges sacred to the subjects of this state by the 
constitution, unless by the law of the land or the judgment of his peers.”187 He 
then cited and adopted Coke’s definition of the law of the land: “due process of 
law, that is, by indictment or presentment of good and lawful men, and trial 
and conviction in consequence.”188 Hamilton argued that ex post facto criminal 
laws violated due process of law.189 
Hamilton’s opposition to ex post facto laws against Loyalists did not end 
there. On January 13, 1787, Samuel Jones introduced into the New York 
Assembly “An Act for Regulating Elections.”190 While that act worked its way 
through the legislature, the legislature on January 26 passed a statutory bill of 
rights with three “due process” clauses.191 About a week later, Hamilton argued 
 
Jacob E. Cooke eds., 1962). The legislature reconsidered the law in February and declined to 
repass it. Id. 
184.  ALEXANDER HAMILTON, LETTER FROM PHOCION TO THE CONSIDERATE CITIZENS OF NEW 
YORK, ON THE POLITICS OF THE DAY 4 (New York, Samuel Loudon 1784), reprinted in 3 THE 
PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON, supra note 183, at 483. 
185.  Id. at 5. 
186.  Id. 
187.  Id. at 4 (quoting N.Y. CONST. of 1777, art. XIII, reprinted in 5 THORPE, supra note 136, at 
2623, 2632). 
188.  Id. at 5. 
189.  Id. at 5-6. 
190.  Alexander Hamilton, Remarks on an Act for Regulating Elections (Jan. 23, 1787), in 4 THE 
PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON, supra note 183, at 19-21 & n.1. 
191.  The statutory Bill of Rights provided in part: 
Second, That no Citizen of this State shall be taken or imprisoned, or disseised of 
his or her Freehold, or Liberties, or Free-Customs; or outlawed, or exiled, or 
condemned, or otherwise destroyed, but by lawful Judgment of his or her Peers, 
or by due Process of Law.  
Third, That no Citizen of this State shall be taken or imprisoned for any Offence, 
upon Petition or Suggestion, unless it be by indictment or Presentment of good 
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to the General Assembly that a proposed Senate amendment to the Act for 
Regulating Elections would violate the constitutional “law of the land” clause 
and the new statutory “due process clause.” The version passed by the 
Assembly would have disqualified the officers of British privateers that had 
attacked the “vessels, property, or persons” of the United States from holding 
any state office of trust.192 The Senate amendment would have extended the 
disqualification to any “owner or owners of such privateers or vessels of 
war.”193 Hamilton said that he had been “restrained by motives of respect for 
the sense of a reasonable part of the house” from opposing the House’s original 
“discriminating clauses,” but was obligated to speak against the Senate 
addition because “it would include almost every man in the city, concerned in 
navigation during the war.”194 He continued: 
He hoped to be indulged by the house in explaining a sentence in the 
constitution, which seems not well understood by some gentlemen. In 
one article of it, it is said no man shall be disfranchised or deprived of 
any right he enjoys under the constitution, but by the law of the land, or 
the judgment of his peers. Some gentlemen hold that the law of the 
land will include an act of the legislature. But Lord Coke, that great 
luminary of the law, in his comment upon a similar clause, in Magna 
Charta, interprets the law of the land to mean presentment and 
indictment, and process of outlawry, as contradistinguished from trial 
by jury. But if there were any doubt upon the constitution, the bill of 
rights enacted in this very session removes it. It is there declared that, 
no man shall be disfranchised or deprived of any right, but by due 
process of law, or the judgment of his peers. The words “due process” 
have a precise technical import, and are only applicable to the process 
and proceedings of the courts of justice; they can never be referred to an 
act of legislature. 
 
and lawful Men of the same Neighburhood where such Deeds be done, in due 
Manner, or by due Process of Law.  
Fourth, That no Person shall be put to answer without Presentment before 
Justices, or Matter of Record, or due Process of Law, according to the Law of the 
Land; and if any Thing be done to the Contrary, it shall be void in Law, and 
holden for Error. 
Williams, supra note 7, at 441 n.134 (emphasis omitted) (quoting An Act Concerning the 
Rights of the Citizens of This State, 1787 N.Y. Laws 5-6). 
192.  Alexander Hamilton, Remarks on an Act for Regulating Elections (Feb. 6, 1787), in 4 THE 
PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON, supra note 183, at 34 n.1. 
193.  Id. 
194.  Id. at 34-35. 
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  Are we willing then to endure the inconsistency of passing a bill of 
rights, and committing a direct violation of it in the same session? In 
short, are we ready to destroy its foundations at the moment they are 
laid? 
  Our having done it to a certain degree is to be lamented; but it is no 
argument for extending it.195 
Commentators have divided on the meaning of this statement. Some have 
argued that Hamilton’s comment that “[t]he words ‘due process’ . . . can never 
be referred to an act of legislature” meant the proposed act of the legislature 
could not have violated due process.196 This interpretation, we think, is 
untenable. After all, Hamilton was arguing on the floor of the legislature that 
the proposed statute would “commit[] a direct violation” of the “bill of rights,” 
referring specifically to the due process clause. In light of this assertion, and 
particularly in light of his argument as Phocion, his speech becomes clear. 
Hamilton, relying on Coke, maintained that the law of the land requires certain 
procedural safeguards before someone may be deprived of his rights. The 
legislature is inherently incapable of providing those safeguards, and thus the 
deprivation of rights must be left to that branch of government capable of 
doing so. To say that due process cannot “be referred to an act of legislature” is 
not to say that due process principles do not apply, but that the legislature is 
institutionally incapable of satisfying them.197 Hamilton specifically rejected 
the argument that whatever the legislature does is by definition consistent with 
“the law of the land.” He regarded the terminology of “due process” as making 
this point clear. 
 
195.  Id. at 35-36. Elsewhere, Hamilton argued that there was no New York analogue to the 
federal prohibition on ex post facto laws. THE FEDERALIST NO. 84, supra note 130, at 510-11 
(Alexander Hamilton). 
196.  See Berger, “Law of the Land” Reconsidered, supra note 2, at 21, 29; Easterbrook, supra note 5, 
at 98 n.35. 
197.  See Gedicks, supra note 6, at 632 (“[A] legislature’s mere compliance with the formal 
requirements for enacting a law did not mean that its acts necessarily accorded with the ‘law 
of the land,’ or constituted the ‘process of law’ owed to a person suffering a deprivation of 
life, liberty, or property.”); Douglas Laycock, Due Process and Separation of Powers: The Effort 
To Make the Due Process Clauses Nonjusticiable, 60 TEX. L. REV. 875, 891 (1982) (“Hamilton is 
saying that legislatures cannot enact statutes depriving persons of rights, because only 
courts can deprive persons of rights. He is plainly wrong; only with statutory authorization 
from the legislature could the courts deprive persons of the right to hold public office.”); 
Riggs, supra note 6, at 990 (understanding Hamilton to be arguing that “only courts, not 
legislatures, can provide due process of law”). 
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It is important to note, however, and contrary to some commentators,198 
that Hamilton’s constitutional argument was about the inability of the 
legislature to provide judicial process, not about “substantive due process” in 
the modern sense. The proposed statute would violate due process, Hamilton 
said, because the legislature cannot provide the procedures necessary for such a 
deprivation of rights. His argument is not “substantive” in the modern sense 
that the government as a whole has no authority to abrogate certain kinds of 
rights even by means of general and prospective legislation. 
E. The Constitution 
Based on their experiences with British violations of colonists’ rights 
during the runup to the Revolution and their early unhappy experiences with 
state legislative supremacy, the Framers of the United States Constitution 
sought a more secure and robust foundation for the rule of law by separating 
the lawmaking from the law-executing and judicial functions. This separation 
of powers gave a new meaning to the ancient idea of due process of law; it 
would be applied to all government action, including acts of the legislature. 
1. General and Specific Provisions 
The Framers decisively departed from the Revolution-era vision of 
unmediated popular government through legislative supremacy. The first 
sentence of Article I limits Congress to the exercise of enumerated “legislative” 
powers, vesting all executive and judicial powers in separate branches.199 This 
establishes the basic framework for separation of powers. Moreover, Article I, 
Section 9 expressly deprives Congress of the quasi-judicial power to deprive 
individuals and groups of rights through bills of attainder, ex post facto laws, 
nonproportional taxes, or, absent certain conditions, the suspension of habeas 
corpus. Article I, Section 10 puts similar limits on the power of state 
legislatures, plus a ban on laws interfering with the obligation of contracts. The 
 
198.  See Ely, supra note 6, at 326 (“His speech . . . lends support for the view that due process 
placed substantive restraints on legislative power.”); Laycock, supra note 197, at 891 
(arguing that “[t]his is substantive due process with a vengeance,” but “[Hamilton] was 
plainly wrong”); Riggs, supra note 6, at 990 (arguing that Hamilton’s opinion, if widely 
held, would mean that “the fifth amendment limits the power of Congress to take away 
substantive rights,” which he says “is the very essence of substantive due process”). Most of 
these commentators fail to distinguish among the kinds of legislative acts that Hamilton 
thought New York’s due process clause prohibited; there is no indication that he thought 
they prohibited generally applicable and prospective laws. 
199.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1. 
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Bill of Rights, adopted in 1791, adds a number of provisions, originally 
applicable only to the federal government, which appear to be specific 
applications of due process, including various aspects of criminal procedure, 
plus the requirement of compensation for takings of property for a public use. 
And, of course, the Fifth Amendment includes the provision: “nor shall any 
person be . . . deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of 
law.”200 
What is the relation among these various provisions? It is difficult to escape 
the conclusion that there is substantial redundancy. Surely the prohibition on 
bills of attainder and the requirement of a jury trial, to name just two examples, 
are comprised within the demand for “due process.” Some scholars have 
suggested that to avoid redundancy, we must interpret “due process” in such a 
way that it would not overlap with other, more specific procedural provisions 
or the Vesting Clauses of Articles I and III.201 We think this places too much 
weight on the interpretive canon against superfluous language. The Framers 
specifically enumerated protections that they regarded as especially important, 
and then added a catch-all. It is impossible to give “due process of law” its 
historical meaning and avoid redundancy. 
Early on, the question of the relation between “due process” and the more 
specific provisions turned out to be significant only in constitutional litigation 
involving state law. At the federal level, litigants tended to challenge actions 
that violated specifically enumerated due process principles under those 
specific clauses rather than under the generic grab-bag of “due process.” But 
the Due Process and Takings Clauses of the Fifth Amendment did not apply to 
the states.202 The only clauses relevant to due process principles and applicable 
to states were the prohibitions of bills of attainder, ex post facto laws, and 
impairments of the obligation of contract found in Article I, Section 10. Thus, 
litigants challenging state action in federal court attempted to fit violations of 
due process principles within one of these more specific categories. That is the 
reason why the Contracts Clause was the most frequently litigated 
constitutional provision in the early nineteenth century.203 For example, in 
Fletcher v. Peck,204 the government of Georgia attempted to rescind land grants 
that had been procured through widespread bribery. In the absence of a due 
 
200.  Id. amend. V. 
201.  See, e.g., Harrison, supra note 12, at 520-24. 
202.  See Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243, 247 (1833). 
203.  See CURRIE, supra note 12, at 128; Ann Woolhandler, The Common Law Origins of 
Constitutionally Compelled Remedies, 107 YALE L.J. 77, 95 n.92 (1997). 
204.  10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810). 
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process clause or takings clause applicable to the states, the Supreme Court 
construed the grant of land as a kind of contract, the obligation of which could 
not be impaired by subsequent legislation.205 
The prohibitions on bills of attainder, ex post facto laws, and laws 
impairing the obligation of contract obviously are directed at legislatures, 
which are the only bodies that enact “bills” and “laws.” Moreover, they are 
targeted at two related but distinguishable legislative abuses: special laws 
passed by a legislature that deprive an identifiable individual of rights, and 
laws that operate retrospectively. Both types of legislation conflict with the 
separation-of-powers notion that the power to make laws—the power to 
“legislate”—is the power to establish general rules for the future, not to 
determine specific applications of law or to punish past acts.206 As we already 
noted, however, this notion was given the form of a specific constitutional 
prohibition only when the effect was a deprivation of rights. Congress and the 
state legislatures remained free to enact special laws for the benefit of particular 
persons, or retroactive laws that did not hurt anyone. 
The Constitution expressly gives four quasi-judicial functions to Congress: 
(1) to the House, “the sole Power of Impeachment”;207 (2) to the Senate, “the 
sole Power to try all Impeachments”;208 (3) to both the House and the Senate, 
the power to be “the Judge of the Elections, Returns and Qualifications of its 
own Members”;209 and (4) to each House, the power to “punish its members 
for disorderly Behavior, and, with the Concurrence of two thirds, expel a 
Member.”210 From early in the Republic, Congress has also successfully 
asserted an inherent power to subpoena persons to testify and to punish 
persons who resist subpoenas by contempt of Congress, at least when relevant 
to the consideration of legislation.211 In addition, the Constitution left Congress 
 
205.  Id. at 132, 135-37, 139; see Michael W. McConnell, Contract Rights and Property Rights: A Case 
Study in the Relationship Between Individual Liberties and Constitutional Structure, 76 CALIF. L. 
REV. 267, 272-73 (1988). 
206.  Cf. MCDONALD, supra note 129, at 38 (“Blackstone and others deplored what the Romans 
called privilegia, or private law, such as ex post facto laws or bills of attainder and bills of 
pains and penalties; but the fact was that Parliament retained the power to enact such 
‘unreasonable’ legislation.”). 
207.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 5. 
208.  Id. § 3, cl. 6. 
209.  Id. § 5, cl. 1. 
210.  Id. § 5, cl. 2. 
211.  See, e.g., McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 174 (1927) (“[T]he power of inquiry—with the 
process to enforce it—is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function.”). 
See generally Josh Chafetz, Executive Branch Contempt of Congress, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 1083 
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the power to enact special bills for the benefit (but not the detriment or 
punishment) of identifiable individuals, such as land grants to specific 
companies. Such bills were commonly enacted by Parliament and state 
legislatures, including granting compensation to petitioners in cases sounding 
in tort or contract, which would otherwise have been barred by sovereign 
immunity, or pensions to soldiers and their families.212 The Due Process Clause 
does not apply to such bills, but only to quasi-judicial acts that “deprive[]” 
someone of “life, liberty, or property.” 
Article III also provides a backstop for due process. Under Article III, 
“[t]he judicial Power of the United States shall be vested in one supreme 
Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time 
ordain and establish,” and “shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising 
under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties.”213 
Furthermore, Article III guarantees that “[t]he Trial of all Crimes, except in 
Cases of Impeachment, shall be by Jury; and such Trial shall be held in the 
State where the said Crimes shall have been committed.”214 For cases falling 
within this compendious definition of “jurisdiction,” the Constitution thus 
embeds the central features of due process as defined by Chapter 29 of Magna 
Charta, with all of its implications as a political check on legislative, executive, 
and national power. To be sure, not all courts were Article III courts; the 
Constitution implicitly recognizes the continued operation and legitimacy of 
state courts, and it would soon be interpreted to permit territorial courts as 
well as various species of Article I “courts” with power to adjudicate “public 
rights” where no jury trial would have been available under the common law.215 
But to a significant extent, by carving out a separate sphere of judicial authority 
and thus taking it away from Congress, Article III limited the range of cases in 
which Congress could violate due process by exercising quasi-judicial power. 
 
(2009) (grounding the legislative contempt power in preconstitutional English and 
American history and in early congressional practice). 
212.  See, e.g., Christine A. Desan, The Constitutional Commitment to Legislative Adjudication in the 
Early American Tradition, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1381, 1407-35 (1998) (exploring the function of 
colonial New York’s General Assembly as a court of claims on public debt). 
213.  U.S. CONST. art. III, §§ 1, 2. 
214.  Id. § 2, cl. 3. 
215.  See N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 , 67-70 (1982); Crowell 
v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 50-51 (1932); In re Ross, 140 U.S. 453, 464-65 (1891); Am. Ins. Co. v. 
356 Bales of Cotton, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511, 546 (1828). For a broad interpretation of 
congressional power to vest jurisdiction over even some private-rights cases in a non-Article 
III court, see Commodities Futures Trading Commission v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 853-57 (1986). 
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2. The Due Process Clause 
The text of the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause says nothing about 
whether it is meant to apply against the legislature, and its legislative history is 
usually given little attention as a source of clues to its meaning.216 We think the 
Clause’s text, its legislative history, and the structure of the Constitution 
(including the Bill of Rights) together suggest that the Due Process Clause was 
a limit on the powers of all three branches. 
The Due Process Clause is tucked into a compound sentence without a 
proper subject. The Fifth Amendment is silent about whom it prohibits from 
depriving rights “without due process of law.” The passive voice suggests that 
the Amendment is not limited as to “who,” but only as to “what.” Just as 
importantly, the Constitution nowhere defines “due process of law.” Textual 
arguments against applying the Due Process Clause to Congress tend to rest on 
two assumptions. The first is that the Framers could not have meant the Clause 
to be redundant with other prohibitions on Congress, such as the Article I, 
Section 9 prohibitions on ex post facto laws and bills of attainder. As we have 
argued, though,217 that redundancy argument is unpersuasive. The 
Constitution and Bill of Rights are shot through with prohibitions that some 
Founders thought to be redundant with enumerated powers or prohibitions. 
Furthermore, there is no historical evidence that the Founders believed that the 
antiredundancy canon of interpretation should be determinative. To the 
contrary, the Framers no less than contemporary constitutional lawyers 
wrapped their arguments in as many constitutional provisions as possible. 
The second main textual objection to applying the Due Process Clause to 
Congress is that “due process of law” assumes that there is already a “law” by 
which “due process” (whatever that might mean) must be afforded, and, thus, 
that the Due Process Clause applies only to those branches that are applying 
law that Congress has already made.218 This objection makes two assumptions 
that the historical evidence shows to be wrong. One assumption is that “due 
process of law” was not a term of art that might be applied against the 
 
216.  See, e.g., Thomas Y. Davies, Correcting Search-and-Seizure History: Now-Forgotten Common-
Law Warrantless Arrest Standards and the Original Understanding of “Due Process of Law,”  
77 MISS. L.J. 1, 131-38 (2007); Ely, supra note 6, at 325; Gedicks, supra note 6, at 641; Riggs, 
supra note 6, at 947; Williams, supra note 7, at 445-46. 
217.  See supra note 201 and accompanying text. 
218.  This argument is both very old and very recent. See, e.g., Harrison, supra note 12, at 497; 
Rosenkranz, supra note 12, at 1041-43. Compare the arguments of Richard Dobbs Spaight in 
response to the decision of the North Carolina Supreme Court in Bayard v. Singleton, 1 N.C. 
(Mart.) 5, 7 (1787), discussed supra Subsection I.D.4. 
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legislature. In fact it was a term of art that had existed in the English customary 
constitution for at least four hundred years and that the most influential 
English commentator, Coke, had equated with “law of the land,” a provision 
that was in most state constitutions and that had already been applied to acts of 
state legislatures. The second mistaken assumption on this reading of “due 
process of law” is that every time Congress acts it makes law. But Congress 
does not “make” a “law” when it exercises its quasi-judicial powers, such as 
contempt. More controversially, we argue it does not “make” a “law” when it 
purports to resolve a particular legal conflict, even if it employs the form of a 
statute to do so. 
The legislative history confirms the view that the Due Process Clause was 
originally understood to apply to legislative as well as executive and judicial 
acts. When Madison first presented a series of proposed amendments to the 
House, he indicated where each of them should be inserted into the original 
Constitution. According to Madison’s scheme, the proposal that ultimately 
became the Fifth Amendment, which at that point already provided that no one 
shall “be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law,” was 
to be inserted into “article 1st, section 9, between clauses 3 and 4.”219 This 
would have put the Due Process Clause in the section of Article I of the 
Constitution devoted to enumerating the limits on congressional power, 
directly following the clause prohibiting Congress from enacting bills of 
attainder and ex post facto laws.220 Ultimately, the first Congress listed the 
various provisions of the Bill of Rights as a separate set of amendments, rather 
than interpolating them into the existing Constitution. Consequently, the 
explicit reference to Congress as the subject of the Due Process Clause was 
eliminated. But there is no reason to think that the change in lexical 
organization was understood or intended to be a change in substance or 
application. Just as the subject-less provisions of the Bill of Rights relating to 
 
219.  1 ANNALS OF CONG. 434 (1789) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834). At the same time, Madison 
proposed an amendment with two clauses, the first of which ultimately failed (but was 
mirrored in some state constitutions). It would have added to the Constitution, as article 
seven, the provision that 
[t]he powers delegated by this Constitution are appropriated to the departments 
to which they are respectively distributed: so that the Legislative Department 
shall never exercise the powers vested in the Executive or Judicial, nor the 
Executive exercise the powers vested in the Legislative or Judicial, nor the Judicial 
exercise the powers vested in the Legislative or Executive Departments. 
  Id. at 435-36. The second clause of this proposed amendment became the Ninth 
Amendment. See id. at 436. 
220.  See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9. 
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the quartering of soldiers in private homes,221 to the taking of property without 
just compensation,222 or to the imposition of cruel and unusual punishments223 
were uncontroversially applicable to acts of Congress, so too was the Due 
Process Clause. 
In commenting on his proposed amendments, Madison began by justifying 
a bill of rights in the American context. He argued that America’s situation was 
different from Britain’s, where “the declaration of rights . . . [has] gone no 
farther than to raise a barrier against the power of the Crown; the power of the 
Legislature is left altogether indefinite.”224 By contrast, “the people of America 
are most alarmed” that “the trial by jury, freedom of the press, or liberty of 
conscience” are unsecured by “Magna Charta” or “the British Constitution.”225 
While “it may not be thought necessary to provide limits for the legislative 
power in that country, yet a different opinion prevails in the United States.”226 
Although Madison may not have spelled out the logic of placing the Due 
Process Clause in Article I, this logic is apparent; it is the same as the logic for 
making the First Amendment apply to “Congress.” Outside the limited 
prerogative powers of the President and inherent powers of the judiciary, the 
authority of those branches is confined to the execution and enforcement of the 
law. If Congress is forbidden to pass laws authorizing a deprivation of life, 
liberty, or property without due process, and the other branches are limited to 
executing and interpreting the law, then the Constitution secures individual 
liberties against all three branches.227 
There was no commentary or debate about the text that became the Fifth 
Amendment Due Process Clause, but circumstances strongly suggest that 
Madison deliberately chose to employ the phrase “due process of law” instead 
of the Magna Charta formula of “law of the land.” The North Carolina, 
Pennsylvania, and Virginia ratifying conventions each sent a proposed 
amendment that parroted, more or less, the “law of the land” language of 
Chapter 29 of Magna Charta.228 Only New York, which, as we have seen, had 
 
221.  Id. amend. III. 
222.  Id. amend. V. 
223.  Id. amend. VIII. 
224.  1 ANNALS OF CONG. 436 (1789) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834). 
225.  Id. 
226.  Id. 
227.  See Shrum v. City of Coweta, 449 F.3d 1132, 1140-43 (10th Cir. 2006) (McConnell, J.) 
(explaining why the First Amendment applies to executive action notwithstanding its first 
word). 
228.  Williams, supra note 7, at 445.  
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some experience with both a law-of-the-land and a due process clause, 
proposed using the phrase “due process of law.”229 It seems unlikely that 
Madison would have rejected the phrasing proposed by his own state, 
especially when that proposal commanded the assent of most others, without a 
solid reason. 
We think it most likely that Madison was trying to avoid any textual 
conflict, or at least confusion, with Article VI of the Constitution. That 
provision states that “Laws of the United States” “made in pursuance” of “This 
Constitution” are “the supreme Law of the Land.”230 Had the Fifth 
Amendment provided that no person was to be deprived of life, liberty, or 
property but by the law of the land, interpreters might have presumed that 
deprivations were permissible whenever they were enacted pursuant to the 
Constitution. The logical corollary would be that no act of Congress, “the 
supreme Law of the Land,” could violate the law-of-the-land clause.231 By 
framing the Amendment in terms of due process of law instead of law of the 
land, Madison avoided foreclosing the possibility of applying the Due Process 
Clause against Congress. Recall that this was Hamilton’s analysis of the 
significance of “due process” in the New York bill of rights.232 
Although it might be thought in the abstract—and some modern scholars 
argue—that due process and the “law of the land” cannot logically apply to 
properly enacted laws, from the beginning legal commentators and courts 
disagreed. Most American courts and jurists in the early Republic agreed, at a 
minimum, that legislative enactments that authorized other branches to 
deprive persons of life, liberty, or property without traditional procedural 
protections or their equivalent violated due process. The preconstitutional 
cases invalidating statutes abridging the right to trial by jury are an example. 
To be sure, a handful of early decisions held that state law-of-the-land clauses 
did not limit the power of the state legislature.233 These decisions, we believe, 
 
229.  Id. 
230.  U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
231.  See Williams, supra note 7, at 456. 
232.  See supra Subsection I.D.5. 
233.  See the inconclusive decision in State v. —, 2 N.C. (1 Hayw.) 38 (1794), which reversed a 
decision to invalidate a statute under the North Carolina Constitution’s law-of-the-land 
clause, holding that the clause did not apply to the legislature. Ryan Williams argues that 
Mayo v. Wilson, 1 N.H. 53 (1817), held that the New Hampshire law-of-the-land clause did 
not apply against the legislature. See Williams, supra note 7, at 450. In fact, the court in Mayo 
held that arrests made pursuant to statutory authorization did not deprive a person of due 
process of law and were therefore not against the law of the land. Mayo, 1 N.H. at 57-58. We 
think the court’s statement that the law-of-the-land clause “was not intended to abridge the 
power of the legislature, but to assert the right of every citizen to be secure from all arrests 
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were the remnant of a dying view, based on a Blackstonian model of 
Parliament rather than the new American view of a Congress limited by 
constitutional positive law. 
As to the modern view that the Due Process Clause renders certain 
unenumerated but fundamental rights impervious to legislative impairment, 
the text of the Clause seems to preclude such an interpretation. The Clause says 
that no one may be deprived of the relevant set of rights “without due process 
of law.” That surely means persons may be deprived of those rights if due 
process of law has been accorded. The words chosen would be a very odd way 
of communicating the idea that the rights mentioned are inalienable.234 
One argument for an original understanding of “substantive due process” 
advanced by contemporary scholars is that the “law” in “due process of law” 
included some form of natural law. On this understanding, laws made by 
Congress that did not conform to natural law were not really law. To be sure, 
some early American jurists held to a version of the law of nature as a universal 
moral code made known by conscience, reason, and even scripture,235 but there 
is little evidence that any Americans in the late eighteenth century thought the 
law of nature trumped the enacted “municipal” law of a political society. At 
most, natural law principles served as rules of equitable construction, or as a 
way to characterize unwritten international obligations under the law of 
nations. Although Lockean legal theory assumed the reality of capacious 
natural liberty, this was not understood as trumping otherwise-valid 
legislation.236 Many of the Framers understood that the express provisions of 
the Constitution entailed certain reservations of rights, but there is no evidence 
that any believed that acts of Congress would be evaluated by their 
conformance to natural law or any other nonpositive principles of justice or 
 
not warranted by law,” id. at 57, should be understood to apply to cases like the one at bar, 
where the legislature passes a general and prospective law that authorizes an abrogation of 
common law procedures. It is of a piece with Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement 
Co., 59 U.S. 272 (1856), and modern procedural due process. 
234.  Cf. Rosenkranz, supra note 12, at 1043 (“[F]ar from forbidding executive deprivations of life, 
liberty, and property, the clause expressly contemplates that the executive will deprive 
persons of life, liberty, and property.”). 
235.  See, e.g., 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *54 (“Those rights then which God and 
nature have established, and are therefore called natural rights, such as are life and liberty, 
need not the aid of human laws to be more effectually invested in every man than they are . . 
. . On the contrary, no human legislature has power to abridge or destroy them unless the 
owner shall himself commit some act that amounts to a forfeiture.”); THE WORKS OF JAMES 
WILSON, 49-127 (James De Witt Andrews ed., Chicago, Callaghan 1896) (arguing that the 
law of God that is promulgated by reason and conscience to men is the “law of nature,” and 
promulgated to political societies is “the law of nations”). 
236.  See McConnell, Natural Rights and the Ninth Amendment, supra note 15, at 18. 
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liberty. Indeed, Article VI defines “the supreme Law of the Land” in purely 
positivist terms: the Constitution, acts of Congress, and treaties are “law.” 
While the law of nations and reserved (but unenumerated) individual rights 
are acknowledged in the text of the Constitution and the Bill of Rights, the 
Supremacy Clause implies that they are subordinate to the “supreme Law of 
the Land,” which was entirely positive. 
i i .  the fourteenth amendment due process clause 
In 1868, in the aftermath of the Civil War and the end of slavery, the nation 
adopted the Fourteenth Amendment. This Amendment was principally meant 
to secure the civil rights of the recently freed blacks against the states. It 
included a Due Process Clause that was unambiguously aimed at the states, but 
otherwise matched the language of the Fifth Amendment word for word: “No 
State shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due 
process of law.”237 At the time, no one suggested that due process had come to 
mean something different from what it had meant in 1791, and no one argued 
that the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause would apply to the states 
differently from how the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause had applied to 
the federal government, or from how state due process and law-of-the-land 
clauses had applied to state governments. Indeed, Ohioan John Bingham, the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s most vocal advocate in the House of Representatives, 
when asked about the meaning of due process, declared that “the courts have 
settled [the meaning of due process of law] long ago, and the gentleman can go 
and read their decisions.”238 
Ryan Williams has argued that early-nineteenth-century courts applied the 
principle of  due process to legislative acts in a novel way, akin to substantive 
due process, and therefore dubs the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process 
Clause as the “one and only substantive due process clause.”239 We disagree. 
Antebellum courts applied due process to state legislative acts in a way that was 
essentially consistent with pre-1791 due process. As we show in this Part, 
courts applied due process to two sorts of legislative acts: (1) acts that operated 
to deprive specific persons of liberty or vested property rights and (2) acts that 
abrogated key procedural protections of the common law. In evaluating the 
 
237.  U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
238.  CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1089 (1866); see Michael W. McConnell, The Fourteenth 
Amendment: A Second American Revolution or the Logical Culmination of the Tradition?, 25 LOY. 
L.A. L. REV. 1159, 1164 (1992); Williams, supra note 7, at 479-81. 
239.  Williams, supra note 7, at 415. 
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constitutionality of both kinds of acts, courts based their judgments on 
separation-of-powers principles—not on higher law, reasonableness, or any 
other principle akin to substantive due process. Courts consistently labeled 
these forbidden statutes as “judicial acts” that usurped the role of the courts 
and violated both separation of powers and due process. Far from being novel, 
the rationale for these decisions echoes the due process arguments of Jefferson, 
Hamilton, Iredell, and other prominent American legal thinkers before 1791. 
We show in this Part that no court and few legal thinkers before the 
Fourteenth Amendment suggested that due process was a source of 
unenumerated and inviolable individual rights; rather, it was universally 
understood to guarantee individual rights of legal process that only courts 
could provide. 
A. Due Process as a Limit on the Legislature’s Power of Adjudication 
In the first few decades after the adoption of the Bill of Rights, state and 
federal courts invalidated a number of legislative acts for depriving specific 
persons of rights without due process of law. The classic example was an act 
that took a vested property right from A and gave it to B. Underlying these 
decisions was a separation-of-powers logic: legislatures had the power to make 
law; based on the common law tradition and enlightenment political science, a 
law was distinguished from a judicial sentence by being prospective and for the 
general welfare; when a legislature deprived persons of life, liberty, or property 
by a retrospective and insufficiently general act, it violated due process (or law 
of the land) constitutional requirements. In this Section, we explain each step 
of this logic, analyze the most important opinions that rely on it, and sort the 
cases into categories based on the type of legislative act that was invalidated. 
At the outset, to understand the early due process cases, one must abandon 
a narrow version of textualism that sorts cases by constitutional text. Courts 
used separation-of-powers logic to invalidate legislative acts under a variety of 
constitutional provisions. It would be a mistake, however, to conclude that 
these opinions were atextual or based on an unwritten constitution. In every 
instance, courts moored their judgment in one or more specific constitutional 
clauses, and they varied their analysis based on the precise terms of the 
applicable clause. When reviewing state statutes under the federal constitution, 
courts usually invoked the Contracts Clause240 and, to a much lesser extent, the 
 
240.  See, e.g., Satterlee v. Matthewson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 380, 416 app. at 686 (1829) (Johnson, J., 
concurring) (remarking that the whole vested-rights doctrine as applied through the 
Contracts Clause would have been obviated “by giving to the phrase ex post facto its 
original and natural application”); Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S.  
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Ex Post Facto and Bill of Attainder Clauses.241 Under state constitutions, 
litigants invoked state provisions guaranteeing jury trials,242 separating the 
judicial from the legislative power,243 guaranteeing the protection of “standing 
laws,”244 or requiring that deprivations of life, liberty, or property be pursuant 
 
(4 Wheat.) 518, 558 (1819) (“To justify the taking away of vested rights, there must be a 
forfeiture; to adjudge upon and declare, which is the proper province of the judiciary.”); 
Terrett v. Taylor, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 43, 52 (1815) (Story, J.) (refusing to give effect to a 
Virginia law transferring traditionally Anglican land from parish vestries to county overseers 
as a violation of the Federal Constitution); Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 137 
(1810) (arguing that a grant is a “contract executed”); Cooper v. Telfair, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 14 
(1800) (invalidating a state law divesting someone of property without compensation 
because it impaired the obligations of contract); Vanhorne’s Lessee v. Dorrance, 2 U.S.  
(2 Dall.) 304, 320 (1795); Soc’y for the Propagation of the Gospel v. Wheeler, 22 F. Cas. 756, 
761 (C.C.D.N.H. 1814) (No. 13,156) (Story, J.) (“[A] retrospective law is one, that takes 
away or impairs rights acquired by existing laws.”). Ogden v. Saunders is particularly on 
point. That decision held that states may enact bankruptcy laws so long as they apply only 
prospectively to obligations made after the adoption of the regulation. 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 
213, 273 (1827). 
241.  See, e.g., Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277 (1866). In Cummings, the Court 
invalidated a Missouri statute that imposed a test oath to punish persons who had been 
Confederate sympathizers during the Civil War as a bill of attainder and ex post facto law. 
In the course of its opinion, the Court expressly linked the Ex Post Facto and Bill of 
Attainder Clauses to the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, describing all three 
provisions as protections from retroactive deprivations of “natural rights” in life, liberty, or 
property. See id. at 298. The same year, the Court held a similar test oath imposed by an act 
of Congress invalid as a violation of the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. Ex parte 
Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333, 345-48 (1866). 
242.  Examples include the New Jersey Supreme Court’s 1779 decision in Holmes v. Walton, see 
supra note 156, and the North Carolina Supreme Court’s 1787 decision in Bayard v. Singleton, 
1 N.C. (Mart.) 5, 7 (1787), both discussed supra Section I.D. See also Marcy v. Clark, 17 Mass. 
(16 Tyng) 330 (1821) (upholding a law making members of a manufacturing company 
personally liable for judgments against the company under the Massachusetts Constitution’s 
law-of-the-land and jury trial clauses on the ground that the company represents its 
members’ interests at trial); Emerick v. Harris, 1 Binn. 416 (Pa. 1808) (upholding a statute 
enlarging the jurisdiction of justices of the peace to twenty pounds from ten pounds under 
the jury trial clause of the Pennsylvania Constitution of 1790). 
243.  E.g., Merrill v. Sherburne, 1 N.H. 199, 211-17 (1818) (opinion of Woodbury, J.) (invalidating 
an act awarding a new trial in an action that had been decided in a court of law under the 
New Hampshire constitution’s separation-of-powers clause and retrospective-law clause); 
see N.H. CONST. of 1792, art. XXXVII, reprinted in 4 THORPE, supra note 136, 2471, 2475 (“In 
the government of this State, the three essential powers thereof, to wit, the legislative, 
executive, and judicial, ought to be kept as separate from, and independent of, each other as 
the nature of a free government will admit, or as is consistent with that chain of connection 
that binds the whole fabric of the constitution in one indissoluble bond of union and 
amity.”). 
244.  E.g., Holden v. James, 11 Mass. (10 Tyng) 396, 405 (1814) (invalidating under the 
Massachusetts Constitution’s standing-laws clause a special act suspending the statute of 
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to the law of the land245 or with due process of law.246 The Fifth Amendment 
Due Process Clause, of course, did not apply to state governmental action.247 
No matter which provision was invoked, the thrust of the court’s rationale was 
always the same: due process and certain other specific limits on legislatures 
were separation-of-powers provisions designed to protect individuals from the 
deprivation of established rights without sufficient procedural safeguards. 
1. Legal Principles 
The strict separation of the judicial from the legislative power was a novelty 
of American constitutionalism. Under the unwritten British constitution, 
Parliament was not only a legislature in the modern sense, but also the “highest 
and greatest” court in the land,248 with authority to “expound[]” the laws 
through declaratory acts, as well as to make or alter them.249 The House of 
Lords served as the highest appellate court, adjudicating specific cases.250 
 
limitations as to plaintiff’s cause of action); see MASS. CONST. pt. I, art. X, reprinted in  
3 THORPE, supra note 136, at 1888, 1891 (“Each individual of the society has a right to be 
protected by it in the enjoyment of his life, liberty, and property, according to the standing 
laws.”). 
245.  See, e.g., Allen’s Adm’r v. Peeden, 4 N.C. (2 Car. L. Rep.) 442, 442 (1816) (invalidating an act 
freeing a particular slave without his owner’s consent as a violation of the state law-of-the-
land clause); Norman v. Heist, 5 Watts & Sergt. 171, 173 (Pa. 1843) (invalidating the 
retrospective application of a statute granting an illegitimate child an interest in his deceased 
mother’s estate as an unconstitutional deprivation of property belonging to the mother’s 
other heirs as an “ex post facto [law] made for the occasion,” in violation of the state 
constitution’s law-of-the-land provision). 
246.  See, e.g., Sadler v. Langham, 34 Ala. 311, 329 (1859) (invalidating the “transfer of property by 
mere legislative edict, from one person to another”); Sherman v. Buick, 32 Cal. 241, 249-50 
(1867) (holding that the due process provision of the state constitution prohibits a statute 
authorizing taking property from one person and giving it to another); Bd. of Cnty. 
Comm’rs v. Carter, 2 Kan. 109, 123-29 (1863) (invalidating a retroactive statute that would 
have transferred property from one person to another); Regents of the Univ. of Md. v. 
Williams, 9 G. & J. 365, 411-12 (Md. 1838) (invalidating a statute taking property from the 
Regents and giving it to another); Townsend v. Townsend, 7 Tenn. (Peck) 1, 17-19 (1821) 
(invalidating a statute forcing creditors to accept devalued notes of certain banks in 
satisfaction of their debts). 
247.  Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243, 247, 250-51 (1833) (holding that the Bill of Rights 
does not apply against the states). 
248.  1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *161; see MCILWAIN, supra note 73, at 109-66 
(discussing the judicial functions of “the High court of Parliament”). 
249.  1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *160. 
250.  3 id. at *55. 
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Blackstone refers to these powers as “judicial.”251 In pre-independence America, 
colonial legislatures frequently exercised the same judicial powers (subject, of 
course, to revision by the Privy Council and Board of Trade).252 After 
Independence, however, under the influence of Montesquieu,253 every state 
constitution adopted some version of separation of powers and assigned the 
ordinary judicial functions to an independent judicial department.254 Outside 
Connecticut and Rhode Island, which continued to operate under their old 
royal charters and preserved the power of legislative adjudication until they 
adopted constitutions in 1818 and 1848, respectively,255 the only major 
adjudicatory powers that state and federal legislatures continued to enjoy were 
the power to impeach government officials and the power to satisfy private 
claims on public debt.256 All criminal and civil disputes between two private 
parties—all cases in which it was possible for a private citizen to “be deprived 
of life, liberty, or property”—were allocated to a separate judiciary. This paved 
the way for a new understanding of due process, where judicial (or  
“quasi-judicial,” as we term them) acts of legislatures were not deemed to be 
“law.” 
 
251.  1 id. at *167. 
252.  See CAROLL T. BOND, THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND: A HISTORY 2 (1928); Desan, 
supra note 212, at 1407-35 (exploring the function of colonial New York’s General Assembly 
as a court of claims on public debt); Ellen A. Peters, Getting Away from the Federal Paradigm: 
Separation of Powers in State Courts, 81 MINN. L. REV. 1543, 1551 (1997); Barbara A. Black, The 
Judicial Power and the General Court in Early Massachusetts, 1634-1686, at 269-71 (Dec. 
1975) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Yale University) (on file with Stanford Law Library) 
(discussing the General Assembly in seventeenth-century Massachusetts as the General 
Court and, in effect, supreme court of the colony). 
253.  See MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS, bk. XI, ch. VI, at 156-66 (Anne M. Cohler, 
Basia Carolyn Miller & Harold Samuel Stone trans. & eds., Cambridge Univ. Press 1989) 
(1748). 
254.  See ADAMS, supra note 132, at 264-69. 
255.  Christopher Collier, William J. Hamersley, Simeon E. Baldwin, and the Constitutional 
Revolution of 1897 in Connecticut, 23 CONN. L. REV. 31, 37 (1990) (noting that Connecticut’s 
legislature was the highest court in the state under the state’s founding documents and 
custom); Amasa M. Eaton, The Development of the Judicial System in Rhode Island, 14 YALE 
L.J. 148, 152-57 (1905) (noting that in Rhode Island, the legislature’s judicial power seemed 
to be implied and customary). 
256.  Floyd D. Shimomura, The History of Claims Against the United States: The Evolution from a 
Legislative Toward a Judicial Model of Payment, 45 LA. L. REV. 625, 635-43 (1985); see Starr v. 
Pease, 8 Conn. 541 (1831); Taylor v. Place, 4 R.I. 324 (1856). 
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The “idea that the legislature can only make laws, or legislative enactments, 
as contradistinguished from judicial sentences and decrees,”257 was an 
American constitutional innovation. But in determining the nature of the 
lawmaking power, courts relied on two common law principles. First, a law 
was prospective. In his chapter entitled “The Nature of Laws in General,” 
Blackstone wrote that “[a]ll laws should be . . . made to commence in 
futur0.”258 As James Kent said, “The very essence of a law is a rule for future 
cases.”259 Laws said how subjects will be bound, while a judgment or sentence 
applied the existing law by which a subject had been bound. A writer in the 
North American Review in 1843 put it this way: 
Adopt, then, the most comprehensive and unlimited theory respecting 
the sovereignty of the people; say that they may frame what enactments 
they like, on all manner of subjects, or may even annul all existing 
statutes, and live without law for all time to come. Still their power 
relates only to the present and the future. The past is fixed and 
irrevocable. The sovereign may enact or abrogate what rules it pleases 
to govern coming events and the future conduct of men; but it cannot 
annul the rights, the contracts, and the expectations which have grown 
up under the laws that did exist.260 
This prospectivity principle had deep roots in the common law. American 
courts routinely cited Coke,261 Bracton,262 Bacon,263 Blackstone,264 and 
 
257.  THEODORE SEDGWICK, A TREATISE ON THE RULES WHICH GOVERN THE INTERPRETATION 
AND CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 649 (John Norton Pomeroy 
ed., New York, Baker, Voorhis & Co., 2d ed. 1874) (1756) (emphasis omitted). 
258.  1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *46. 
259.  Dash v. VanKleeck, 7 Johns. 477, 502 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1811) (Kent, J.); see also Merrill v. 
Sherburne, 1 N.H. 199, 212 (1818) (“[T]he very nature and effect of a new law is a rule for 
future cases.”). 
260.  Annual Message of the Executive to the General Assembly of Maryland (Dec. 1842), in The 
Independence of the Judiciary, 57 N. AM. REV. 400, 424-25 (1843). 
261.  See, e.g., Dash, 7 Johns. at 502 (citing Dr. Bonham’s Case, (1610) 77 Eng. Rep. 638 (C.P.) 
652; 8 Co. Rep. 107 a, 118 a). 
262.  BRACTON, supra note 44, at 531 (“[E]very new constitution ought to impose a form upon 
future matters, and not upon things past.”). 
263.  6 MATTHEW BACON, A NEW ABRIDGMENT OF THE LAW 370 (Philadelphia, Philip H. Nicklin 
1813). 
264.  1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *46 (“All laws should be therefore made to 
commence in futuro, and be notified before their commencement; which is implied in the 
term ‘prescribed.’”). 
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Mansfield265 for the proposition that laws must be prospective.266 But this idea 
could not have had real constitutional force against retrospective legislation as 
long as Parliament continued to engage in legislative adjudication, either 
through the enactment of laws “declaratory” of what the law (supposedly) 
always had been, or through the review of specific cases in the capacity of the 
highest court. After Americans abandoned the practice of legislative 
adjudication by confining Congress to certain enumerated “legislative” powers 
and prohibiting both federal and state legislatures from passing ex post facto 
criminal laws and retrospective impairments of the obligation of contract, the 
prospectivity principle and the due process principle became mutually 
reinforcing: if law must be prospective and rights can be deprived only 
pursuant to law, then retroactive deprivations, even pursuant to legislative 
action, are a violation of due process. 
The line between prospective and retrospective legislation is illustrated by 
two famous antebellum cases, Ogden v. Saunders267 and Trustees of the University 
of North Carolina v. Foy.268 In Ogden, the Supreme Court held, over a dissent by 
Chief Justice Marshall, that the Contracts Clause protects existing contract 
rights from legislative abrogation, but does not limit the power of the 
legislature to regulate or prohibit the making of future contracts.269 Similarly, 
in Foy, the North Carolina Supreme Court held that a statute designed to divert 
the university’s income stream to the state was valid as to future payments, but 
invalid under the state law-of-the-land clause as to payments that had already 
 
265.  Couch v. Jeffries, (1769) 98 Eng. Rep. 290 (K.B.); 4 Burr. 2460. 
266.  See, e.g., Dash, 7 Johns. at 484-85 (opinion of Spencer, J.) (citing Couch v. Jeffries, (1769)  
98 Eng. Rep. 290 (K.B.); 4 Burr. 2460; Helmore (Gilmore) v. Shuter, (1678) 89 Eng. Rep. 
348 (K.B.); 2 Show. 16); id. at 483 (opinion of Yates, J.) (“[T]his case is clearly 
distinguishable from a known vested right, to which the doctrine cited [by plaintiff] from  
4 Bac. would apply; that no statute ought to have a retrospect beyond the time of its 
commencement . . . .”); id. at 495-96 (opinion of Thompson, J.) (citing 6 BACON, supra note 
263, at 370; 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *46; 2 COKE, supra note 19, at 360 a); 
id. at 504 (opinion of Kent, C.J.) (citing Couch v. Jeffries, (1769) 98 Eng. Rep. 290 (K.B.);  
4 Burr. 2460, 2462 (Mansfield, C.J.); 3 BRACTON, supra note 44, at 531); see also Soc’y for the 
Propagation of the Gospel v. Wheeler, 22 F. Cas. 756, 768 (C.C.D.N.H. 1814) (Story, J.) 
(citing 3 BRACTON, supra note 44, at 531); James L. Kainen, Nineteenth Century Interpretations 
of the Federal Contract Clause: The Transformation from Vested to Substantive Rights Against the 
State, 31 BUFF. L. REV. 381, 399 (1982) (“[E]very violation of a vested right was conceived to 
result from the retrospective application of a rule which did not exist at the time the 
individual’s right had vested.”). 
267.  25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213 (1827). 
268.  5 N.C. (1 Mur.) 58 (1805). 
269.  Ogden, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) at 295 (opinion of Thompson, J.). 
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been made.270 These statutes failed not because of their “substance,” but 
because of their attempted retroactive effect. By contrast, almost thirty years 
after ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, in the decision generally 
regarded as the Supreme Court’s first unequivocal “substantive due process” 
case, Allgeyer v. Louisiana,271 the Court for the first time held that the Due 
Process Clause invalidated a prospective statute that prohibited entering into 
certain contracts.272 This was the real novelty and the real break from the 
original meaning. 
Second, in contrast to a judicial judgment, a law is “general and public.”273 
It must operate on all persons “under like circumstances.”274 This, too, was a 
long-established principle of common law, but never fully realized in a system 
where Parliament could enact bills of attainder or render rulings in specific 
cases. John Locke regarded as central to civil liberty that society be governed by 
“a standing Rule to live by, common to every one of that Society.”275 
Blackstone wrote that law is “not a transient sudden order . . . to or concerning 
a particular person; but something permanent, uniform, and universal.”276 
Chief Justice Marshall put it this way: “It is the peculiar province of the 
legislature to prescribe general rules for the government of society; the 
application of those rules to individuals in society would seem to be the duty of 
other departments.”277 This did not mean that a law had to apply universally to 
 
270.  Foy, 5 N.C. (1 Mur.) at 88-89. 
271.  165 U.S. 578 (1897). 
272.  Id. at 592-93. 
273.  Vanzant v. Waddel, 10 Tenn. (2 Yer.) 260, 270 (1829) (opinion of Catron, J.) (interpreting 
the state constitution’s law-of-the-land clause). 
274.  Holden v. James, 11 Mass. (9 Tyng) 396, 405 (1814) (interpreting the state constitution’s 
standing-law clause); see also Merrill v. Sherburne, 1 N.H. 199, 204 (1818) (“It is the 
province of judicial power also, to decide private disputes between or concerning persons; 
but of legislative power to regulate publick concerns and to make laws for the benefit and 
the welfare of the state.” (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)); id. at 212 (“They 
must too in general, be rules prescribed for civil conduct to the whole community, and not a 
transient, sudden order from a superior to, or concerning a particular person. For . . . an act, 
which operates on the rights or property of only a few individuals, without their consent, is 
a violation of the equality of privileges guaranteed to every subject.” (citations and internal 
quotation marks omitted)). 
275.  JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 284 (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge Univ. 
Press 1988) (1690); see also Ogden v. Blackledge, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 272, 277 (1804) (opinion 
of Marshall, C.J.) (appearing to accept without elaboration the rule of prospectivity when 
raised by counsel). 
276.  1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *44. 
277.  Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 136 (1810). 
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all persons. A law prohibiting minors from drinking alcohol, for example, 
would not have been regarded as insufficiently general. The antebellum 
decisions did not go so far as to subject legislative classifications to judicial 
review for reasonableness; the due process generality principle invalidated only 
laws that applied to fixed and identifiable individuals or groups. 
It is important to note that “private statutes” that do not “deprive” anyone 
of “life, liberty, or property” were not thought to run afoul of due process, even 
if they violated the norms of separation of powers. Antebellum courts upheld 
private acts that were challenged on due process and separation-of-powers 
grounds precisely because the legislature had not deprived anyone of a right.278 
As one court put it: “[S]uch statutes, when lawful, are enacted on petition, or 
by the consent of all concerned; or else they forbear to interfere with past 
transactions and vested rights.”279 Thus, the separation-of-powers principles of 
prospectivity and generality are only incompletely protected by the 
Constitution. John Manning has recently reminded us that under a rigorous 
textual approach to constitutional interpretation, abstract separation-of-powers 
 
278.  See, e.g., Bloomer v. McQuewan, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 539, 553 (1852) (interpreting a special 
statute extending the term of a patent to extend the term of the original assignment of the 
right to use the patent as well because “a special act of Congress, passed afterwards, 
depriving the appellees of the right to use [the patented articles], certainly could not be 
regarded as due process of law”); Wilkinson v. Leland, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 627, 661 (1829) 
(upholding an act of the Rhode Island legislature ratifying a private sale of land because it 
was meant “not to destroy existing rights, but to effectuate them, and in a manner beneficial 
to the parties”); Rice v. Parkman, 16 Mass. (15 Tyng) 326, 329-31 (1820) (upholding a 
special act allowing a father to sell real estate in which his children retained an expectation 
interest under the Massachusetts Constitution’s structure of separation of powers because it 
was for the benefit of all parties involved); Cochran v. Van Surlay, 20 Wend. 365, 373-74 
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1838) (upholding a special act allowing a trustee to sell the vested remainder 
interests of a class of infants because the proceeds were to be used for their benefit); 
Stoddart v. Smith, 5 Binn. 355, 364 (Pa. 1812) (upholding a general and prospective 
Maryland law under the federal Contracts Clause because it (1) did not impair contracts but 
created a new remedy for default and (2) probably was passed before the contracts at issue 
in the case, which would not “impair[]” them); Vanzant, 10 Tenn. (2 Yer.) at 271 (opinion of 
Catron, J.) (upholding under the state constitution’s law-of-the-land clause a special statute 
that altered the time when certain parties—creditors of two named banks—were required to 
appear in court for questioning because it did not deprive them of the ability to obtain a 
final judgment on the same grounds and at the same time as a prior statute). But see Jones’ 
Heirs v. Perry, 18 Tenn. (10 Yer.) 59, 71-72 (1836) (invalidating an act authorizing particular 
guardians to sell infants’ property to pay particular debts because the “law of the land” 
requires “a general and public law, operating equally upon every member of the 
community”). 
279.  Merrill, 1 N.H. at 204 (citation omitted). 
1672.CHAPMANMCCONNELL.1807.DOC 4/10/2012  12:16:28 PM 
due process as separation of powers 
1735 
 
principles are not a sufficient basis for judicial invalidation of legislation.280 
Courts, he argues, should invalidate an act of Congress on separation-of-
powers grounds only when it violates a specific constitutional provision, such as 
the provisions in Article I that create a bicameral legislature or that vest the 
House with the power to impeach and the Senate with the power to try 
impeachments.281 Manning does not discuss due process as an example of a 
more specific principle, but to us, it qualifies. Due process is not an abstract 
separation-of-powers principle; rather, it is the individual right to deprivation 
of life, liberty, or property upon adjudication by a court according to generally 
applicable laws. The separation-of-powers principles that antebellum courts 
relied on to determine whether a legislative act violated due process, though 
not moored in a specific provision of the Constitution, were not free-floating 
notions, either: because of the text of the Due Process Clause they applied only 
when the legislature had deprived someone of a right by effectively issuing a 
judicial sentence. 
The nature of the liberty and property that could be deprived only with due 
process was likewise based on common law jurisprudence. Liberty was 
understood to be natural. People were born with natural liberty and were free 
to exercise it consistent with law. In the words of John Locke’s Second Treatise 
on Government, civil liberty includes “a Liberty to follow my own Will in all 
things, where the Rule prescribes it not.”282 Liberty only where there was no 
contrary law was not a tautology. It distinguished a society where the 
government, with the consent of the governed, was authorized to proscribe 
certain behaviors to protect the whole society from two extremes: anarchy 
(where all could exercise liberty with complete license and no one’s person or 
goods were secure) and slavery (where a ruler could impose rules arbitrarily, 
purely for personal benefit). Blackstone agreed with this definition of liberty. 
Like the right to life,283 he wrote, personal liberty “is a right strictly natural,”284 
which may be abridged only with “the explicit permission of the laws.”285 The 
 
280.  John F. Manning, Separation of Powers as Ordinary Interpretation, 124 HARV. L. REV. 1939, 
1988 (2011). 
281.  Id. at 2006-13. 
282.  LOCKE, supra note 275, at 284. 
283.  1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *130. 
284.  1 id. at *134. 
285.  Id.; see Philip A. Hamburger, Natural Rights, Natural Law, and American Constitutions,  
102 YALE L.J. 907, 909 (1993) (“[U]nder civil government—that is, under secular 
government and its legal system—natural liberty was available only as permitted by civil 
law.”). At least one court determined that “every man has a natural right to exercise” 
employment in an occupation—which means that the legislature could limit that right 
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most influential state constitutions of the era bear out this understanding: the 
Pennsylvania (1776), Virginia (1776), and Massachusetts (1780) constitutions 
acknowledged that citizens had a “natural” right in “enjoying and defending 
their lives and liberties.”286 This basic form of natural liberty was the freedom 
to “remov[e] one’s person to whatsoever place one’s own inclination may 
direct,”287 but it also included the freedom to engage in the basic cooperation 
that is constitutive of human life, or “civil liberties” such as the freedom to 
worship according to conscience, to work, to contract for goods and labor, and 
to raise a family. All of these natural liberties could be abridged by general  
and prospective law.288 Most American constitutions went a step further, and 
expressly put certain of these natural liberties beyond the reach of government 
at all. The First Amendment’s protections of the freedom of religious exercise, 
speech, and the press are prime examples. That was the point of the command 
that “Congress shall make no law . . . .”289 Liberties not singled out for 
constitutional protection continued to enjoy the same protection they had 
enjoyed since Magna Charta: the guarantee that they could not be taken away 
except by the law of the land, which entailed both a generally applicable law 
and its application to a specific case by a court. 
The rights of property were more difficult to define. Property is different 
from liberty because property is acquired pursuant to the laws of society rather 
than being inherent in the nature of human life. Locke asserted that property 
existed in the state of nature and was acquired by use. He recognized, however, 
that “in Governments, the laws regulate the right of property, and the 
possession of land is determined by positive constitutions.”290 Similarly, 
Blackstone emphasized that though “the original of private property is 
 
through a licensing system or outright prohibition. Portland Bank v. Apthorp, 12 Mass. 252, 
256 (1815) (opinion of Parker, C.J.); see id. at 258 (“Every man has the implied permission of 
the government to carry on any lawful business; and there is no difference in the right, 
between those which require a license and those which do not, except in the prohibition, 
either express or implied, where a license is required.”). 
286.  MASS. CONST. pt. I, art. I, reprinted in 3 THORPE, supra note 136, at 1888, 1889 (enumerating 
the rights of “enjoying and defending . . . lives and liberties” and “acquiring, possessing, and 
protecting property”); PA. CONST. of 1776, art. I, reprinted in 5 THORPE, supra note 136, at 
3081, 3082 (enumerating the rights of “enjoying and defending life and liberty, acquiring, 
possessing and protecting property”); VA. CONST. of 1776, § 1, reprinted in 7 THORPE, supra 
note 136, at 3812, 3813 (enumerating the right to “enjoyment of life and liberty, with the 
means of acquiring and possessing property”). 
287.  1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *134. 
288.  See, e.g., Apthorp, 12 Mass. at 256. 
289.  U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
290.  LOCKE, supra note 275, at 302. 
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probably founded in nature, . . . certainly the modifications under which we at 
present find it, the method of conserving it in the present owner, and of 
translating it from man to man, are entirely derived from society.”291 To be 
sure, the right of “acquiring, possessing, and protecting property”292 is natural 
and was understood to be part of natural liberty. But the right to particular 
property required acquisition of title in accordance with the common law; in 
particular, it was inextricably bound up with remedies available pursuant to an 
elaborate system of writs and court procedures.293 
We may be able to do whatever we wish (unless there is a law against it), 
but we cannot own whatever we wish. Liberty exists unless the law says 
otherwise; property exists only if the law has recognized it.294 Importantly, 
unlike liberties, which usually may be exercised simultaneously by everyone 
(my freedom of worship coexists with yours), property is an exclusive right to 
control the use of land or some other thing. Only one person or group can own 
a particular thing. Charters, money, land, chattel, choses in action, commercial 
instruments, and under some circumstances public offices were property at 
common law, and infringements of those property rights were remedied in 
court through a system of writs. To be sure, the rhetoric of the ancient 
constitution included assertions that English political rights were a form of 
property, as Madison repeated in a speculative essay,295 but this theory had no 
basis in the practice of law in England or early America. As James Kainen has 
shown, it was not until the late nineteenth century that courts began to apply 
this more capacious conception of property, a move that in part generated 
Lochner-style substantive due process.296 
By and large, early American courts focused their protection of property 
rights from legislative deprivations of “vested” property rights. These were 
marked by finality. They had been conclusively acquired pursuant to the 
 
291.  1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *138. 
292.  See the state constitutional provisions cited supra note 286. 
293.  See Daniel J. Hulsebosch, The Anti-Federalist Tradition in Nineteenth-Century Takings 
Jurisprudence, 1 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 967, 977-78 (2005). 
294.  Modern Supreme Court doctrine reflects this distinction, but with a twist. The Supreme 
Court holds that “liberty” is defined by federal constitutional law and “property” is most 
often defined by state positive law. See Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972). This 
imports into the distinction two institutional dichotomies: judicial versus legislative, and 
state versus federal. 
295.  See James Madison, Property, NAT’L GAZETTE, Mar. 27, 1792, reprinted in 14 THE PAPERS OF 
JAMES MADISON 266, 266-68 (Robert A. Rutland et al. eds., 1983) (defining “property” to 
include all legal rights). 
296.  Kainen, supra note 266, at 387-92. 
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positive law in effect at the time of acquisition. An expectation in a right that 
might be secured by law in the future was not vested, and neither was a right 
“to a particular remedy.”297 For example, in Marbury v. Madison, the Supreme 
Court held that the right to a commission vested in the appointee upon the 
signature of the President, attested by the seal of the United States.298 Before 
that, the commission could be revoked; after that, the officeholder could be 
removed only through the forms of law. 
Legal scholars have offered various interpretations of the logic 
underpinning vested rights.299 We believe that the doctrine was based 
fundamentally on the separation of powers: courts invalidated legislative acts 
to protect vested rights because the acts were quasi-judicial “sentences” rather 
than genuine “laws.” 
Both Joseph Story and Theodore Sedgwick, the two leading antebellum 
constitutional treatise writers, described laws devesting vested property rights 
as “acts of a judicial nature,”300 or the exercise by the legislature of “judicial 
functions.”301 Sedgwick provided the clearest explication of the idea. He 
explained that the doctrine of vested rights is “summed up in the idea that the 
 
297.  THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH REST UPON 
THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION 361 (Boston, Little, Brown 
1868). 
298.  Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 162 (1803). 
299.  For a good, albeit somewhat dated, overview of the history, see Kainen, supra note 266, at 
388-97. The classic statements include EDWARD S. CORWIN, LIBERTY AGAINST 
GOVERNMENT: THE RISE, FLOWERING AND DECLINE OF A FAMOUS JUDICIAL CONCEPT 72 
(1948); EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE TWILIGHT OF THE SUPREME COURT: A HISTORY OF OUR 
CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY 55-70 (1934); HAINES, supra note 59, at 304-05, 339-41; CHARLES 
GROVE HAINES, THE REVIVAL OF NATURAL LAW CONCEPTS 88-95 (1930); CHARLES GROVE 
HAINES, THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS,  
1789-1835, at 32-40 (1960); LAURENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 456-57 (2d 
ed. 1978); Edward S. Corwin, The Basic Doctrine of American Constitutional Law, 12 MICH. L. 
REV. 247, 258 (1914); Corwin, supra note 5, at 376-77; Ely, supra note 6, at 345; and William 
E. Nelson, Changing Conceptions of Judicial Review: The Evolution of Constitutional Theory in 
the States, 1790-1860, 120 U. PA. L. REV. 1166, 1166 (1972). For more recent scholarship on 
the topic, see JAMES W. ELY, JR., THE GUARDIAN OF EVERY OTHER RIGHT: A 
CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF PROPERTY RIGHTS 59-82 (3d ed. 2008), which identifies 
natural law as the origin of vested-rights doctrine; ORTH, DUE PROCESS OF LAW, supra note 
12, at 48-49, 91-93; Orth, Taking from A, supra note 12; and Gordon S. Wood, The Origins of 
Vested Rights in the Early Republic, 85 VA. L. REV. 1421, 1423 (1999). 
300.  SEDGWICK, supra note 257, at 604. 
301.  3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 1392, at 
266-67 (Boston, Hilliard, Gray & Co. 1833). 
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legislature can only make laws, or legislative enactments, as contradistinguished 
from judicial sentences and decrees.”302 Moreover, 
[i]f we renounce, as I think we must, the idea that the validity of a law 
can be determined by the judiciary on abstract notions of justice and 
right . . . then . . . no other restriction can be imposed on legislative 
action except such as is derived from the idea . . . expressed with equal 
clearness in the guaranty of the law of the land, that legislative power 
only is granted to it, and that vested rights of property can only be 
interfered with by it so far as is competent to be done by the enactment 
of laws.303 
Whether or not these arguments are convincing by contemporary lights,304 
this was the orthodox constitutional theory when the Fourteenth Amendment 
was crafted, and was how an informed reader of the Fourteenth Amendment 
text would have understood the words “due process.” The antebellum courts 
did not take upon themselves the power to evaluate the abstract reasonableness 
or justice of legislation, and they did not operate on the assumption that due 
process limited legislative sovereignty as to matters of substance. To them, the 
central feature of the law of the land, as applied to legislatures, was that 
legislatures were limited to making general and prospective law. 
These differences between liberty and property meant that the prospectivity 
and generality principles applied differently to a claimed deprivation of liberty 
versus a claimed deprivation of property. Once a person had exercised a natural 
liberty, in a manner consistent with the positive law existing at the time of the 
act, the prospectivity principle precluded subsequent acts of legislation to 
 
302.  SEDGWICK, supra note 257, at 649 (emphasis omitted). 
303.  Id. (emphasis omitted). 
304.  The doctrine of vested rights depended on a definition of property based on exclusive rights 
with respect to identifiable tangible or intangible “things” (the word used by Blackstone); it 
could not include mere expectancies or rights to engage in future acquisition. Legal Realists 
regarded this understanding of property as incoherent. See, e.g., Thomas C. Grey, The 
Disintegration of Property, in PROPERTY: NOMOS XII 69 (J. Roland Pennock & John W. 
Chapman eds., 1980); Kenneth J. Vandevelde, The New Property of the Nineteenth Century: 
The Development of the Modern Concept of Property, 29 BUFF. L. REV. 325, 364 (1980). Some 
modern scholars have defended the traditional understanding. See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill 
& Henry E. Smith, The Property/Contract Interface, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 773, 782-89 (2001). 
But whichever scholars are most persuasive on this conceptual point, there is no serious 
dispute that the antebellum vested-rights cases, which formed the backdrop for adoption of 
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, were based on this pre-Realist 
definition. For an illuminating exposition of this point, from a critical point of view, see 
Kainen, supra note 266, at 381, 404. 
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punish the conduct.305 This principle did not, however, preclude the legislature 
from passing laws regulating or even forbidding such acts in the future, 
assuming such legislation was within the enumerated authority of the 
legislative body and there was no enumerated constitutional reservation of the 
particular right. Similarly, once a person had acquired property pursuant to the 
positive law existing at the time of the acquisition, the prospectivity principle 
precluded subsequent acts of legislation nullifying the acquisition. This 
principle did not, however, preclude the legislature from passing general laws 
regulating certain uses of property by all persons, or from passing laws 
regulating or forbidding particular modes of property acquisition or contract 
formation in the future. Nor did it prohibit the government from retrospective 
nullification of title to property if the government provided just 
compensation.306 
The generality requirement also applied differently to claims of liberty and 
property. The liberty claims that have featured in modern substantive due 
process cases have been on behalf of all persons. Everyone has a right to make 
contracts to sell their labor (Lochner307), everyone has a right to engage in 
intimate relations with persons of either gender (Lawrence308), everyone has the 
right to control who may associate with one’s children (Troxel309), and so forth. 
Thus the principle of generality plays no part in the analysis of these claims. In 
contrast with modern substantive due process, the vested-rights cases 
invariably involved exclusive rights of determinate persons. Until 
Wynehamer,310 which we discuss below, no case invalidated a law that restricted 
the use of an entire category of property rights, even if that law effectively 
made the property contraband. 
2. Illustrative cases 
Henry St. George Tucker’s commentary on Congress’s punishment of 
Robert Randall, and five early and influential cases, Calder v. Bull,311 Dash v. 
 
305.  See, e.g., In re Dorsey, 7 Port. 293 (Ala. 1838) (invalidating a statute requiring state officials 
to swear they had never participated in a duel). 
306.  See the discussion of eminent domain infra Subsection II.A.3. 
307.  Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
308.  Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
309.  Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000). 
310.  Wynehamer v. People, 13 N.Y. 378 (1856). 
311.  3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798). 
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Van Kleek,312 Society for the Propagation of the Gospel v. Wheeler,313 Hoke v. 
Henderson,314 and Bloomer v. McQuewan315 illustrate these principles. 
a. The Randall Affair 
Robert Randall was the first person in the American Republic known to 
have asserted a violation of the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause. In 1795, 
Randall tried to bribe a few members of the House of Representatives to grant 
him land in the Northwest Territory. Upon discovery of the scheme, the 
Speaker of the House ordered the Sergeant at Arms to take Randall into 
custody. The House voted him guilty of “contempt and of a breach of the 
privileges of the House” and ordered him detained indefinitely.316 Randall 
protested that he had been arrested, tried, convicted, and imprisoned without 
due process of law in violation of the Fifth Amendment; the House 
disagreed.317 
Later, though, Henry St. George Tucker, a prominent Virginia Jeffersonian 
jurist, took up Randall’s cause in his influential 1803 commentary on 
Blackstone.318 Tucker maintained that the House had violated due process of 
law by punishing Randall without indictment or presentment of a grand jury, 
and without conviction by an impartial jury of the state and district where the 
crime had been committed. The congressional contempt proceeding, he 
argued, violated all of these due process protections.319 Tucker’s explanation is 
the first extended legal analysis of the recently enacted Clause, and thus 
warrants quotation at length. Observe the way in which Tucker weaves 
together the principles of due process and governmental structure: 
By the amendments to the constitution, no person shall be deprived of 
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law. 
 
312.  7 Johns. 477 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1811). 
313.  22 F. Cas. 756 (C.C.D.N.H. 1814) (No. 13,156). 
314.  15 N.C. (4 Dev.) 1 (1833). 
315.  55 U.S. (14 How.) 539 (1852). 
316.  DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS: THE FEDERALIST PERIOD, 1789-1801, at 
232 (1997) (quoting 5 ANNALS OF CONG. 219 (1796)). 
317.  See id. at 234 n.238. 
318.  See 1 BLACKSTONE’S COMMENTARIES: WITH NOTES OF REFERENCE, TO THE CONSTITUTION 
AND LAWS, OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES; AND OF THE 
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA *203-06 (St. George Tucker ed., Philadelphia, William 
Young Birch & Abraham Small 1803) [hereinafter TUCKER’S BLACKSTONE]. 
319.  Id. 
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  Due process of law as described by sir Edward Coke I, is by 
indictment or presentment of good and lawful men, where such deeds 
be done in due manner, or by writ original of the common law. Due 
process of law must then be had before a judicial court, or a judicial 
magistrate. The judicial power of the United States is vested in one 
supreme court, and such inferior tribunals, as congress may establish, 
and extends to all cases in law and equity, arising under the 
constitution, &c. . . . In the distribution of the powers of government, 
the legislative powers were vested in congress . . . the executive powers 
(except in the instances particularly enumerated,) in the president and 
senate. The judicial powers (except in the cases particularly enumerated 
in the first article) in the courts: the word the, used in defining the 
powers of the executive, and of the judiciary, is, with these exceptions, 
co-extensive in it[s] signification with the word all: for all the powers 
granted by the constitution are either legislative, and executive, or 
judicial; to keep them for ever separate and distinct, except in the cases 
positively enumerated, has been uniformly the policy, and constitutes 
one of the fundamental principles of the American governments. 
. . . . 
. . . It will be urged, perhaps, that the house of representatives of the 
United States is, like a British house of commons, a judicial court: to 
which the answer is, it is neither established as such by the constitution 
(except in respect to its own members,) nor has it been, nor can it be so 
established by authority of congress; for all the courts of the United 
States must be composed of judges commissioned by the president of 
the United States, and holding their offices during good behaviour, and 
not by the unstable tenure of biennial elections.320 
To Tucker, then, due process means judicial process, and is tied to the 
“fundamental principle[] of the American governments” that legislative, 
executive, and judicial powers must be kept “for ever separate and distinct.” 
Significantly, the two houses of Congress had been granted quasi-judicial 
authority only with respect to their own members; for them to order the 
imprisonment of a nonmember was a usurpation of the judicial role and thus a 
denial of due process. To this fundamental concern, Tucker added other 
constitutional failures of the contempt proceedings. The House arrested 
Randall without a warrant “supported by ‘oath or affirmation’”;321 held 
Randall to answer for “an infamous crime[] without indictment or 
 
320.  Id. at *203-04 (second alteration in original). 
321.  Id. at *204. 
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presentment of a grand jury”;322 and tried him of a crime without a public trial 
by “an impartial jury of the state and district” where he committed the crime.323 
These specific derelictions reinforced Tucker’s fundamental point that a 
legislative body is incapable of providing due process of law—essentially the 
same point Hamilton had made in the New York assembly. 
Randall’s imprisonment by order of the House of Representatives 
established a precedent that due process does not preclude the houses of 
Congress from punishing nonmembers for contempt. Whatever the merits of 
that position, which to us seems dubious,324 the precedent remains 
authoritative to this day.325 Tucker’s treatment of the issue, however, was an 
early argument by a leading lawyer that the Due Process Clause applies to 
legislative action, draws much of its content from the separation of powers, 
and prohibits Congress from exercising quasi-judicial power to deprive an 
individual of liberty. 
Tucker also had occasion to analyze the Due Process Clause in the context 
of the Alien Acts, which (among other things) gave the President unilateral 
authority to declare particular aliens traitors and to banish them from the 
United States. Tucker argued that the statute 
seems impossible to validate, unless we could conceive that aliens are 
not persons, that the suspicions of a president of the United States are a 
probable cause supported by oath, or affirmation; that the opinion or 
judgment of a president is a trial by jury and a conviction, (in case of 
treasonable acts) upon the testimony of two witnesses; and that neither 
imprisonment, nor banishment, is any deprivation of personal 
liberty.326 
 
322.  Id. 
323.  Id. at *205. 
324.  We do not doubt the power of Congress to enact laws making contempt of Congress a 
crime, but to us it would seem more consistent with due process for Congress to refer any 
cases of contempt for prosecution in the courts, at least where the sanction is detention or 
fine. This power of contempt appears to derive from parliamentary practice under lex 
parliamenti. See CHAFETZ, supra note 83, at 193-235. We think it is notable that the U.S. 
Constitution expressly adopts the customary rules of lex parliamenti as to certain 
housekeeping functions of the houses of Parliament, see id., but not as to contempt of 
nonmembers. 
325.  See McGrain v. Daughtery, 273 U.S. 135 (1927) (upholding the power of the Senate to 
imprison a nonmember to coerce compliance with a subpoena to testify before a Senate 
committee); Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 204 (1821) (upholding the power of the 
House to imprison a nonmember as punishment for contempt). 
326.  2 TUCKER’S BLACKSTONE, supra note 318, at *137 n.24. 
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The interesting point here is not the substance of Tucker’s understanding 
of what due process requires, that no one may be deprived of personal liberty 
(including imprisonment or banishment) except by trial and conviction by a 
jury on charges based on probable cause supported by oath. That 
understanding was conventional. Chancellor Kent, from the Federalist side of 
the spectrum, described it as “a self-evident proposition, universally 
understood and acknowledged throughout this country, that no person can be 
taken, or imprisoned, or disseised of his freehold, or liberties, or estate, or 
exiled, or condemned, or deprived of life, liberty, or property, unless by the law 
of the land, or the judgment of his peers.”327 The interesting point is that 
Tucker regarded the statute itself, the Alien Act, as invalid on due process 
grounds, and not merely the President’s acts pursuant to the statute. This 
demonstrates that Tucker believed that due process was more than the 
requirement that courts and executive officers follow the law; it was a 
limitation on the legislature itself, preventing the legislature from authorizing 
courts and executive officers to invade rights without the traditional 
protections of probable cause and trial by jury. This principle is the nub of the 
modern doctrine of procedural due process, which tests the procedures 
provided by the legislature against enduring constitutional standards. 
b. Calder v. Bull 
In Calder v. Bull,328 a party who had lost a probate dispute on appeal to the 
Connecticut General Assembly argued to the Supreme Court that the 
legislature’s decision was an ex post facto law in violation of Article I, Section 
10 of the United States Constitution. The Connecticut government operated 
under its 1662 charter until 1818, and under that charter the General Assembly 
operated as the highest judicial court, in addition to also being the 
legislature.329 Three of the four Justices of the United States Supreme Court 
concluded that the General Assembly had acted pursuant to this traditional 
judicial power. If so, they decided, the Ex Post Facto Clause did not apply. An 
exercise of the General Assembly’s judicial power did not amount to a “law.”330 
Even if the act did amount to a law, these Justices further held, it would not 
 
327.  2 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 9-10 (New York, O. Halsted 1827). 
328.  3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798). 
329.  Id. at 395 (opinion of Paterson, J.); see Styles v. Tyler, 30 A. 165 (Conn. 1894); Collier, supra 
note 255, at 37 (noting that Connecticut’s legislature was the highest court in the state under 
the state’s founding documents and custom). 
330.  Calder, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 398 (opinion of Iredell, J.) (noting that, in this case, Connecticut’s 
legislature acted as a court, not as a legislative department). 
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violate the Ex Post Facto Clause because that Clause applied only to statutes 
that would result in criminal punishment for past actions, and not to civil 
matters like probate.331 
Justice Samuel Chase was not content to leave it at that. He offered a 
structural analysis examining the legality of the General Assembly’s act even on 
the assumption that it was legislative and not judicial in nature. He based his 
analysis on a confusing mixture of the textual provisions of Article I, Section 10 
and what he called “general principles of law and reason.”332 This has led most 
observers to assume that Chase believed the judiciary could invalidate state law 
on the basis of principles of “reason” not embodied in the text of the United 
States Constitution.333 A close examination of his opinion, however, reveals 
that his discussion of “general principles of law and reason” was in support of 
his interpretation of the meaning of separation of powers, and specifically his 
view that “legislative” power is limited to the passage of general and 
prospective rules of conduct. It was not an invocation of “natural law” in the 
sense of fundamental rights superior to positive law. He wrote: 
An ACT of the Legislature (for I cannot call it a law) contrary to the 
great first principles of the social compact; cannot be considered a 
rightful exercise of legislative authority. The obligation of a law in 
governments established on express compact, and on republican 
principles, must be determined by the nature of the power, on which it 
is founded. A few instances will suffice to explain what I mean. A law 
that punished a citizen for an innocent action, or, in other words, for an 
act, which, when done, was in violation of no existing law; a law that 
destroys, or impairs, the lawful private contracts of citizens; a law that 
makes a man a Judge in his own cause; or a law that takes property 
from A. and gives it to B: It is against all reason and justice, for a people 
to entrust a Legislature with SUCH powers; and, therefore, it cannot be 
presumed that they have done it. The genius, the nature, and the spirit, 
of our State Governments, amount to a prohibition of such acts of 
legislation; and the general principles of law and reason forbid them. 
The Legislature may enjoin, permit, forbid, and punish; they may 
declare new crimes; and establish rules of conduct for all its citizens in 
future cases; they may command what is right, and prohibit what is 
wrong; but they cannot change innocence into guilt; or punish 
 
331.  Id. at 399. 
332.  Id. at 388 (opinion of Chase, J.). 
333.  See, e.g., CURRIE, supra note 12, at 46-48. 
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innocence as a crime; or violate the right of an antecedent lawful private 
contract; or the right of private property. To maintain that our Federal, 
or State, Legislature possesses such powers, if they had not been 
expressly restrained; would, in my opinion, be a political heresy, 
altogether inadmissible in our free republican governments.334 
After considering the distinctions in principle between judicial and 
legislative authority, Chase turned to the prohibitions placed on the states by 
Article I, Section 10. The prohibitions on bills of attainder and ex post facto 
laws, he argued, are of a piece.335 Though “legislative judgments,” they are “an 
exercise of judicial power.”336 The other provisions of Article I, Section 10 relate 
to the rights of “property, or contracts.”337 He summed up these provisions, 
prohibiting state legislatures from authorizing paper money as legal tender and 
passing laws impairing the obligation of contracts, as reflecting the principle 
that “[i]t is not to be presumed, that the federal or state legislatures will pass 
laws to deprive citizens of rights vested in them by existing laws; unless for the 
benefit of the whole community, and on making full satisfaction.”338 
Chase’s dictum has often been cited as evidence of his willingness to go 
beyond the strictures of the written Constitution, and apply unwritten general 
principles of reason or natural law to state enactments, contrary to the Tenth 
Amendment, in the name of the United States Constitution. Some of his 
language certainly points in that direction. The key sentence is this: “To 
maintain that our Federal, or State, Legislature possesses such powers, if they 
had not been expressly restrained; would, in my opinion, be a political heresy, 
altogether inadmissible in our free republican governments.”339 Modern 
interpreters read this to say that these constitutional limitations would exist 
even if there were no express restraints such as the Ex Post Facto, Due Process, 
or Contracts Clauses.340 Actually, in light of Blackstonian equitable interpretive 
vocabulary, his point was different: that the legislature should not be 
“presumed” to act contrary to these principles.341 
 
334.  Calder, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 388-89 (opinion of Chase, J.) (emphases omitted). 
335.  Id. at 389. 
336.  Id. 
337.  Id. at 390. 
338.  Id. at 394. 
339.  Id. at 388-89. 
340.  See, e.g., CURRIE, supra note 12, at 46-48. 
341.  See Kurt T. Lash, The Lost Original Meaning of the Ninth Amendment, 83 TEX. L. REV. 
331, 403-06 (2004) (rejecting the common claim that Calder is properly viewed as allowing 
judicial invalidation of state laws abridging natural rights). 
1672.CHAPMANMCCONNELL.1807.DOC 4/10/2012  12:16:28 PM 
due process as separation of powers 
1747 
 
The “general principles” to which he refers are themselves based on 
separation of powers and the attendant limitations on state legislation. Chase 
argues that the central theme of the Bills of Attainder, Ex Post Facto, and 
Contracts Clauses of Article I, Section 10 is to prohibit state legislatures from 
exercising essentially judicial power to deprive subjects of property “rights 
vested in them by existing laws.”342 His explanation is in substance quite 
similar to Tucker’s explanation of due process as the general principle that ties 
together the constitutional prohibitions on the exercise of quasi-judicial power 
by the federal legislature. Chase’s confusing discourse was countered by Justice 
Iredell’s clear and unequivocal opinion stating that the courts have no authority 
to exercise judicial review on the basis of unwritten principles. 
c. Dash v. Van Kleeck 
In Dash v. Van Kleeck,343 the New York Supreme Court similarly struggled 
with the implications of the separation of powers for the practice of legislative 
adjudication. The facts in Dash were complicated. Jason Rudes was sentenced 
to debtors’ prison but was released on bond so long as he remained within a 
certain area, known as gaol-liberties. On May 18, 1807, Rudes traveled outside 
the gaol-liberties, though he immediately returned. Under the law as then 
interpreted by the New York courts, a creditor could sue the sheriff for 
permitting a debtor to escape these bounds, and Rudes’s creditor Dash did so. 
In April 1810, after Dash filed suit, but before it went to judgment, the 
legislature passed a statute declaring that a sheriff could claim as a defense to 
suit the capture or voluntary return of the debtor to prison before the creditor 
filed suit. The case presented the question whether this statute could 
constitutionally be applied to a suit that was pending when it was passed.344 
The five justices entered seriatim opinions. They all agreed that the act 
would be constitutional as applied to suits that were not pending when it was 
passed.345 The only question was whether the New York Constitution forbade 
the retrospective application of the act to pending suits. Two of the justices 
thought that the statute did nothing more than to “explain[] the true 
 
342.  Calder, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 394 (opinion of Chase, J.). 
343.  7 Johns. 477 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1811). 
344.  Id. at 477-79. 
345.  Id. at 482 (opinion of Yates, J.); id. at 486-87 (opinion of Spencer, J.); id. at 495 (opinion of 
Thompson, J.); id. at 502 (opinion of Kent, C.J.) (“The very essence of a new law is a rule 
for future cases.”). 
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construction of the former statutes,”346 contrary to the prior judicial 
interpretation. As such, it did not create a new rule of law.347 Further, they 
noted that “[t]here is nothing in the state constitution to prevent legislative 
interference.”348 Justice Spencer even argued that the state legislature had the 
same supremacy as a court of last resort as Parliament: 
The construction of statutes, undoubtedly, is a judicial function, 
subject, however, to the uncontrollable power of the legislature, to alter 
that construction in cases which have not passed to judgment; and I 
must insist, that our state legislature, when acting within the pale of the 
constitutions of the United States and of this state, has the same 
omnipotence which Judge Blackstone ascribes to the British 
parliament: “It has sovereign and uncontrollable authority, in the 
making, confirming, restraining, abrogating, repealing, reviving and 
expounding of laws, concerning all matters of all possible 
denominations.”349 
Chief Justice Kent wrote an influential opinion to the contrary.350 He based 
his judgment on “principles of law and the constitution.”351 The first legal 
principle he cited was that “[t]he very essence of a new law is a rule for future 
cases.”352 He contrasted this common law rule with the Roman rule that the 
 
346.  Id. at 483 (opinion of Yates, J.); see also id. at 487 (opinion of Spencer, J.) (“[The later 
statute] is, in effect a declaratory statute; in form, a directory one . . . . If it was competent to 
the legislature to alter the law retrospectively, it appears to me that they have effectually 
done it.”). 
347.  Id. at 484 (opinion of Yates, J.) (“[T]he legislature were possessed of competent authority to 
pass this declaratory act; and that the defendant is entitled to his defence, as at common law, 
according to the construction given to the former statutes by this last law . . . .”). 
348.  Id. at 483; see also id. at 488 (opinion of Spencer, J.) (“It is in vain to search for any 
prohibition in the state constitution . . . .”). 
349.  Id. at 492-93 (opinion of Spencer, J.) (quoting 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 
*160). 
350.  Id. at 500 (opinion of Kent, C.J.). Justice Van Ness joined Kent’s opinion. Id. at 513. Justice 
Thompson wrote a separate opinion that matched Kent’s reasoning and judgment. Id. at 
493-500 (opinion of Thompson, J.). In Society for the Propagation of the Gospel v. Wheeler,  
22 F. Cas. 756 (C.C.D.N.H. 1814), Justice Story, riding circuit, cited the authority of Chief 
Justice Kent’s opinion alongside Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798), and added that 
he “should be disposed to go a great way with the learned argument of Chief Justice Kent.” 
Wheeler, 22 F. Cas. at 767. 
351.  Dash, 7 Johns. at 501 (opinion of Kent, C.J.). 
352.  Id. at 502; see also id. at 503 (“It is a principle in the English common law, as ancient as the 
law itself, that a statute, even of its omnipotent parliament, is not to have a retrospective 
effect. . . . This was the doctrine as laid down by [Bracton and Coke]. [I]t received a solemn 
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prince may adopt retrospective laws, “for the will of the prince, under the 
despotism of the Roman emperors, was paramount to every obligation. Great 
latitude was anciently allowed to legislative expositions of statutes; for the 
separation of the judicial from the legislative power was not then distinctly 
known or prescribed.”353 This is where Kent transitioned to “the constitution”: 
Our case is happily very different from that of the subjects of Justinian. 
With us, the power of the lawgiver is limited and defined; the judicial is 
regarded as a distinct, independent power: private rights have been 
better understood and more exalted in public estimation, as well as 
secured by provisions dictated by the spirit of freedom, and unknown 
to the civil law. Our constitutions do not admit the power assumed by 
the Roman prince; and the principle we are considering is now to be 
regarded as sacred. It is not pretended that we have any express 
constitutional provision on the subject; nor have we any for numerous 
other rights dear alike to freedom and to justice.354 
Kent thus makes clear that he was not reasoning from an express 
constitutional prohibition on retrospective laws, but from the constitutional 
separation of powers. He does not here link these principles to New York’s due 
process clause (though, as we will show, he had already done so as a member 
of the New York Council of Revision), but the effect of his separation-of-
powers reasoning was the same. His decision does not turn on natural law,355 
but on the prospective “essence” or “nature” of lawmaking, as contrasted with 
retrospective quasi-judicial legislative acts. At pre-Revolutionary common law, 
prospectivity was merely a principle of statutory construction because, as 
Justice Spencer emphasized, Parliament had authority to pass declaratory acts, 
as did many of the colonial and early state legislatures. It was the separation of 
the judicial from the legislative power effected by New York’s written 
constitution that converted that principle into a constitutional command. 
d. Society for the Propagation of the Gospel v. Wheeler 
The principles of prospectivity and generality were not always self-
defining. In a case resting on New Hampshire’s express constitutional 
 
recognition in the Court of K. B. [in Gilmore v. Shuter].” (emphasis omitted) (citations 
omitted)).  
353.  Id. at 504-05. 
354.  Id. (emphases omitted). 
355.  Contra Williams, supra note 7, at 448 & n.170. 
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prohibition on “[r]etrospective” laws, which went beyond the Ex Post Facto 
Clause by applying to civil as well as criminal laws,356 Justice Joseph Story 
rendered the leading interpretation of what it meant for a civil law to be 
“retrospective”—an interpretation still authoritative today.357 In Society for the 
Propagation of the Gospel v. Wheeler,358 a British corporation (which happened to 
be the missionary arm of the Church of England) sued for possession of land in 
New Hampshire, which had been occupied for some time by New Hampshire 
tenants. At the time it acquired the land, the corporation gained title and “an 
absolute and unconditional right to [its] remedy for the possession, clear of 
any incumbrance, freely and without purchase.”359 Years later, the New 
Hampshire legislature enacted a law entitling tenants to the value of any 
improvements they made to a leasehold.360 At trial, the jury required the 
landowner to compensate the tenants for the improvements they had made to 
the land.361 
The federal court, sitting in diversity, held that the act violated article 23 of 
the New Hampshire Constitution, which provided that “[r]etrospective laws 
are highly injurious, oppressive, and unjust. No such laws, therefore, should be 
made, either for the decision of civil causes or the punishment of offences.”362 
This required an interpretation of the term “retrospective.” In one sense, the 
New Hampshire law was prospective: it applied only to improvements made 
after the statute was enacted. In another sense, it altered the rights the plaintiff 
had acquired under the law applicable at the time of the acquisition. Justice 
Story thus was forced to interpret the constitutional terms: 
What is a retrospective law, within the true intent and meaning of this 
article? Is it confined to statutes, which are enacted to take effect from a 
time anterior to their passage? [O]r does it embrace all statutes, which, 
though operating only from their passage, affect vested rights and past 
 
356.  N.H. CONST. of 1792, art. XXIII, reprinted in 4 THORPE, supra note 136, at 2471, 2474. 
357.  See Fernandez-Vargas v. Gonzalez, 548 U.S. 30, 37 (2006). 
358.  22 F. Cas. 756 (C.C.D.N.H. 1814) (No. 13,156) (Story, J.). 
359.  Id. at 759 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
360.  Id. at 767-68. 
361.  Id. at 769. 
362.  N.H. CONST. of 1792, art. XXIII, reprinted in 4 THORPE, supra note 136, at 2474. Before 
reaching that determination, Story concluded that the enactment violated neither the federal 
Contracts Clause as interpreted in Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. 6 (Cranch) 87 (1810), because it 
touched only property and not contract rights, nor the federal Ex Post Facto Clause as 
interpreted in Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798), because it affected only civil and not 
criminal rights. Wheeler, 22 F. Cas. at 767. 
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transactions? It would be a construction utterly subversive of all the 
objects of the provision, to adhere to the former definition. It would 
enable the legislature to accomplish that indirectly, which it could not 
do directly. Upon principle, every statute, which takes away or impairs 
vested rights acquired under existing laws, or creates a new obligation, 
imposes a new duty, or attaches a new disability, in respect to transactions or 
considerations already past, must be deemed retrospective . . . .363 
Applying this test to the case at bar, Justice Story concluded that the statute 
was unconstitutional. It amounted to “a direct extinguishment of a vested right 
in all the improvements and erections on the land, which were annexed to the 
freehold.”364 Justice Story referred to Bracton and other common law principles 
of “natural justice” to interpret the New Hampshire Constitution’s express 
prohibition on “retrospective” laws. Contrary to Ryan Williams’s assertion,365 
Justice Story was not applying natural law in the sense of unwritten universal 
rights, and he was not ignoring a due process clause. He simply pointed out 
that New Hampshire’s express constitutional provision, which itself referred to 
justice, was in accord with common law views of natural justice.366 
e. Hoke v. Henderson 
Hoke v. Henderson367 was a more problematic attempt to deal with the 
ambiguities of generality and prospectivity. Under North Carolina law, court 
clerks were to “hold their offices during their good behaviour” so long as they 
continued to reside in the county.368 Under the common law, such an office 
was recognized as a form of property.369 In 1832, however, the legislature 
 
363.  Wheeler, 22 F. Cas. at 767 (emphasis added). Justice Story relied upon the reasoning in 
Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, and Dash v. Van Kleeck, 7 Johns. 477 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1811), 
stating that “in a fit case, depending upon elementary principles, I should be disposed to go 
a great way with the learned argument of Chief Justice Kent.” Wheeler, 22 F. Cas. at 767. The 
Supreme Court recently invoked this construction of retroactivity in Fernandez-Vargas v. 
Gonzalez, 548 U.S. 30, 37 (2006). 
364.  Wheeler, 22 F. Cas. at 768. 
365.  Williams, supra note 7, at 448 & n.170. 
366.  For instance, he cited Bracton’s principle that a law must govern only future cases, “nova 
constitutio futuris formam imponere debet, & non praeteritis.” Wheeler, 22 F. Cas. at 768 
(quoting 3 BRACTON, supra note 44, at 530). 
367.  15 N.C. (4 Dev.) 1 (1833). 
368.  Id. at 10. 
369.  See 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *36. 
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passed a one-time act that required all county clerks to stand for election,370 
following which they would return to good-behavior tenure. Lawson 
Henderson, who had been appointed a clerk for Lincoln County in 1807, was 
defeated by John Hoke.371 Henderson refused to relinquish the office, leading 
to a suit by Hoke against Henderson.372 Chief Justice Ruffin, writing for the 
North Carolina Supreme Court, described the statute as one that “transfer[red] 
the office of clerk from one of these parties to the other, without any default of 
the former, or any judicial sentence of removal”373 and held that it was an 
invalid exercise of the General Assembly’s power under the state law-of-the-
land and separation-of-powers clauses.374 Much of the court’s analysis 
consisted of now-familiar discussion of separation-of-powers principles. 
Ruffin began by comparing the purely legislative powers of the General 
Assembly with the adjudicative powers that were exercised by Parliament. 
Parliament, he wrote, “decides questions of private right” and puts those 
decisions “into the form of a statute.”375 He continued: 
[Parliament] can adjudicate and often does substantially adjudicate, 
when it professes to enact new laws. That faculty is expressly denied to 
our Legislature, as much as legislation is denied to our Judiciary. 
Whenever an act of the Assembly therefore is a decision of titles 
between individuals, or classes of individuals, although it may in terms 
purport to be the introduction of a new rule of title, it is essentially a 
judgment against the old claim of right: which is not a legislative, but a 
judicial function.376 
Chief Justice Ruffin then stated the general rule that “where a right of property 
is acknowledged to have been in one person at one time and is held to cease in 
 
370.  Hoke, 15 N.C. (4 Dev.) at 2 (reproducing the 1832 enactment’s text). 
371.  Id. at 1. 
372.  Id. 
373.  Id. at 7. 
374.  Id. at 12, 30-31; see also N.C. CONST. of 1776, art. XII, reprinted in 5 THORPE, supra note 136, 
at 2787, 2788 (“[N]o freeman ought to be taken, imprisoned, or disseized of his freehold, 
liberties or privileges, or outlawed, or exiled, or in any manner destroyed, or deprived of his 
life, liberty, or property, but by the law of the land.” (emphasis added)); id. art. IV, reprinted 
in 5 THORPE, supra note 136, at 2787 (“[T]he legislative, executive, and supreme judicial 
powers of government ought to be forever separate and distinct from each other.”). 
375.  Hoke, 15 N.C. (4 Dev.) at 12. 
376.  Id. at 12-13. 
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him and to exist in another, whatever may be the origin of the new right in the 
latter, the destruction of the old one in the former is by sentence.”377 
While noting that the common law deemed public office as a property 
right—an “incorporeal hereditament[],”378 to be technical—Chief Justice Ruffin 
argued that a public office is different from many other kinds of property. It is 
subject to “the general interest,”379 and, unlike most other kinds of property, it 
is inalienable and may be forfeited as punishment for mismanagement.380 
Nonetheless, the emoluments of the office are the officeholder’s “private 
property, as much as the land which he tills, or the horse he rides or the debt 
which is owing to him.”381 The office “cannot be divested without some default 
of the officer, or the cesser [i.e., expiration] of the office itself.”382 He also 
stated: 
Creating a right or conferring it on one, when not already vested in 
another, is legislation. So prescribing the duties of officers, their 
qualifications, their fees, their powers and the consequences of a breach 
of duty, including punishment and removal, are all political 
regulations, and fall within the legislative province. But to inflict those 
punishments, after finding the default, is to adjudge; and to do it, 
without default, is equally so and still more indefensible.383 
Chief Justice Ruffin reasoned that the legislature had deprived Henderson 
of a vested property right in his office by requiring an election that would 
result in the office’s being transferred to another. But the form of the 
legislation was not specific as to him; the legislation requiring clerks to submit 
to reelection applied equally to all counties in the state of North Carolina. Was 
it really, therefore, a sentence? An adjudication? Ruffin struggled with the 
issue. He noted that “[i]f the act . . . had been confined in its terms to the 
clerkship of Lincoln, its judicial character would be obvious.”384 We would add 
that if the act had applied to all clerk positions into the future, switching from 
good-behavior tenure to periodic election, its legislative character would have 
 
377.  Id. at 13. 
378.  Id. at 7. 
379.  Id. at 19. 
380.  Id. at 19-20. 
381.  Id. at 18-19. 
382.  Id. at 19. 
383.  Id. at 15. 
384.  Id. at 13. 
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been equally obvious. This act seemed to be general in one respect and special 
in another. 
Chief Justice Ruffin seemed to recognize that he was venturing into 
uncharted waters by invalidating as a “judicial” act a statute that was in some 
sense general on its face. To resolve the problem, he invoked a distinction 
between legislation that transfers ownership of property from one class of 
persons to another, and legislation that modifies or abolishes the property right 
itself: the legislature may “destroy[]” property created by statute, “but it 
cannot continue the office, and either lessen the tenure of the incumbent, or 
transfer it to another.”385 He thus “readily conceded” that the legislature had 
the power “of abolishing the office altogether,” but denied that it could exercise 
the power “of depriving the officer of his office, while it continues.”386 The 
decision may be seen as a precursor to cases like Board of Regents v. Roth,387 
which held that the terms of public employment—pay, emoluments, duties, 
and the like—may be altered prospectively, by legislative action, but that 
removing a person from a public office, once it has vested according to the 
terms of the positive law in force at the time,388 requires process either from a 
court or from an administrative substitute satisfying the criteria of notice and 
the opportunity to be heard. 
f. Bloomer v. McQuewan 
The Supreme Court’s first decision mentioning the Fifth Amendment’s 
Due Process Clause, Bloomer v. McQuewan,389 decided three years before the 
better-known Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co.,390 invoked 
both generality and prospectivity. The case involved a federal act that extended 
the term of a specific patent. The Court had to determine whether the 
extension also effectively extended the original assignment of the right to use 
the patent, or whether the patent holder could reassign the patent, within its 
extended term, after the original assignment had been set to end. The Court 
interpreted the statute to extend not only the term of the patent, but also the 
 
385.  Id. at 26. 
386.  Id. 
387.  408 U.S. 564 (1972). 
388.  In Roth, the Court did not use the nineteenth-century vocabulary of “vesting,” but spoke 
instead of a “legitimate claim of entitlement,” such as tenure. Id. at 577. We regard this as an 
equivalent, if looser, term. 
389.  55 U.S. (14 How.) 539 (1853). 
390.  59 U.S. (18 How.) 272 (1856). 
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term of the assignment. This was because “a special act of Congress, passed 
afterwards, depriving the appellees of the right to use [the patented articles], 
certainly could not be regarded as due process of law.”391 It would be hard to 
summarize the antebellum due process doctrine more succinctly. 
3. Categories of Impermissible Quasi-Judicial Acts 
a. An Act That Takes from A and Gives to B 
Writing in 1829, Joseph Story explained: 
We know of no case, in which a legislative act to transfer the property 
of A. to B. without his consent, has ever been a constitutional exercise 
of legislative power in any state in the union. On the contrary, it has 
been constantly resisted as inconsistent with just principles, by every 
judicial tribunal in which it has been attempted to be enforced.392 
The law that takes property from A and gives it to B was the paradigmatic 
example of an impermissible quasi-judicial act. 
The earliest such cases were Symsbury’s Case393 and Bowman v. Middleton,394 
both of which involved conflicting grants of land by colonial legislatures. Both 
posed a conflict between the ordinary “last in time” rule that in the event of 
inconsistent laws by a single legislature, the later-enacted law controls, and the 
principle, traced to Magna Charta, that once property vested pursuant to 
legislative grant, subsequent legislatures did not have power to take it away.395 
The judges in Bowman determined that 
the plaintiffs could claim no title under the [later-enacted] act in 
question, as it was against common right, as well as against magna 
charta, to take away the freehold of one man and vest it in another, and 
that, too, to the prejudice of third persons, without any compensation, 
or even the trial by a jury of the country, to determine the right in 
question. [The later act] was, therefore, ipso facto, void.396 
 
391.  Bloomer, 55 U.S. (14 How.) at 553. 
392.  Wilkinson v. Leland, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 627, 658 (1829) (Story, J.). 
393.  1 Kirby 444 (Conn. 1785); see HAMBURGER, supra note 37, at 332 n.5. 
394.  1 S.C.L. (1 Bay) 252 (1792). 
395.  See HAMBURGER, supra note 37, at 330-36. 
396.  Bowman, 1 S.C.L. at 254-55. 
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Trustees of the University of North Carolina v. Foy,397 which we briefly cited as 
an application of the prospectivity rule, was one of the most influential early 
state law-of-the-land cases. The court’s judgment relied expressly on 
separation-of-powers principles. In 1789, the North Carolina legislature 
granted “all the property that has heretofore or shall hereafter escheat to the 
state” to the Trustees of the University of North Carolina.398 In 1800 the 
legislature prospectively repealed the statute, and declared that all properties 
that the university had been granted under the 1789 statute that it had not yet 
sold “shall from hence revert to the state, and henceforth be considered as the 
property of the same.”399 The trustees of the university sued, arguing that 
clawing back the unsold real estate violated the state constitution, as a 
“deprivation” of “property” “in violation of the law of the land.”400 
The State made two principal arguments in response: (1) that as the creator 
of the corporation through charter, it necessarily had the power to destroy the 
corporation;401 and (2) the law of the land either did not apply to the 
legislature or did not apply to taking the property of corporations (as opposed 
to natural persons).402 
Judge Locke, for the court, invalidated the law on two independent 
constitutional grounds, only one of which is relevant here: that the law was 
invalid under the state law-of-the-land clause because it was an exercise of 
judicial power by the legislature. According to Judge Locke, the law-of-the-
land clause 
warrant[s] a belief that members of a corporation as well as individuals 
shall not be so deprived of their liberties or property, unless by a trial 
by Jury in a court of Justice, according to the known and established 
rules of decision, derived from the common law, and such acts of the 
Legislature as are consistent with the constitution.403 
 
397.  5 N.C. (1 Mur.) 58 (1805). 
398.  Id. at 81 (quoting Act of 1789, ch. 21, § 2, 1715-1790 N.C. Sess. Laws 474). 
399.  Id. at 81 (quoting Act of 1800, ch. 5, § 2, 1791-1803 N.C. Sess. Laws 150). 
400.  See id. at 61 (argument of Mr. Haywood, counsel for the plaintiffs). 
401.  See id. at 85. 
402.  See id. at 87. 
403.  Id. at 88. 
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There was some disagreement among early courts over whether the 
property rights of corporations were constitutionally protected,404 but the 
North Carolina court took the affirmative side of that dispute. The court noted 
that “the Trustees are a corporation established for public purposes,” 
yet we conceive that circumstance will not make the property of the 
Trustees subject to the arbitrary will of the Legislature. The property 
vested in the Trustees must remain for the uses intended for the 
University, until the Judiciary of the country in the usual and common 
form, pronounce them guilty of such acts, as will, in law, amount to a 
forfeiture of their rights or a dissolution of their body.405 
The court’s definition of law of the land did limit the legislature, but it 
limited it from depriving specific persons of property without “a trial by Jury in 
a court of Justice” and without “the known and established rules of decision, 
derived from the common law, and such acts of the Legislature as are 
consistent with the constitution.” This is not akin to modern substantive due 
process. This is an individual freedom against the deprivation of rights except 
by a court in accordance with the separation of powers. 
One of the most influential due process cases in the antebellum era was 
Taylor v. Porter.406 A New York statute required town highway commissioners, 
upon an application by a private citizen and certification of need by twelve local 
freeholders, to divest a landowner of land and vest it in the applicant for a 
private road. The applicant was to pay the original landowner the value of the 
 
404.  See, e.g., Turpin v. Lockett, 10 Va. (6 Call.) 113, 170 (1804) (Roane, J., concurring) (“[T]his 
position of vested rights, only extends to such private and perfect rights, as are not hostile to 
the principles of the government.”). 
405.  Foy, 5 N.C. (1 Mur.) at 89. Judge Hall dissented, concluding that the law was constitutional 
because the Legislature had the authority as the branch assigned by the Constitution to 
create a university to judge the best way to provide for that university. He made no 
comment on the trustees’ law-of-the-land argument. Id. at 89-92. 
406.  4 Hill 140 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1843) (opinion of Bronson, J.); see Williams, supra note 7, at  
464-65 (describing Justice Bronson’s opinion in Taylor as “famous”); id. at 474 (“In 1854, 
Representative Gerrit Smith of New York, a former presidential candidate of the  
anti-slavery Liberty Party, invoked Justice Bronson’s Taylor v. Porter decision.”); id. at 475 
(“[A]bolitionists Joel Tiffany and William Goodell both published treatises seeking to 
establish the unconstitutionality of slavery in which they equated ‘due process’ with judicial 
process and simultaneously invoked Justice Bronson’s 1843 decision in Taylor v. Porter.” 
(footnote omitted)); id. at 476 (claiming that Taylor represented the “most common” theory 
of due process advanced by abolitionists—viz., “that the due process guarantee protects 
individuals against deprivations of rights except as punishment for a crime”); id. at 491 
(noting that Dean John Norton Pomeroy of the Law School of the University of New York 
quoted Taylor in his treatise “to demonstrate the meaning of ‘due process of law’”). 
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land, determined by a jury of six freeholders from a neighboring town. The 
road was then entirely private, “for the use of such applicant, his heirs and 
assigns.”407 Justice Bronson, writing for the New York Supreme Court, put the 
issue squarely: 
The property of A. is taken, without his permission, and transferred to 
B. . . . Whatever sum may be tendered, or however ample may be the 
provision for compensation, the question still remains, can the 
legislature compel any man to sell his land or his goods, or any interest 
in them, to his neighbor, when the property is not to be applied to 
public use?408 
Justice Bronson held that the Act was unconstitutional, for authorizing 
deprivations of property without due process of law. He first stated that the Act 
was not included in the power of eminent domain, because that extended only 
to land taken for public use, not land taken from one private party and given to 
another.409 He then asserted that his “present impressions” were that the New 
York Constitution’s assignment of the “legislative power” to the General 
Assembly did not authorize it to pass acts taking property from A and giving it 
to B.410 But he did not rely on the grant of legislative power because he thought 
the law-of-the-land clause and especially the due process clause were on point. 
The words “due process of law,” in this place, cannot mean less than a 
prosecution or suit instituted and conducted according to the 
prescribed forms and solemnities for ascertaining guilt, or determining 
the title to property. It will be seen that the same measure of protection 
against legislative encroachment is extended to life, liberty and 
property; and if the latter can be taken without a forensic trial and 
judgment, there is no security for the others. If the legislature can take 
the property of A. and transfer it to B., they can take A. himself, and 
either shut him up in prison, or put him to death. But none of these 
things can be done by mere legislation. There must be “due process of 
law.” Perhaps the whole clause [the law-of-the-and and due process 
clauses] should be read together, and then if it do not, as I have 
supposed, amount to a direct prohibition against taking the property of 
 
407.  Taylor, 4 Hill at 142 (quoting 1 R.S. 513, § 54, 77-79). 
408.  Id. at 143. 
409.  Id. 
410.  Id. at 145. 
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one and giving it to another, it contains, at the least, an implication too 
strong to be resisted that such an act cannot be done.411 
The result is highly reminiscent of Justice Thomas’s dissenting opinion in 
Kelo v. City of New London.412 
b. An Act That Takes Land for Public Use Without Compensation 
In Britain the power of eminent domain was customarily exercised by 
Parliament through special acts—laws specifying particular property to be 
taken for a public use—with just compensation. The compensation in effect 
satisfied due process concerns because provision of equivalent value obviated 
any deprivation.413 It was not until the 1770s that Parliament authorized the 
executive to exercise eminent domain for the purpose of building highways, 
and then it required the approval of two justices, with a jury trial if the justices 
disagreed about the amount of compensation.414 The practice in the colonies, 
too, was to provide for compensation through the political process either by 
statute or by jury trial.415 Only two colonial charters guaranteed just 
compensation for a taking;416 otherwise, it was merely customary.417 Two early 
 
411.  Id. at 147 (citation omitted); cf. In re Albany St., 11 Wend. 149 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1834) 
(invalidating a state statute under the state takings clause insofar as it authorized 
commissioners to take a whole parcel of private land for the use of New York City when 
only a portion of the parcel was necessary for a public street). Another similar case is In re 
John & Cherry Streets, 19 Wend. 659 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1839), which invalidated a state statute 
under the state due process and takings clauses insofar as it authorized commissioners to 
entirely divest a private party of land and give it to the corporation of New York City for 
nonpublic use. This decision resembles Justice O’Connor’s dissenting position in the recent 
case of Kelo v. City of New London, though the latter was based on the “public use” language 
of the Takings Clause rather than on due process. See 545 U.S. 469, 494 (2005) (O’Connor, 
J., dissenting). 
412.  545 U.S. at 505 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
413.  See, e.g., 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *138-39; EMER DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF 
NATIONS, bk. 1, ch. 20, §§ 244-46, at 232-33 (Béla Kapossy & Richard Whatmore eds., 
Liberty Fund 2008) (1758). 
414.  MCDONALD, supra note 129, at 22. 
415.  William Michael Treanor, The Original Understanding of the Takings Clause and the Political 
Process, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 782, 787 (1995). 
416.  MASSACHUSETTS BODY OF LIBERTIES § 8 (1641), reprinted in SOURCES OF OUR LIBERTIES: 
DOCUMENTARY ORIGINS OF INDIVIDUAL LIBERTIES IN THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 
AND BILL OF RIGHTS 148, 149 (Richard L. Perry & John C. Cooper eds., 1952) [hereinafter 
SOURCES OF OUR LIBERTIES] (requiring “reasonable prices and hire” for public use of “Cattel 
or goods” and “suffitient[] recompence[]” if the “Cattle or goods shall perish or suffer 
damage”); FUNDAMENTAL CONSTITUTIONS OF CAROLINA, art. XLIV (1669), reprinted in  
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constitutions—those of Massachusetts and Vermont—made just compensation 
for takings a constitutional requirement, as did the Bill of Rights.418 Even in 
states without an explicit just compensation clause, however, some courts 
concluded that due process required a certain judicial procedure for 
determining how much compensation was due.419 
Just a few years after adoption of the Bill of Rights, in Lindsay v. 
Commissioners,420 the South Carolina Supreme Court considered the validity of 
an act authorizing the City of Charleston to appoint three commissioners to 
take certain private lands for a public street, “and to assess the owners of lots 
near or adjoining to it, in proportion to the benefit they were likely to receive 
by it.”421 One of the landowners sued for a prohibition against the taking, 
arguing that the act authorized the commissioners to take land without 
consent, jury trial, or adequate compensation in violation of the state 
constitution’s law-of-the-land and jury trial clauses.422 The former provided 
that “[n]o freeman of this State shall be taken, or imprisoned, or disseized of 
his freehold, liberties, or privileges, or outlawed, or exiled, or in any manner 
destroyed, or deprived of his life, liberty or property, but by the judgment of 
his peers, or by the law of the land.”423 The latter provided that “[t]he trial by 
 
5 THORPE, supra note 136, at 2778 (“The damage the owner of such lands (on or through 
which any such public things shall be made) shall receive thereby shall be valued, and 
satisfaction made by such ways as the grand council shall appoint.”). 
417.  Hulsebosch, supra note 293, at 977; Treanor, supra note 415, at 787. 
418.  MASS. CONST. pt. I, art. X, reprinted in 3 THORPE, supra note 136, at 1888, 1891 (“[W]henever 
the public exigencies require that the property of any individual should be appropriated to 
public uses, he shall receive a reasonable compensation therefor.”); VT. CONST. of 1777, ch. 
I, art. II, reprinted in 6 THORPE, supra note 136, at 3737, 3740 (“[W]henever any particular 
man’s property is taken for the use of the public, the owner ought to receive an equivalent in 
money.”); see also Northwest Ordinance of 1787, art. 2, reprinted in SOURCES OF OUR 
LIBERTIES, supra note 416, at 392, 395 (“[S]hould the public exigencies make it necessary, for 
the common preservation, to take any person’s property, or to demand his particular 
services, full compensation shall be made for the same.”). 
419.  See, e.g., Vanhorne’s Lessee v. Dorrance, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 304, 315 (C.C.D. Pa. 1795); see also 
Gardner v. Trs. of the Vill. of Newburgh, 2 Johns. Ch. 162, 167-68 (N.Y. Ch. 1816) 
(concluding on the evidence of natural equity, English customary law, state constitutions, 
and the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause that it was the “sense of the people of this 
country” that every exercise of eminent domain requires just compensation); Hulsebosch, 
supra note 293, at 977 (discussing Gardner). 
420.  2 S.C.L. (2 Bay) 38 (Ct. App. 1796). 
421.  Id. at 38-39 (quoting the 1795 statute). 
422.  Id. at 40. 
423.  S.C. CONST. of 1790, art. IX, § 2, reprinted in 6 THORPE, supra note 136, at 3258, 3264. 
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jury . . . shall be forever inviolably preserved.”424 The South Carolina 
Constitution did not have a just compensation clause—though interestingly, 
there had been such a clause in the colonial charter prior to independence. 
The city recorder defended on the ground that the power of eminent 
domain had been “recognised by magna charta and confirmed to the state by 
our own constitution.”425 He admitted 
that the legislature had no authority to interfere between individuals in 
relation to their private property, and by an act in a shorthanded way to 
change the rights of the parties and to take the property from A. and 
give it to B. This, he said, was against both magna charta and our own 
constitution.426 
But a taking for a public use, he argued, was in accord with the law. 
The court split. Two of the judges voted to uphold the law.427 The exercise 
of eminent domain, they concluded, was “part of the lex terrae, which both 
[Magna Charta and the law-of-the-land clause] meant to defend and 
protect.”428 They appeared to agree that just compensation was required under 
the law of the land, but they believed that the city’s assessment of the land’s 
value and offer of compensation were sufficient. 
The other two judges thought the law was invalid as a legislative 
deprivation of property against the law of the land. Judge Burke wrote that the 
law of the land required that exercises of eminent domain be coupled with “fair 
compensation made to the private individual, for the loss he might sustain by 
it, to be ascertained by a jury of the country.”429 Judge Waties agreed, but 
elaborated. He cited Vattel, Bynkershoek, and Blackstone to the effect that the 
government may exercise the power of eminent domain, but only with just 
compensation.430 He then cited an act of Parliament authorizing the taking of 
private land that provided for a jury trial (upon demand) on the issue of what 
amount of compensation would be just.431 Quoting the law-of-the-land clause, 
he asserted that “[t]he rights of our citizens are not less valuable than those of 
 
424.  Id. § 6, reprinted in 6 THORPE, supra note 136, at 3258, 3264. 
425.  Lindsay, 2 S.C.L. (2 Bay) at 42. 
426.  Id. 
427.  Id. at 56. 
428.  Id. at 57. 
429.  Id. at 58. 
430.  Id. 
431.  Id. at 58-59. 
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the people of England: we have besides a constitution, which limits and 
controls the power of the legislature.”432 He maintained that the constitution 
prohibited the legislature from depriving a freeman of his property, “but by 
such means as are authorized by the ancient common law of the land,” which, in 
this case, required full compensation.433 
c. An Act That Revises a Charter or Revokes a Land Grant 
We have already seen that British and American Whigs before and during 
the Revolution thought that Parliament violated due process when it altered 
the charters of the East India Company and the colony of Massachusetts. The 
point was that Parliament could not act like a court by passing a special bill that 
deprived a certain party of rights without providing basic common law 
procedures such as notice and a hearing. In effect, valuable rights acquired 
through a charter were conceptualized as a form of property, which could not 
be taken away except by means of generally applicable legislation administered 
by courts. When states separated the judicial from the legislative powers, the 
same logic led jurists to conclude that state legislatures could not pass statutes 
singling out particular charters for special deprivation. 
The New York Council of Revision, a body that reviewed proposed 
legislation for constitutionality and public policy, provided two early examples. 
In 1803, the Council considered a bill that amended the charter of the 
Corporation of the City of New York without its consent. Chief Justice James 
Kent, who sat on the Council, objected to the charter revision on the ground 
that it would breach the Crown’s covenant with the city, which guaranteed that 
its charter provisions would “be valid and effectual” “notwithstanding any 
statute of Parliament, or any act of Assembly.”434 Without appealing to the 
New York Constitution, Kent advised against the act as a “dangerous 
precedent” because, 
if the alterations contained in the said bill can be made without the 
consent of the corporation, the charter may with equal right be altered 
in other particulars, and may even be destroyed whenever it shall seem 
meet to the Legislature. And not only this, but every other charter, and 
 
432.  Id. at 59. 
433.  Id. 
434.  ALFRED B. STREET, THE COUNCIL OF REVISION OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK 424 (Albany, 
William Gould 1859). 
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every grant from government can be altered or resumed at pleasure, for 
they all rest upon the same foundation.435 
The General Assembly enacted the bill over Kent’s objection.436 
Four years later the Council considered a bill that would have altered the 
charter of Columbia College. The Council noted that “[t]he right in question 
has received the repeated and explicit sanction of government [through 
original charter, constitutional provisions, and statute], and it has thereby 
acquired all the security which any grant or chartered right can receive under 
the Constitution and the law of the land.”437 This time Chief Justice Kent wrote 
for a united Council (including Governor Lewis and Justice Thompson) that 
explicitly rejected the bill as a violation of due process of law: 
It is a sound principle in free governments, and one which has received 
frequent confirmation by the acts of the Legislature, that charters of 
incorporation, whether granted for private or local, or charitable, or 
literary or religious purposes, were not to be affected without due 
process of law, or without the consent of the parties concerned.438 
Kent added that an abrogation of the charter could perhaps be justified “by 
some strong public necessity,” but “no such necessity is presumed to exist in 
the present case.”439 The bill died.440 
The separation-of-powers logic also makes sense of the first decision by the 
full Supreme Court to invalidate a state act under the Contracts Clause, Fletcher 
v. Peck.441 Under the influence of bribes, the Georgia legislature had sold most 
of what is now Alabama and Mississippi for pennies an acre. The next year the 
legislature repealed the grant. Peck later acquired some of the land and sold it 
to Fletcher, who sued him for breach of covenant title because the grant had 
been repealed.442 The Court invalidated the act revoking the land grant as an 
 
435.  Id. at 425. 
436.  Id. at 405, 423-25. 
437.  Id. at 344. 
438.  Id. at 345. 
439.  Id. 
440.  Id. 
441.  10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810); cf. Wales v. Stetson, 2 Mass. (2 Tyng) 143 (1806) (interpreting 
a statute authorizing toll gates on turnpike roads narrowly to authorize them only on private 
roads, and not on roads where the public had an easement, because the statute would then 
operate to retrospectively divest the public of a right to use the road without a toll). 
442.  Fletcher, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) at 92. 
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interference with the state’s contract with the buyers, in violation of either 
“general principles which are common to our free institutions, or . . . the 
particular provisions of the constitution of the United States.”443 Chief Justice 
Marshall, writing for the Court, determined that “when absolute rights have 
vested,” under a statutory grant, “a repeal of the law cannot devest those 
rights.”444 He continued: 
  To the legislature, all legislative power is granted; but the question, 
whether the act of transferring the property of an individual to the 
public, be in the nature of the legislative power, is well worthy of 
serious reflection. 
  It is the peculiar province of the legislature to prescribe general rules 
for the government of society; the application of those rules to 
individuals in society would seem to be the duty of other 
departments.445 
One might think that the revocation of a land grant should be analyzed as a 
taking of property, but neither of the two federal constitutional provisions that 
govern deprivations of property, the Just Compensation and Due Process 
Clauses of the Fifth Amendment, applied to state governments. The Court 
therefore turned to the Contracts Clause as its ground for decision. Chief 
Justice Marshall reasoned that a grantor implicitly promises not to revoke its 
grant, constituting a binding contract. Revocation of the grant would therefore 
impair “the obligation of [that] contract[]” in violation of the Contracts 
Clause.446 The correctness of the decision might well be questioned on the 
ground that the Contracts Clause might have been understood to apply only to 
private contracts;447 extension of the principle to legislative promises produces 
conundrums about whether a legislature can bargain away the constitutional 
authority of successor legislators.448 The significant point for our purposes, 
however, is that Marshall applied the same sort of separation-of-powers logic 
to the Contracts Clause that courts generally applied to questions of vested 
rights. 
 
443.  Id. at 139. 
444.  Id. at 135. It is unclear whether Chief Justice Marshall meant that Georgia lacked the power 
to revoke the grant under general principles notwithstanding the Constitution. See CURRIE, 
supra note 12, at 130-32. 
445.  Fletcher, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) at 136. 
446.  Id. at 138. 
447.  See McConnell, supra note 205, at 290 & n.106. 
448.  See Kainen, supra note 266, at 405-06. 
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Daniel Webster’s argument in Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward449 
was even more paradigmatic of due-process-as-separation-of-powers logic. 
Webster argued that an act of the New Hampshire legislature that divested one 
named private corporation, the Trustees of Dartmouth College, of its rights 
pursuant to a royal charter violated the state constitution’s law-of-the-land 
clause because the charter rights were taken away without “judgment of [their] 
peers, or the law of the land.”450 Webster first argued that the corporation and 
its trustees had property rights that were protected by the law-of-the-land 
clause, and concluded, as did the justices in Trustees of the University of North 
Carolina v. Foy,451 that corporate property is protected.452 Webster then argued 
that the act infringed the thirty-seventh article of the New Hampshire 
Constitution, which provided that the powers of government shall be kept 
separate: 
By these acts, the legislature assumes to exercise a judicial power. It 
declares a forfeiture, and resumes franchises, once granted, without 
trial or hearing. If the constitution be not altogether wastepaper, it has 
restrained the power of the legislature in these particulars. If it has any 
meaning, it is, that the legislature shall pass no act directly and 
manifestly impairing private property, and private privileges. It shall 
not judge, by act. It shall not decide by act. It shall not deprive, by act. 
But it shall leave all these things to be tried and adjudged by the law of 
the land.453 
Webster passed directly from this argument based on the separation of 
powers to an argument based on the fifteenth article of the state constitution, 
which provided that no one shall be deprived of “property, immunities, or 
privileges, but by the judgement of his peers or the law of the land.”454 The 
New Hampshire court had admitted that the property rights of the corporation 
and trustees were privileges protected under the law-of-the-land clause, but 
had said that it was difficult to know whether the legislative act under question 
 
449.  17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819); see also COOLEY, supra note 297, at 353-54 (noting that “[n]o 
definition [of due process] is more often quoted” than Webster’s); JOHN M. SHIRLEY, THE 
DARTMOUTH COLLEGE CAUSES AND THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 207-08 (St. 
Louis, G.I. Jones & Co. 1879) (recounting Webster’s arguments). 
450.  Dartmouth Coll., 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 561. 
451.  5 N.C. (1 Mur.) 58 (1805); see supra notes 397-405 and accompanying text. 
452.  Dartmouth Coll., 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 561, 580. 
453.  Id. at 579 (emphasis omitted). 
454.  Id. at 580 (quoting N.H. CONST. of 1792, art. XV, reprinted in 4 THORPE, supra note 136, at 
2471, 2473). 
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was a law of the land.455 Webster’s reply, which has been cited as a 
“substantive” interpretation,456 was actually nothing more than a reiteration of 
Hamilton’s point that legislatures are limited by due process and law-of-the-
land principles, and that they cannot enact quasi-judicial measures that are 
tantamount to a judicial sentence. Citing Coke and Blackstone, Webster argued 
that the challenged acts of the legislature were “particular” rather than 
“general,” and were “sentences” rather than “laws.”457 He offered this 
interpretation of “the law of the land”: 
By the law of the land is most clearly intended the general law; a law, 
which hears before it condemns; which proceeds upon inquiry, and 
renders judgment only after trial. The meaning is, that every citizen 
shall hold his life, liberty, property, and immunities, under the 
protection of the general rules which govern society. Every thing which 
may pass under the form of an enactment, is not, therefore, to be 
considered the law of the land. If this were so, acts of attainder, bills of 
pains and penalties, acts of confiscation, acts reversing judgments, and 
acts directly transferring one man’s estate to another, legislative 
judgments, decrees, and forfeitures, in all possible forms, would be the 
law of the land.458 
Chief Justice John Marshall decided the case on the grounds of the 
Contracts Clause, and not the Due Process Clause (which did not apply to the 
states), but his rationale tracked Webster’s.459 
d. Laws That Reduce Procedural Protections for a Small Class of Citizens 
Courts likewise invalidated laws that reduced procedural protections for a 
small class of citizens.460 The cases wedded the generality requirement with a 
 
455.  See id. at 550-51. 
456.  See, e.g., Williams, supra note 7, at 424-25. 
457.  Dartmouth Coll., 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 581-82. 
458.  Id. 
459.  Id. at 627; see also id. at 675, 689 (Story, J.) (noting that the royal charter provided that 
donations to the corporation would be administered by the trustees for the purpose of the 
corporation without interference by the Crown, unless “taken away by due process of law,” 
which Justice Story interpreted to mean “without the consent of the corporation”); id. at 705 
(arguing that each trustee has an individual legal interest in his office “and it cannot be 
divested but by due course of law”). 
460.  Reed v. Wright, 2 Greene 15, 23-25 (Iowa 1849) (invalidating a state statute providing special 
procedures for settling title to Native American lands as a “special and limited act” against 
1672.CHAPMANMCCONNELL.1807.DOC 4/10/2012  12:16:28 PM 
due process as separation of powers 
1767 
 
concern about departure from traditional procedural protections that was 
ultimately moored in the Due Process Clause by the Supreme Court in such 
cases as Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co.461 and Hurtado v. 
California,462 discussed below.463 Two of the most important of these hybrid 
cases were Holden v. James464 and Bank of the State v. Cooper.465 
In Holden, the Massachusetts Supreme Court invalidated a special bill that 
allowed the plaintiff to sue the defendant after the statute of limitations had 
run. Article 10 of the Declaration of Rights provided that “[e]ach individual of 
the society has a right to be protected by it in the enjoyment of his life, liberty, 
and property, according to standing laws.”466 Although another provision of the 
constitution gave the legislature “the power of suspending the laws, or the 
execution of the laws,”467 the court interpreted that provision as allowing only 
the suspension of a law in its entirety, not merely “for the government of one 
particular case.”468 The court explained this interpretation by reference to “the 
first principles of civil liberty and natural justice, and to the spirit of our 
constitution and laws,” which forbid “that any one citizen should enjoy 
 
the state constitution’s due process clause); Holden v. James, 11 Mass. (9 Tyng) 396, 401-03 
(1814) (invalidating a special act suspending the statute of limitations as to plaintiff’s cause 
of action under the Massachusetts Constitution’s standing-laws clause); Baker v. Kelley,  
11 Minn. 480, 496-97 (1865) (invalidating a state statute precluding the use of certain 
evidence as proof of title to land); Merrill v. Sherburne, 1 N.H. 199, 216-17 (1818) 
(invalidating an act granting a new trial to plaintiff under the New Hampshire 
Constitution’s separation-of-powers guarantee clause and retrospective-laws clause); Jones’ 
Heirs v. Perry, 18 Tenn. (10 Yer.) 59, 71-72 (1836) (invalidating special legislation 
authorizing particular guardians to sell infants’ property to pay particular debts and defining 
the “law of the land” to mean “a general and public law, operating equally upon every 
member of the community”); Bank of the State v. Cooper, 10 Tenn. (2 Yer.) 599, 605 (1831) 
(invalidating a statute establishing a specially constituted court to hear and decide all claims 
against a particular bank as a “partial . . . law” prohibited by the law-of-the-land provision). 
See also the case of Champion v. Casey (C.C.D.R.I. 1792), which invalidated a special act of 
the Rhode Island Assembly giving defendant three years to settle his accounts with British 
creditors without arrest or attachment as a violation of the federal Contracts Clause. The 
court’s decision was unreported. For one account of the decision, see 1 CHARLES WARREN, 
THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 66-68 (1922). 
461.  59 U.S. (18 How.) 272 (1855). 
462.  110 U.S. 516 (1884). 
463.  See infra note 635 and accompanying text. 
464.  11 Mass. (9 Tyng) 396. 
465.  10 Tenn. (2 Yer.) 599. 
466.  MASS. CONST. pt. I, art. X, reprinted in 3 THORPE, supra note 136, at 1888, 1891 (emphasis 
added). 
467.  Holden, 11 Mass. (9 Tyng) at 404. 
468.  Id. at 405-06. 
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privileges and advantages which are denied to all others under like 
circumstances.”469 
Citing this language, some scholars have claimed that this decision was 
based on “natural law,” making it an example of treating natural law as 
superior to positive law.470 On the contrary, the decision was based on the 
“standing law” clause of the Declaration of Rights, and the court invoked 
“natural justice” solely as a ground for a narrow interpretation of the 
legislature’s power to suspend the execution of the laws. As such, it was a 
classic example of due process reasoning, based on the generality principle. 
Similarly, in Cooper, the Supreme Court of Tennessee invalidated a statute 
that created a special court to hear claims brought by the Bank of Tennessee 
against certain officers, sureties, and defaulters. For that limited class of claims 
and parties, the statute replaced common law procedures and a jury trial with a 
court sitting at equity and no right of appeal.471 Citing Fletcher v. Peck and 
Holden v. James, Justice Green focused chiefly on the partial nature of the law: 
If the law be general in its operation, affecting all alike, the minority are 
safe, because the majority, who make the law, are operated on by it 
equally with the others. . . . Two important privileges, the trial by jury, 
and the right of appeal, are by this act taken away in these special cases, 
while every other member of the community, having incurred similar 
liabilities, enjoys them. The fact that the persons embraced in this act 
form a class of the debtors to the bank, tends no more to give it the 
character of a general law than if the act had operated on one individual 
debtor only, whose case might have some peculiarity distinguishing it 
from that of all other debtors. Other banks, and many merchants, and 
many other members of the community, have contracts similar to the 
one set out in this bill. In order to have avoided the force of the 
objection to this act, it should have operated equally on all these; and 
because it has not done so, it is not “the law of the land.”472 
e. Wynehamer v. People 
The first major antebellum case to go beyond these traditional, and limited, 
understandings of due process was the New York Court of Appeals’ decision in 
 
469.  Id. at 405 (emphasis added).  
470.  See, e.g., Williams, supra note 7, at 448 & n.170. 
471.  Bank of the State v. Cooper, 10 Tenn. (2 Yer.) 599, 599-600 (1831). 
472.  Id. at 606-08. 
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Wynehamer v. People.473 In Wynehamer, the court invalidated a statute 
prohibiting the sale of liquor, reasoning that the law effectively deprived liquor 
owners of their property without compensation or judicial process in violation 
of the law-of-the-land and the due process clauses of the state constitution.474 
Regulation of this sort was entirely consistent with the reasoning of “vested” 
rights cases because it involved general and prospective laws that merely 
limited the use of property without taking it. The statute did not transfer a 
property right from A to B, and it applied generally to all property owners in a 
similar situation. 
Would something have to give, however, when a statute effectively 
obliterated the value of an entire category of property (as opposed to merely 
restricting its use)? That was the issue in Wynehamer. Departing from the 
prevailing notion of due process, the New York Court of Appeals effectively 
treated the right to sell a certain kind of property (as opposed to manufacture, 
keep, or drink it) in the state of New York (as opposed to in a neighboring 
state or abroad) as inviolable. Additionally, Wynehamer involved limitations on 
the use of property, rather than transferring title to property from one person 
to another or to the state. It thus seemed to anticipate the regulatory-takings 
doctrine of Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon.475 No antebellum case treated the 
regulatory destruction of the value of property as an impermissible deprivation 
of property; indeed, this was precisely the doctrinal move Chief Justice Ruffin 
declined to make in Hoke v. Henderson.476 Wynehamer was immediately 
controversial,477 and although Indiana courts had adopted a position similar to 
Wynehamer’s,478 at least three other states that had adopted the vested-rights 
doctrine upheld prohibition statutes similar to the one struck down in 
Wynehamer.479 Furthermore, the United States Supreme Court later upheld a 
similar Kansas statute against a Fourteenth Amendment due process 
challenge480—even though that statute declared all personal property used to 
 
473.  13 N.Y. 378 (1856). 
474.  Id. at 378. 
475.  260 U.S. 393 (1922). 
476.  16 N.C. (4 Dev.) 1 (1833); see supra notes 367-388 and accompanying text. 
477.  Williams, supra note 7, at 468-69; cf. ELY, supra note 1, at 16 (declaring Wynehamer and Dred 
Scott “aberrations neither precedented nor destined to become precedents themselves”). 
478.  Herman v. State, 8 Ind. 545 (1855) (invalidating a state law prohibiting the sale of liquor on 
similar grounds as Wynehamer); Beebe v. State, 6 Ind. 501 (1855) (same). 
479.  See, e.g., Fisher v. McGirr, 67 Mass. (1 Gray) 1 (1854); State v. Gallagher, 4 Mich. 244 (1856); 
Lincoln v. Smith, 27 Vt. 328 (1855). 
480.  Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887). 
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manufacture liquor to be contraband (and therefore forfeit).481 We think 
Wynehamer was wrongly decided, and there is no evidence it had any bearing 
on the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause. 
f. Slavery and the Dred Scott Case 
It was well established from the time of Somerset’s Case482 that slavery was a 
product of positive law and could be legally sustained only on the basis of 
positive law. From the beginning of the Republic, attempts to abolish slavery 
met with resistance on the ground that abolition would deprive slaveowners of 
their vested property rights without due process.483 Almost all formal state 
emancipations were gradual and prospective, applying only to those who 
might otherwise be born into slavery or brought into the state as a slave.484 The 
 
481.  See DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS: DESCENT INTO THE MAELSTROM, 
1829-1861, at 17 (2005). 
482.  Somerset v. Stewart, (1772) 98 Eng. Rep. 499 (K.B.). 
483.  See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 30th Cong., 1st Sess. 619 (1848) (statement of Sen. Bagby) 
(asserting, in opposition to the abolition of slavery in the territories acquired from Mexico, 
that “[t]he Constitution guarantees [slavery] to those who think proper to hold it; and 
while the Constitution exists, they cannot be deprived of it, without doing violence to that 
instrument”); 12 REG. DEB. 2247 (1836) (statement of Rep. Pickens) (arguing that for a state 
to abolish slavery would violate the “law of the land” provision of its constitution); 12 REG. 
DEB. 693 (1836) (statement of Sen. Walker) (“Congress has no constitutional power to 
abolish slavery in the District of Columbia. . . . But this petition proposes to take from the 
people of this District their slaves, which are their ‘private property,’ ‘without due process of 
law,’ ‘without compensation,’ and for no ‘public use’ . . . .” (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. 
V)); 12 REG. DEB. 97 (1836) (statement of Sen. Calhoun) (“Are not slaves property? [A]nd if 
so, how can Congress any more take away the property of a man in his slave, in this District, 
than it could his life and liberty?”); 33 ANNALS OF CONG. 1229 (1819) (statement of Rep. 
McLane) (arguing that at least as to retrospective laws, Congress lacked the “power to 
disturb” a slave owner’s “legal title to [his slaves’] labor and services, [because] it had 
become a vested right”); CURRIE, supra note 481, at 13 (summarizing arguments made 
against the abolition of slavery because it would deprive owners of property without due 
process); DON E. FEHRENBACHER, THE DRED SCOTT CASE: ITS SIGNIFICANCE IN AMERICAN 
LAW AND POLITICS 84 (1978) (noting that the first governor of the Northwest Territory 
interpreted the Northwest Ordinance’s prohibition on slavery, in article 6, to be only 
prospective). 
484.  Pennsylvania (1780), Connecticut (1784), and Rhode Island (1784) adopted statutes freeing 
the children born subsequently (but only after those children reached the age of majority). 
See JOANNE POPE MELISH, DISOWNING SLAVERY: GRADUAL EMANCIPATION AND “RACE” IN 
NEW ENGLAND, 1780-1860, at 66-68 (1998). The chief exception was Vermont, which 
outlawed slavery whole-cloth by constitutional amendment in 1777. See VT. CONST. of 1777, 
art. I., reprinted in 6 THORPE, supra note 136, at 3737, 3739-40. In Massachusetts and New 
Hampshire, slavery was abolished by court interpretation of the state constitutions, but the 
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inverse argument, that laws enforcing slavery deprived slaves of their natural 
liberty, occurred relatively late in the long American political conflict over 
slavery,485 and to our knowledge it was the basis of only one court decision, 
which in turn was soon reversed by the Supreme Court.486 That decision 
interpreted due process not to place slavery out of bounds altogether, but to 
require that black persons have the benefit of “regular judicial proceedings, 
according to the course of the common law, or by a regular suit commenced 
and prosecuted according to the forms of law”—in short, a “day in court”—
before being declared a slave under the process provided by the Fugitive Slave 
Act of 1850.487 Even so, a number of abolitionists did argue that natural liberty 
could not be deprived on the basis of race even by validly enacted positive law. 
This argument may have been a noble enterprise, but it was never adopted by 
more than a fringe. Slavery was abolished at the point of a sword, under the 
President’s war powers, and ultimately by a constitutional amendment that 
provided expressly for the abolition of slavery—not as an interpretation of due 
process or any other extant constitutional principle. 
From a purely legal perspective, the vice of Chief Justice Taney’s opinion in 
Dred Scott v. Sandford488 was not, therefore, that it countenanced slavery in the 
states and territories where slavery had the sanction of positive law. That view 
was commonplace and legally entrenched. The vice was its extension of the 
idea of vested property rights to allow slavery to exist even in territories where 
positive law forbade it. After determining that the Court lacked jurisdiction to 
hear Scott’s claim,489 and that Congress lacked the power to regulate slavery in 
the territories,490 Taney offhandedly asserted in the alternative that 
 
practical effect of those rulings was a gradual emancipation, as they left a twilight where it 
was unclear whether the constitution had emancipated all slaves or only those who had 
reached majority (and had therefore given their owner fair compensation through their 
labor as children). See MELISH, supra, at 64-66. 
485.  CONG. GLOBE, 31st Cong., 1st Sess. 1146 (1850) (statement of Sen. Chase); FEHRENBACHER, 
supra note 483, at 141 (“This argument was incorporated into the platforms of the Liberty 
party in 1844, the Free Soil party in 1848, and the Republican party in 1856 and 1860.”); see 
CURRIE, supra note 481, at 170; Williams, supra note 7, at 472. 
486.  In re Booth, 3 Wis. 1 (1854), rev’d sub nom. Ableman v. Booth, 62 U.S. 506 (1858). 
487.  Id. at 41-43 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
488.  60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857). 
489.  Id. at 405-06, 416-18, 422-23. 
490.  Id. at 432-46 (opinion of Taney, C.J.); see also id. at 489-90 (opinion of Daniel, J.) (asserting 
that the Constitution gave Congress no power “to impair the civil and political rights of the 
citizens of the United States” or to “exclude” slave owners from the territories). 
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an act of Congress which deprives a citizen of the United States of his 
liberty or property, merely because he came himself or brought his 
property into a particular Territory of the United States, and who had 
committed no offence against the laws, could hardly be dignified with 
the name of due process of law.491 
As Don Fehrenbacher has ably shown, this assertion (which was not expressly 
joined by any other opinion) fails to “[come] to grips with the question of 
whether the mere prohibition of slavery in a federal territory actually 
constituted deprivation of property.”492 If a person from a jurisdiction where a 
species of property is protected takes it voluntarily into a jurisdiction where it is 
contraband, he cannot complain that his property was taken. The logical 
implication of Dred Scott was that slaveowners could take their slaves into free 
states, thus effectively making the entire Union slave territory. It was a position 
even more radical and uncompromising than the proslavery Democratic Party 
had previously urged, and it pulled the rug out from under Stephen Douglas’s 
attempted compromise based on popular sovereignty. Chief Justice Taney’s 
opinion can be seen as a form of substantive due process, since it makes 
inviolate the right to own slaves, positive law to the contrary notwithstanding. 
Unsurprisingly, the Scott decision was immediately controversial. 
Republicans derided it, while Southerners and Democrats urged respect for the 
Supreme Court’s judgment.493 The Republicans, of course, won in the end. 
The Fourteenth Amendment repudiates the Scott holding, and it would be 
perverse to think that the public at the time of adoption of that Amendment 
understood it to perpetuate Chief Justice Taney’s approach to due process. In 
light of the foregoing, Dred Scott deserves no respect as a source of meaning of 
the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause.  
In sum, Dred Scott and Wynehamer, the two principal instances of 
antebellum courts’ applying due process to invalidate a general and prospective 
law, are the faulty exceptions that prove the rule. Outside of slavery and, to a 
much lesser extent, the general regulation of alcohol, no one in antebellum 
America suggested that due process prohibited legislatures from adopting 
general and prospective laws. Furthermore, as radical as Wynehamer and Dred 
Scott were, they do not go as far as modern substantive due process cases go. 
 
491.  Id. at 450. 
492.  FEHRENBACHER, supra note 483, at 383; see also id. at 425 (noting that a contemporary essay 
of a person “identified only as ‘[a] Kentucky Lawyer’” was “[e]specially perceptive,” “for he 
showed that the crucial question here was not whether slaves constituted property but 
whether prohibition constituted deprivation”). 
493.  See id. at 417-19. 
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The rights protected in Wynehamer and Dred Scott had their origin in positive 
law. The courts held that the positive rights involved in those cases, once 
vested, could not be taken away. They did not hold that there is an inviolable 
right to sell alcohol or to own slaves, which would require every jurisdiction to 
allow the sale of alcoholic beverages and the ownership of slaves. Modern 
substantive due process goes that additional step—to hold that all people in all 
jurisdictions have the right to do something positive law had not permitted. 
B. Due Process as a Limit on the Legislature’s Power To Abrogate Common Law 
Judicial Procedures 
Besides applying due process to invalidate quasi-judicial legislative acts that 
deprive persons of rights, early Americans also believed that due process 
prohibited the legislature from abrogating fundamental common law court 
procedures. These opinions built on the Revolutionary and early-Republic 
arguments that legislatures lacked the power to deprive defendants of trial by a 
local jury. And as we have seen, due process was understood to prevent a 
legislature from depriving a specific person or narrow class of litigants of the 
procedural protections otherwise enjoyed by everyone.494 More broadly, several 
prominent legal thinkers treated the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause as a 
kind of catchall provision for constitutional procedure: it embraced all of the 
procedural protections otherwise enumerated in the Constitution. As a 
practical matter, Congress was free to set court procedures so long as they did 
not conflict with a specific constitutional provision or deny litigants the 
procedures necessary to obtain a fundamentally fair trial. This understanding 
forms the basis of modern procedural due process. 
In 1819, Attorney General William Wirt advised the Secretary of War that 
the Due Process Clause prohibited Congress from abrogating the right to jury 
trial.495 The question was whether an act subjecting West Point cadets to the 
jurisdiction of courts martial would deprive them of the constitutional right to 
a jury trial. Wirt listed the Jury Trial Clause of Article III, Section 2; the Grand 
Jury and Due Process Clauses of the Fifth Amendment; and the Jury Trial 
Clause of the Seventh Amendment as “positive and repeated provisions” in the 
Constitution of the right to jury trial.496 From these provisions he concluded 
that 
 
494.  See supra Section II.A. 
495.  Cadets at West Point, 7 Op. Att’y Gen. 276 (1819). 
496.  Id. at 276-77. 
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Congress has no power to pass a law which shall deprive the person 
accused of a criminal or otherwise infamous offense, of his trial by jury, 
except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the militia, when 
in actual service, in time of war or public danger.497 
Indeed, the entire Bill of Rights follows this pattern. Congress may not 
make a law “abridging the freedom of speech,”498 and since the executive and 
judiciary can deprive someone of liberty only according to due process of 
“law,” none of them can constitutionally abridge the freedom of speech.499  
The Supreme Court’s first major Due Process Clause decision applied this 
same logic against Congress and became the basis for what we now call 
procedural due process. The occasion was an act of Congress that authorized 
executive officials to seize private property without judicial warrant or a jury 
trial. In keeping with arguments advanced by lawyers and courts from the 
earliest days of the Republic, the Supreme Court declared in Murray’s Lessee v. 
Hoboken Land & Improvement Co.500 that to comply with due process, statutes 
must either provide for the use of common law procedures or, if they do not, 
employ alternative procedures that the courts would regard as equivalently fair 
and appropriate. A customs officer owed money to the Department of the 
Treasury. Officers of the Treasury sought to secure a lien on the custom 
officer’s property in the amount of the debt by a “distress warrant” pursuant to 
an act of Congress that authorized such instruments. The Court considered 
whether the acts of the Treasury officers, who did not have federal judicial 
power under Article III of the Constitution, could deprive the customs officer 
of his rights, and if so, whether the warrant constituted due process of law.501 
The Court began with the proposition that “[t]he article”—the Due Process 
Clause—“is a restraint on the legislative as well as on the executive and judicial 
powers of the government, and cannot be so construed as to leave congress free 
to make any process ‘due process of law,’ by its mere will.”502 The more 
difficult question was how to determine which process was constitutionally 
due, such that Congress could not abrogate it. The Court identified two 
sources for evidence of the contents of due process: (1) the procedures required 
by the text of other constitutional provisions; and (2) the “settled usages and 
 
497.  Id. at 277 (emphasis added). 
498.  U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
499.  See Shrum v. City of Coweta, 449 F.3d 1132, 1140-43 (10th Cir. 2006) (McConnell, J.). 
500.  59 U.S. (18 How.) 272 (1855). 
501.  Id. at 275-76. 
502.  Id. at 277. 
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modes of proceeding existing in the common and statu[t]e law of England, 
before the emigration of our ancestors, and which are shown not to have been 
unsuited to their civil and political condition by having been acted on by them 
after the settlement of this country.”503 Reviewing the English history of 
governmental debt collections, the Court concluded that there had always been 
a “summary method for the recovery of debts due to the crown,”504 which the 
Americans had not changed, and therefore Congress was not prohibited by the 
Due Process Clause from authorizing the recovery of a federal debt upon a 
“distress warrant,” rather than by “a trial according to some settled course of 
judicial proceedings.”505 
The opinion in Murray’s Lessee is relevant to our inquiry for three reasons. 
First, it confirms the understanding that the Due Process Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment applied to Congress and restrained the ability of Congress to 
depart from traditional legal procedures in cases affecting private rights. 
Second, it rejects the redundancy argument that the Due Process Clause cannot 
overlap other constitutional provisions.506 And third, it addresses for the first 
time the relation between longstanding procedures and legislative power to 
change or reform those procedures. Under the Court’s analysis, longstanding 
procedures, if not acted upon by the legislature, provide due process, and 
require no further examination. But if Congress has departed from 
longstanding procedures, the Court has an obligation to examine what 
Congress has done and ensure that the new procedures pass constitutional 
muster. Put differently, the traditional procedures of the common law are by 
definition sufficient to satisfy due process. Only departures from the traditional 
common law procedures must be scrutinized for fairness under the Due 
Process Clause.507 
Another pre-Fourteenth Amendment case bears out this notion of due 
process as a floor or catchall for constitutional procedure. In Griffin v. 
Wilcox,508 a Union officer in Indiana issued an order forbidding the sale of 
 
503.  Id. 
504.  Id. 
505.  Id. at 272, 280. 
506.  See supra notes 201, 217, and accompanying text. 
507.  See, e.g., Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604 (1990) (concluding that due process was 
satisfied when California state courts exercised personal jurisdiction over plaintiff who was 
served with process when he was in the state on a brief visit); Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 
319 (1976) (concluding that due process does not require a hearing before termination of 
social security benefits); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (concluding that due 
process requires a hearing before termination of welfare benefits). 
508.  21 Ind. 370 (1863). 
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alcohol to Union soldiers. Pursuant to this order, the army jailed a private 
citizen for an indefinite term. The prisoner did not petition for a writ of habeas 
corpus, but later sued the officer for false imprisonment.509 The officer raised 
as a defense a congressional act insulating from liability officers acting under 
the President’s authority.510 Because the statute did not purport to authorize 
detentions, but only to provide a defense to liability, the court focused on 
whether the officer had the power to detain private citizens under martial law 
when the ordinary courts were open. It concluded that he did not.511 In dicta, 
the court declared that, along with the Fourth Amendment, the Fifth 
Amendment Due Process Clause “prohibit[s] the passage of a law by Congress, 
authorizing the arrest of the citizen, without just cause, because such arrest 
deprives him of his liberty.”512 The state court unanimously agreed that even 
Congress, during time of war, could not authorize detentions of citizens 
without a trial when the ordinary courts of justice were open. In the words of 
Justice Hanna, concurring in the judgment, “to prevent such an unjust course 
of procedure [as in England when Parliament authorized arrests and 
imprisonments without judicial process], the constitution thus expressly sets 
up a barrier against the passage of a law by Congress authorizing the 
perpetuation of such acts of wantonness by those in authority.”513 
The Supreme Court embraced this version of due process a decade and a 
half after the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause. In 
Hurtado v. California,514 the Court applied the Fourteenth Amendment Due 
Process Clause to a state law that abrogated the common law right to 
indictment by a grand jury. The Court upheld the law at issue, but, in dicta, 
gave a helpful gloss on the Murray’s Lessee rule: “[N]ot every act, legislative in 
form . . . is law. Law is something more than mere will exerted as an act of 
power.”515 The Court went on to list the sorts of legislative acts that would run 
afoul of due process of law: 
acts of attainder, bills of pains and penalties, acts of confiscation, acts of 
reversing judgments, and acts directly transferring one man’s estate to 
another, legislative judgments and decrees, and other similar special, 
 
509.  Id. at 372. 
510.  Id. 
511.  Id. at 373-74. 
512.  Id. 
513.  Id. at 397 (Hanna, J., concurring). 
514.  110 U.S. 516 (1884). 
515.  Id. at 535. 
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partial and arbitrary exertions of power under the forms of legislation. 
Arbitrary power, enforcing its edicts to the injury of the persons and 
property of its subjects, is not law, whether manifested as the decree of 
a personal monarch or of an impersonal multitude.516 
The Court concluded, however, that substitute procedures provided by the 
legislation were sufficiently equivalent to the grand jury indictment that due 
process had been satisfied.517 This decision marked a shift in procedural due 
process analysis, from whether the procedures employed deviated from 
longstanding common law methods to whether they were “arbitrary.” Hurtado 
was the culmination of the interpretation of due process given by numerous 
early commentators and courts: due process limits a legislature’s power to 
abrogate common law procedures and thereby to authorize another branch to 
directly deprive persons of rights without due process. 
C. Legislative History of the Fourteenth Amendment 
The Fourteenth Amendment was adopted to ensure that all persons would 
enjoy the same civil liberties against the states that whites had previously 
enjoyed against the federal government.518 There was not much debate about 
the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause, presumably 
because it had a well-defined legal meaning. Except that it applied to the states 
instead of the federal government, it was lifted entirely from the Fifth 
Amendment. This is why Representative John Bingham, when asked what he 
believed due process entailed, responded that “the courts have settled that long 
ago, and the gentleman can go and read their decisions.”519 It is also what  
then-Representative James Garfield, who had served in the Thirty-Ninth 
Congress, meant when he later declared that the Fourteenth Amendment Due 
Process Clause had been copied from the Fifth Amendment. He elaborated: 
It realizes the full force and effect of the clause in Magna Charta, from 
which it was borrowed; and there is now no power in either the State or 
the national Government to deprive any person of . . . Life, liberty and 
 
516.  Id. at 536. 
517.  Id. at 538. 
518.  See AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 171 n.* 
(1998) (“This first sentence of the Fourteenth Amendment consciously overruled Dred 
Scott’s holding that blacks could never be ‘citizens.’”). 
519.  CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1089 (1866); see McConnell, supra note 238, at 1164; 
Williams, supra note 7, at 479-81. 
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property, except by due process of law; that is, by an impartial trial 
according to the laws of the land.520 
This encapsulates the position that Fourteenth Amendment due process 
was understood to mean nothing different than what due process and the law 
of the land had meant up to that point. As we have shown, due process, from 
before the Fifth Amendment had been ratified, was understood to apply to the 
legislature when it deprived persons of rights through quasi-judicial acts. The 
Fourteenth Amendment applied this rule to the states. Because it applied to all 
persons, the effect was to make the treatment of black citizens the same as the 
treatment of whites. 
It is true that, starting in about 1840 and lasting through the Civil War, 
radical abolitionists, including Representative Bingham, argued that the Fifth 
Amendment Due Process Clause directly prohibited Congress from authorizing 
the institution of slavery in the territories. For instance, Bingham indulged in a 
bit of high-flown rhetoric on the House floor when describing the “law” that 
“due process of law” was meant to require: “law in its highest sense, that law 
which is the perfection of human reason, and which is impartial, equal, exact 
justice.”521 He later asserted that the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause had 
“declared the equality of all men” and “forbade the Government of the United 
States from making any discrimination.”522 We think Bingham’s comments in 
support of the Fourteenth Amendment—though they sounded in lofty 
rhetoric—when taken together, amounted to nothing more than an argument 
that the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause would ensure that blacks 
would receive the same due process of law that “the courts had settled long 
ago.” Nowhere did Bingham suggest that the Fourteenth Amendment would 
prohibit states from enacting general and prospective laws. Rather, he 
advocated a vision of law, based on divine and natural law,523 that does not 
discriminate on the basis of race. And indeed, the Fourteenth Amendment, 
adopted after the Thirteenth Amendment had prohibited slavery, was meant to 
ensure that no one would be deprived of key civil rights on the basis of race. In 
short, there is nothing in the legislative or ratification history of the Fourteenth 
Amendment to suggest that it was understood to operate against states any 
differently than due process clauses had since the early days of the Republic.524 
 
520.  CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. app. at 153 (1871) (emphasis added). 
521.  CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1094 (1866). 
522.  Id. at 1292. 
523.  See id. at 1094. 
524.  Williams argues that late-nineteenth-century treatises—especially Thomas M. Cooley’s 
influential treatise on constitutional law—espoused a “substantive” version of due process. 
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i i i .  applications 
In this Part we offer a quick summary of how the original meaning of due 
process as based on separation of powers would apply to modern cases, paying 
particular attention to controversial cases. In some instances our approach 
suggests a different outcome, and in others it supplies a more persuasive 
grounding for decisions that the Supreme Court analyzed in a different way. 
We do not attempt to analyze every due process issue, or to provide 
comprehensive analyses of the cases, but to show how our approach might 
assist in resolving some difficult cases. 
A prefatory word is in order about whether applying this conception of due 
process is workable. The first potential problem is that distinguishing between 
the constitutional functions of the legislature, executive, and judiciary is 
“daunting, if not impossible.”525 We take no issue with John Manning’s recent 
article arguing that constitutional interpretations should rely on specific 
provisions instead of vague principles derived from the tripartite structure.526 
Considering whether an act of the legislature is quasi-judicial in the context of a 
deprivation of a person’s rights—especially with the aid of the generality and 
prospectivity requirements that the Framers knew as part of the common law 
 
See Williams, supra note 7, at 493-94 (citing COOLEY, supra note 297). Cooley’s 
understanding of due process in 1868 was consistent with the understanding exhibited by 
the late-eighteenth- and early-nineteenth-century state and federal court cases that we have 
canvassed. In fact, it is notable (though not noted by Williams) that in Cooley’s first 
sustained treatment of “the law of the land,” he asserted that a legislature has never been 
assigned the power to take from A and give to B, irrespective of whether there is a 
constitutional law-of-the-land clause, because the legislature can neither function like a 
court nor act arbitrarily: 
If the act proceeded upon the assumption that such other person was justly 
entitled to the estate, and therefore it was transferred, it would be void, because 
judicial in its nature; and if it proceeded without reasons, it would be equally 
void, as neither legislative nor judicial, but a mere arbitrary fiat. There is no 
difficulty in saying that any such act, which, under pretence of exercising one 
power is usurping another, is opposed to the constitution and void. It is assuming 
a power which the people, if they have not granted it at all, have reserved to 
themselves. 
COOLEY, supra note 297, at 175. Note, however, that there may be a seed of rational basis 
review in Cooley’s caveat that “a legislative enactment” “without reasons” “would be . . . 
void, as neither legislative nor judicial, but a mere arbitrary fiat.” Id. He gave no example to 
support this assertion. Presumably Cooley was drawing on the legacy of Bonham’s Case, 
which, as we have shown, was widely held by early Americans to state, at most, a common 
law rule of statutory construction. See supra notes 57-67 and accompanying text. 
525.  Magill, supra note 69, at 1193. 
526.  Manning, supra note 280, at 1943-46. 
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background—does not have the same pitfalls as trying to untangle the 
constitutional functions of the legislative and executive branches in the 
administrative state. 
The second potential practical problem is that many of the concepts in the 
due process logic require interpretation to determine whether they apply to 
particular facts. Legislative, quasi-judicial, property, liberty, process, law, 
general, prospective—these are classes more than species and require sensitive 
interpretation in light of context. There are several reasons why we think they 
should nonetheless govern the legal analysis. First, the basic elements of the 
logic are derived from the words of the Constitution: “due process of law,” 
“liberty,” “property,” “legislative Powers,” and “judicial Power.” There is no 
avoiding them. Second, even the elements of the logic that are not expressly in 
the text of the Constitution—the requirements that a law be general and 
prospective—were part of the background rules inherited by the Founders and 
subsequent generations as the defining features of “law.” Third, courts applied 
them quite proficiently for many decades. They are at least as workable today 
as the concepts modern courts have substituted for them. Finally, the 
challenges of applying due process as separation of powers are no more 
daunting than those of any subtle legal conception. As with any other 
theoretical construct, there will be hard cases about which reasonable people 
may disagree, even within the theory. And as with any other approach to 
interpretation, a creative judge could stretch its elements to reach a preferred 
outcome. We nonetheless think that a sound general theory will make 
decisions in specific cases more predictable and less arbitrary. And in terms of 
malleability, the understanding of due process we defend is surely exceeded by 
modern substantive due process, which has no consistent or reliable content 
beyond the Justices’ personal moral views. 
A. Defining “Liberty” and “Property” 
This Article is about the meaning of “due process of law,” meaning what 
steps are necessary before a person may be deprived of rights protected under 
the Due Process Clause. We have touched only slightly on what rights are 
comprised within the phrase “life, liberty, or property.”527 The fallacy in 
modern substantive due process is not its assumption that Americans retain 
certain rights beyond those enumerated by the Bill of Rights, but its 
assumption that the Due Process Clause renders these unenumerated rights 
inviolable, even with due process. It is sufficient for present purposes to recall 
 
527.  See supra Section II.A. 
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the important difference between the legal concepts “liberty” and “property”: 
“property” is defined by positive law, while “liberty” is natural and governs 
except to the extent that it has been abridged by positive law.528 In other words, 
we may do whatever we like with our bodies and our property, unless there is 
positive law to the contrary. As Locke put it, each person has “[a] Liberty to 
follow [his] own Will in all things, where the Rule prescribes not.”529 Property, 
by contrast, is confined to interests established pursuant to positive law, such 
as the common law of property, inheritance law, the terms of federal land 
grants, patent law, or other such sources. 
The Court has held that “liberty” is defined by federal constitutional law 
and “property” by “existing rules or understandings that stem from an 
independent source such as state law.”530 We think that is correct as to 
property, but not quite right as to liberty. Contrary to the Court’s 
understanding, all natural liberty is protected. But it is protected only against 
deprivations not pursuant to law. Other than specific liberties expressly or 
impliedly protected elsewhere in the Constitution, there are no “fundamental 
rights” that enjoy a legal status superior to acts of the legislature. As to 
nonnatural liberties, those not existing in nature but created by positive law, 
their definition is to be found, like that of property, in the law that creates 
them. 
The administrative state has complicated matters by creating a number of 
statutory or “public” rights foreign to the common law, which typically are 
conditional on the recipient’s status or acts and therefore never “vest” in the 
classic sense. Modern due process jurisprudence allows the legislature to 
determine the appropriate procedures governing these new “public rights,” so 
long as they satisfy judicially defined minima of notice, hearing, and fair 
procedures.531 
The basic idea of due process, both at the Founding and at the time of 
adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment, was that the law of the land required 
each branch of government to operate in a distinctive manner, at least when the 
effect was to deprive a person of liberty or property. The executive had power 
 
528.  See supra Subsection II.A.1. 
529.  LOCKE, supra note 275, at 284. 
530.  Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972); cf. Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 394 
(1798) (opinion of Chase, J.) (“[T]he right, as well as the mode, or manner, of acquiring 
property, and of alienating or transferring, inheriting, or transmitting it, is conferred by 
society; is regulated by civil institution, and is always subject to the rules prescribed by 
positive law.”). 
531.  See, e.g., Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334 (1976); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 
266-71 (1970). 
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only to enforce law in accordance with its terms, and not to make law. The 
judiciary was required to adjudicate cases in accordance with longstanding 
procedures, unless the legislature substituted alternative procedures of 
equivalent fairness. The legislative branch could enact general laws for the 
future, including the rules for acquisition and use of property, but could not 
assume the “judicial” power of deciding individual cases. This meant the 
legislature could not retrospectively divest a person of vested rights that had 
been lawfully acquired under the rules in place at the time. 
B. Due Process Against the Executive 
1. The Steel Seizure Case 
The first, central, and largely uncontroversial meaning of “due process of 
law,” the meaning established in Magna Charta and applied vigorously by 
Coke against the first two Stuart Kings, was that the executive may not seize 
the property or restrain the liberty of a person within the realm without legal 
authority arising either from established common law or from statute. In other 
words, executive decrees are not “law.” The principle is so fundamental it is 
rarely tested. But in the most famous of all Supreme Court decisions involving 
an executive seizure of private property based on nothing but an executive 
order, the Steel Seizure case,532 the Supreme Court floundered about for a legal 
framework for the decision and—with the exception of a casual reference in a 
concurring opinion—failed even to mention the Due Process Clause. Lord 
Coke would have done a better job with the case using nothing fancier than the 
Magna Charta. 
At the height of the Korean War, the nation’s supply of steel was 
endangered by a labor strike. In response, President Truman “issued an order 
directing the Secretary of Commerce to take possession of and operate most of 
the Nation’s steel mills.”533 No Act of Congress authorized the President’s 
order; indeed, several statutes, by negative implication, appeared to foreclose 
any such power.534 The question therefore was presented whether the President 
could order the seizure of private property under the circumstances based on 
his own constitutionally vested powers. 
The question elicited several of the most sophisticated constitutional 
opinions in the Court’s history. All of them dwelt on whether the President had 
 
532.  Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (Steel Seizure), 343 U.S. 579 (1952). 
533.  Id. at 582. 
534.  See id. at 597-609 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
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attempted to exercise a power—that of making laws—that the Constitution had 
expressly vested in Congress. Justice Douglas also touched on the Takings 
Clause as a limit on the President’s power to effect an expropriation.535 Only 
one of the Justices’ opinions—Justice Jackson’s—mentioned the Fifth 
Amendment Due Process Clause, and that was seemingly in passing, as a 
counter to the President’s assertion that the expropriation was pursuant to his 
power to faithfully execute the laws: 
[The President’s authority to “take Care that the laws be faithfully 
executed”] must be matched against words of the Fifth Amendment 
that “No person shall be . . . deprived of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law. . . .” One gives a governmental authority 
that reaches so far as there is law, the other gives a private right that 
authority shall go no farther. These signify about all there is of the 
principle that ours is a government of laws, not of men, and that we 
submit ourselves to rulers only if under rules.536 
That is an apt and eloquent summary of the primordial meaning of due 
process. Whatever the extent of the general prerogative “executive power” 
vested in the President by the first sentence of Article II,537 the Due Process 
Clause makes clear that he cannot deprive persons in the United States of life, 
liberty, or property except in the course of proper execution of “law.” Only 
Congress has power to make new law. President Truman’s executive order was 
not “law.” That would have been a complete and entirely satisfactory rationale 
for the decision. 
Instead, Justice Jackson offered a three-part taxonomy of separation-of-
powers cases, later adopted as the holding of the Court in Dames & Moore v. 
 
535.  Justice Douglas argued that congressional authorization is required to effectuate a taking, 
because compensation is required and Congress has control over appropriations. See id. at 
629-32 (Douglas, J., concurring). That sounds correct in theory, but we wonder whether, 
under Douglas’s theory, Congress’s decision to enact an unlimited and indefinite 
appropriation to pay claims for takings adjudicated by the Court of Claims would amount to 
a delegation of power to effectuate the takings themselves. 
536.  Id. at 646 (Jackson, J., concurring) (omissions in original). 
537.  A comparison of the first sentences of Articles I, II, and III suggests that while Congress is 
limited to enumerated powers, the executive retains some undefined prerogative powers of 
an executive nature. See Steven G. Calabresi, The Vesting Clauses as Power Grants, 88 NW. U. 
L. REV. 1377 (1994); A. Michael Froomkin, The Imperial Presidency’s New Vestments, 88 NW. 
U. L. REV. 1346 (1994). Our suggestion here is that, whatever those prerogative powers 
might be, in the domestic arena the President cannot deprive any person of life, liberty, or 
property pursuant to prerogative, but only pursuant to law. 
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Regan.538 The three-part test is much admired and much quoted, and forms the 
basis for most modern discussions of the allocation of power between Congress 
and the President, especially in the international arena.539 We do not share this 
admiration. Justice Jackson’s first category comprises cases “[w]hen the 
President acts pursuant to an express or implied authorization of Congress.”540 
In such cases, the act will be sustained if the federal government as a whole has 
the power.541 In the third category, “the President takes measures incompatible 
with the expressed or implied will of Congress.”542 In such cases, the action can 
be sustained only if it falls within the constitutional powers of the President 
and the Congress has no relevant powers.543 Jackson’s intermediate, second 
category comprises cases where Congress has neither authorized nor forbidden 
the President’s actions.544 The answer in these cases, Jackson says, “is likely to 
depend on the imperatives of events and contemporary imponderables rather 
than on abstract theories of law.”545 
This is needlessly complicated and contradicts the premise of the Due 
Process Clause—assuming, as was true in the Steel Seizure case, that the 
President’s actions deprived a person of life, liberty, or property. Unless the 
President’s acts were “pursuant to an express or implied authorization of 
Congress,” they were not lawful. Under the original understanding of due 
process, only acts falling in the first category are legitimate, at least in regard to 
the exercise of power within the United States, against persons subject to its 
laws.546 This is not to say that the President has no prerogative powers, no 
powers independent of congressional authorization—just that none of them 
extends to the deprivation of life, liberty, or property within the United States. 
Justice Jackson’s second category suggests, inaccurately, that in some largely 
indeterminate category of cases a deprivation of property may be permissible 
 
538.  453 U.S. 654, 668-69 (1981). 
539.  See, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Congressional Authorization and the War on 
Terrorism, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2047, 2050 (2005); Neal K. Katyal & Laurence H. Tribe, 
Waging War, Deciding Guilt: Trying the Military Tribunals, 111 YALE L.J. 1259, 1274 (2002). 
540.  Steel Seizure, 343 U.S. at 635 (Jackson, J., concurring). 
541.  Id. at 636-37. 
542.  Id. at 637. 
543.  Id. at 637-38. 
544.  Id. at 637. 
545.  Id. 
546.  We do not here need to address acts of war, carried out by the Commander-in-Chief 
pursuant to congressional authorization. All the Justices in the majority concluded that 
seizing factories in the United States fell outside this category of authority. See id. at 587 
(majority opinion). 
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even if not authorized by law. And Justice Jackson’s third category flips the due 
process presumption on its head, by suggesting that executive seizures of 
property are not reliably deemed unlawful unless Congress has affirmatively 
legislated to make them unlawful. 
Justice Jackson’s three categories are reminiscent of the debate between 
Coke and Ellesmere in the Case of Proclamations.547 Coke took the view that the 
King could not trench upon private rights, by royal decree, without authority 
under common law or an act of Parliament changing that law. In other words, 
only acts falling in Justice Jackson’s first category are legitimate. Ellesmere took 
the view that the King could make new rules as he wished, unless there were a 
contrary law. In other words, only acts falling in Justice Jackson’s third 
category are forbidden. Coke’s view of the case has generally been thought to 
have prevailed, and to have been embraced by the Founders of the American 
Republic. Justice Jackson’s suggestion that the executive may sometimes seize 
private property within the United States without the express or implied 
authorization of Congress, based on “the imperatives of events and 
contemporary imponderables,” was a retreat from fundamental Cokean 
principles of separation of powers and due process. It is not necessary for 
Congress to forbid executive acts depriving persons of property or liberty to 
render them unlawful; it suffices that Congress did not authorize them. 
2. Excessive Delegations of Power to the Executive 
A certain degree of interpretive discretion is inherent in law execution, 
because no law, however precisely crafted, is self-defining with respect to all 
conceivable applications. Yet at a certain point, broad delegations of 
standardless power to the executive strain the understanding that the executive 
can regulate conduct only pursuant to law. For much of our history, Congress 
and the Supreme Court operated on the loose but workable assumption that 
Congress could delegate legislative power—the power to make rules—to the 
executive so long as it provided an “intelligible principle” to govern that 
discretion.548 Since the New Deal, the Supreme Court has regarded as 
sufficiently “intelligible” the standard that the agency regulate “in the public 
interest,” which is, realistically, no standard at all.549 We think the explanation 
 
547.  See supra notes 31-38 and accompanying text. 
548.  The leading case was J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394 (1928). 
549.  Nat’l Broad. Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 225-26 (1943); N.Y. Cent. Sec. Corp. v. 
United States, 287 U.S. 12, 24-25 (1932). The Court recently reaffirmed these decisions in 
Whitman v. American Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457 (2001). 
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for this judicial latitudinarianism is not any doubt that the nondelegation 
doctrine is rooted in genuine constitutional principle; rather the explanation is 
the Court’s conclusion, as a result of long experience, that there are no 
judicially manageable standards for determining “the permissible degree of 
policy judgment that can be left to those executing or applying the law.”550 The 
danger is too grave that if courts attempted to police the boundaries of 
permissible delegation, they would approve of delegations that seemed to them 
necessary in light of policy realities, and disapprove of those that did not. This 
would be a usurpation of the legislative function. 
There are, nonetheless, three ways in which recognition of the due process 
principle that the executive is only the executor, not the maker, of law that 
affects the life, liberty, or property of persons in the United States could play 
an important role. First, an informed and constitutionally responsible Congress 
would exercise more care in limiting the scope of its delegations. This is not 
necessarily in the political self-interest of the legislators, because it would 
require them to assume greater accountability for difficult judgments rather 
than allowing them to kick the ball to unaccountable executive agencies. There 
are, however, some indications of an awakening sense among some members 
of Congress that their branch of government is responsible to the people for 
ensuring conformity of legislation to the Constitution. In the discharge of that 
responsibility, Congress is not constrained by the standards of judicial 
manageability.551 Congress may and should insist that statutes be genuine 
“law” and not just authorization of executive decree. 
Second, even if courts are ill-advised to declare congressional decisions to 
delegate power unconstitutional, they should not be reticent to ensure that 
discretion claimed by the executive is genuinely rooted in congressional 
delegation. Delegation is not only a constitutional issue; it is, in the first 
instance, an issue of statutory construction. Armed with the understanding 
that the legislative branch, not the executive, makes law, courts should 
interpret statutes narrowly to ensure that any delegation is the genuine 
intention of Congress, and not an instance of executive overreach. Scholars 
have called this idea a “nondelegation canon.”552 At a minimum, agencies 
should not be able to claim Chevron deference with respect to claims of their 
 
550.  Whitman, 531 U.S. at 474-75 (quoting Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 416 (1989) 
(Scalia, J., dissenting)). 
551.  See Michael W. McConnell, Institutions and Interpretation: A Critique of City of Boerne v. 
Flores, 111 HARV. L. REV. 153, 155-56, 189-92 (1997). 
552.  John F. Manning, The Nondelegation Doctrine as a Canon of Avoidance, 2000 SUP. CT. REV. 
223; Cass R. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 315 (2000). 
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own authority.553 Chevron deference is a response to the conclusion that 
Congress has vested an executive agency with interpretive power. It should not 
be bootstrapped into deference to an agency’s assertion of power. 
On occasion, inattentive or collusive courts have allowed the President to 
conjure up an entire regulatory regime on the basis of a few stray statutory 
words that Congress almost certainly did not intend to be used in that way. 
One of the most notorious instances was President Jimmy Carter’s imposition 
of wage and price controls in the guise of implementing federal law requiring 
“economy” and “efficiency” in the award of federal contracts.554 President 
Nixon used the same inapt authority to require federal contractors to engage in 
racial affirmative action.555 Wetlands regulation was similarly based on scanty 
legislative authority—though ironically, this was compelled by a court in the 
face of agency reluctance.556 Some scholars contend that the use of the 
Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) of the Emergency Economic 
Stabilization Act of 2008, which authorized assistance to “any financial 
institution,” to bail out General Motors and Chrysler, which are automobile 
manufacturers and not banks, was a similar instance of executive 
misinterpretation of statutory authority to accomplish ends not sanctioned by 
Congress.557 
Indeed, some courts have held that an agency’s own assertion of authority 
to regulate, based on an ambiguous statute, is entitled to deference.558 In effect, 
this is a throwback to the Ellesmere position that the executive can impose 
regulations by decree unless there is clear legislation to the contrary.559 To be 
true to the original meaning of “due process” as applied to executive action, 
courts must be vigilant to ensure that power exercised by the executive is 
 
553.  The clearest judicial statement of this point is Judge David Sentelle’s concurrence to his own 
majority opinion in American Business Ass’n v. Slater, 231 F.3d 1, 8-9 (D.C. Cir. 2000). For a 
scholarly exposition, see Nathan Alexander Sales & Jonathan H. Adler, The Rest Is Silence: 
Chevron Deference, Agency Jurisdiction, and Statutory Silences, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 1497. 
Neither source mentions the Due Process Clause, though they rely on the same separation-
of-powers logic that confines executive enforcement to the scope of laws enacted by 
Congress. 
554.  AFL-CIO v. Kahn, 618 F.2d 784, 788 (D.C. Cir. 1979). 
555.  Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 304 (1979) (calling the legislative basis for the 
executive order “somewhat obscure”). 
556.  Natural Res. Def. Council v. Callaway, 392 F. Supp. 685 (D.D.C. 1975). 
557.  See Gary Lawson, Burying the Constitution Under a TARP, 33 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 55, 72 
(2010). 
558.  See Sales & Adler, supra note 553, at 1507-18. 
559.  See supra notes 33-36 and accompanying text. 
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genuinely pursuant to law, meaning legislation properly enacted by Congress. 
Rather than defer to executive assertions of power, courts should presume that 
Congress has not intended to delegate power unless it has done so with clarity. 
Third, in carrying out the responsibility to interpret statutes passed by 
Congress arguably vesting the executive with broad discretionary power, 
courts should bear in mind the distinction between regulatory schemes 
affecting the life, liberty, and property of Americans, on the one hand, and 
programs that merely expend money or involve exercises of power not affecting 
individual rights, on the other. It may not be coincidental that Congress’s first 
serious debate over the propriety of delegating power to the executive, the Post 
Roads Debate, involved power that did not implicate the Due Process 
Clause.560 When due process rights are implicated by executive action, courts 
should be especially attentive to ensure that any deprivation was pursuant to 
congressional decision, rather than deferring to a broad assertion of power by 
the executive. 
3. “Substantive Due Process” Against the Executive 
The Court has held that substantive due process claims against the 
executive—usually law enforcement officers—are governed by a “shocks the 
conscience” test.561 These are cases where the executive acts pursuant to lawful 
authority, but uses that authority in an allegedly abusive way. The leading case 
is County of Sacramento v. Lewis.562 When an officer told a motorcyclist to stop, 
the motorcyclist fled with his passenger, Lewis. The officer pursued in a patrol 
car at high speed through a residential neighborhood. The motorcycle tipped 
over and Lewis fell in front of the patrol car, which skidded into Lewis and 
killed him. His estate sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that the officer 
deprived him of his life without due process of law in violation of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.563 If the injured party had been the motorcyclist, the 
object of the pursuit, the Fourth Amendment would supply the relevant 
standard for decision, because a chase is an attempted seizure.564 Because the 
victim was a mere bystander whom the government was not attempting to 
seize, Fourth Amendment principles were inapplicable, and the Court turned 
instead to due process. A majority of the Justices agreed that the proper 
 
560.  See CURRIE, supra note 316, at 146-49. 
561.  Cnty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 846 (1998). 
562.  523 U.S. 833. 
563.  Id. at 837. 
564.  See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 394-95 (1989). 
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standard for police-chase cases is whether the officer intended to deprive a 
person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, or acted with 
deliberate indifference to the risk of such a deprivation.565 The Court located 
this standard under the larger umbrella of Rochin v. California’s “shocks the 
conscience” standard for determining whether executive action violates the Due 
Process Clause.566 
We think the standard of intentional conduct or “deliberate” indifference 
was correct, but that the Court was wrong to wrest this standard from so 
nebulous and unrooted an inquiry as whether the act “shocks the conscience.” 
The Due Process Clause does not forbid those acts of government that judges 
regard as really, really bad. The more precise question was whether the police 
officer confined his actions to a properly executive role. When a police officer 
deliberately deprives a person of life, liberty, or property outside of the 
deprivations authorized by a court, the officer is acting the role of judge, jury, 
and executioner of the law all at once. Officers who deprive someone of life, 
liberty, or property through negligent or reckless behavior may be, and in 
appropriate cases should be, subject to personal suit, discipline, or criminal 
action under common law or state statute. But they have not violated 
someone’s constitutional right to due process because they have not usurped 
the role of the judge and jury. Not every tort committed by an officer of 
government in the course of official duties is a constitutional violation. 
A mens rea element is required for executive officials—and not for the 
legislature or the courts—because, although the acts of the latter may be 
imprudent or abusive, they are never accidental. Congress and the courts make 
law and issue judgments principally through words. Executive officials, by 
contrast, are called upon to act. Such acts happen in real time, call for a great 
deal of discretion, and inevitably entail risk. We never wonder whether a 
legislature intended to make a law, or whether it was an incidental byproduct 
of other legislative duties. We never wonder whether a court intended to issue 
a judgment or whether judgment simply happened as the court was going 
about its other business. In the same way, an executive official can be said to 
violate due process only when he intends to deprive someone of life, liberty, or 
property, and does so without due process of law. 
This means, in effect, that there is no such thing as a substantive due 
process claim against an executive officer for death or injury outside of custody, 
caused in the course of duty. An intentional killing before arrest is a 
deprivation of life without due process of law. An intentional seizure is 
 
565.  Lewis, 523 U.S. at 836. 
566.  Id. (discussing Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172-73 (1952)). 
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governed by Fourth Amendment standards. If the officer’s action is merely 
negligent or reckless, it is governed by state tort law. If a deprivation of life 
occurs during lawful custody, the standard is set by the Eighth Amendment, 
and is the same: deliberate indifference or intentional injury. The “shocks the 
conscience” standard is both vacuous and unnecessary. 
4. Detention Without Trial: Korematsu and Hamdi 
Both during World War II and more recently during the so-called War on 
Terror, the executive claimed authority under statute to detain citizens within 
the United States without indictment or trial, on the basis of mere suspicion. 
On both occasions, the Supreme Court affirmed the constitutionality of the 
detentions. In Korematsu v. United States,567 persons of Japanese descent—
including American citizens—living on the West Coast were detained in 
internment camps on suspicion that they might engage in espionage. In Hamdi 
v. Rumsfeld,568 an American citizen captured in Afghanistan was detained on a 
naval vessel within United States waters on allegations of being an enemy 
combatant. In Korematsu, the Court deferred to the executive’s prerogative to 
exercise extraordinary powers during a perceived emergency, arguing that 
“[t]here was evidence of disloyalty on the part of some [Americans of Japanese 
ancestry], the military authorities considered that the need for action was great, 
and time was short.”569 In Hamdi, a plurality concluded that the citizen was 
entitled only to a “meaningful opportunity” before a “neutral decisionmaker” 
to “contest the factual basis” for classification as an enemy combatant570—a 
proceeding that need not be judicial and in which the ultimate burden of proof 
may be placed on the detainee. 
The cases have a common core, but Hamdi is far more difficult than 
Korematsu. Even apart from the use of a racial classification, which has tended 
to be the focus of interest in Korematsu, the decision was flatly inconsistent 
with the original meaning of due process. Congress cannot authorize the 
military to indefinitely incarcerate an American citizen without at least an 
individualized determination that the citizen is a national security threat. The 
executive may get a very limited grace period during an emergency—literally 
during and right after an attack. But even then it may incarcerate American 
citizens only as it makes progress toward charges, a hearing, and a preliminary 
 
567.  323 U.S. 214 (1944). 
568.  542 U.S. 507 (2004). 
569.  Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 223-24. 
570.  Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 509. 
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adjudication. The existence of a military emergency was not enough to 
dispense with due process. Extensive historical evidence shows that even 
during military emergencies—including actual armed rebellions on domestic 
soil—Parliament and the early American republicans believed that it was 
necessary both to pass a suspension of habeas corpus and to explicitly authorize 
detentions based on suspicion,571 neither of which was done in Korematsu. 
Hamdi was a more difficult case, because Hamdi was captured abroad in a 
zone of battle and arguably had taken up arms with a foreign army against the 
United States. It is at least plausible, as the plurality held, that American 
citizens caught under these circumstances may be held as the functional 
equivalent of prisoners of war, rather than indicted and tried for treason. As the 
dissent recognized, there are certain historically well-established and clearly 
defined exceptions to the principle that citizens may not be detained without 
trial: commitment of the mentally ill, quarantine of the infectious, and possibly 
detention of material witnesses.572 Perhaps detention of enemy combatants as 
prisoners of war to prevent their return to the field of battle is another 
exception. We take no position on that, except to note that scholars have 
presented substantial historical evidence that British subjects caught fighting 
against the Crown were customarily tried as traitors, rather than held as 
prisoners.573 If that seemingly unbroken practice establishes a constitutional 
norm that the public would have regarded as inherent in due process, then the 
Hamdi plurality was wrong and Justice Scalia was correct that the military had 
to charge and try Hamdi, or let him go. 
The Hamdi precedent, however, must not be extended to United States 
citizens or others within protection who might be detained within United 
States territory on suspicion of involvement in terrorism or other crimes, or of 
being an enemy combatant. Then, the special circumstances that made Hamdi a 
close case would not exist. In this respect, we think it was a mistake for the 
Hamdi plurality to look to the balancing test of Mathews v. Eldridge574 as  
the proper due process standard for detentions.575 Mathews was devised in the 
context of denial of disability benefits,576 which are a form of property 
 
571.  The evidence is recounted in Amanda L. Tyler, The Forgotten Core Meaning of the Suspension 
Clause, 125 HARV. L. REV. 901 (2012). 
572.  Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 556 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
573.  See PAUL D. HALLIDAY, HABEAS CORPUS: FROM ENGLAND TO EMPIRE 45-46, 169-71 (2010); 
Tyler, supra note 571, at 1000. 
574.  424 U.S. 319 (1976). 
575.  Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 529. 
576.  Mathews, 424 U.S. at 323. 
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unknown to the common law. As with all property, the contours of the right to 
welfare benefits are determined by positive law and until it vests, it is not 
entitled to the full protection of Magna Charta-style process. Detention, by 
contrast, goes to the heart of the liberty protected by the Fifth Amendment. It 
is contrary to the original understanding of due process to allow a citizen to be 
seized and detained within the United States without full traditional process—
meaning prompt indictment and trial before a jury—or, at a minimum, its 
equivalent. 
C. Substantive Due Process Against Legislatures 
The best known and most controversial line of modern due process cases 
begins with Allgeyer v. Louisiana577 and Lochner v. New York,578 is repudiated by 
the New Deal, revives with Griswold v. Connecticut579 and Roe v. Wade,580 
retreats with Bowers v. Hardwick581 and Washington v. Glucksberg,582 and springs 
back to life with Lawrence v. Texas.583 At a certain level of detail, these decisions 
rest on a variety of justifications: limitations on the police power, penumbras 
and emanations from enumerated rights, privacy, lack of public purpose, and 
tradition. All of them, however, share the central assumption that courts may 
identify certain liberties with no source in positive law and protect them even 
against general and prospective legislation enforced with all proper procedure. 
1. Lochner v. New York 
In Lochner v. New York,584 the Supreme Court held that a New York statute 
prohibiting bakers from working more than ten hours a day or six days a week 
deprived bakers and their employers of liberty without due process of law.585 
 
577.  165 U.S. 578 (1897). 
578.  198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
579.  381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
580.  410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
581.  478 U.S. 186 (1986). 
582.  521 U.S. 702 (1997). 
583.  539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
584.  198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
585.  Id. at 64; cf. Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578, 591 (1897) (invalidating a state statute 
prohibiting the state’s citizens from entering into a “contract for insurance or to do an act to 
effectuate such a contract already existing . . . where the contract was made outside the 
State”). 
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There was no deficiency in the procedures used for enforcement. Rather, the 
Court’s improbable logic went like this: “The general right to make a contract 
in relation to his business is part of the liberty of the individual protected by 
the Fourteenth Amendment . . . .”586 States have “the right to prohibit” certain 
kinds of contracts in the exercise of the “somewhat vaguely termed police 
powers,” which “relate to the safety, health, morals and general welfare of the 
public.”587 The question “Is it within the police power of the State? . . . must be 
answered by the court.”588 And how ought the Court answer that question? 
The mere assertion that the subject relates though but in a remote 
degree to the public health does not necessarily render the enactment 
valid. The act must have a more direct relation, as a means to an end, 
and the end itself must be appropriate and legitimate, before an act can 
be held to be valid which interferes with the general right of an 
individual to be free in his person and in his power to contract in 
relation to his own labor.589 
The New York act thus failed because it was not a “necessary or 
appropriate” way to effect the state’s interest in protecting the health of its 
citizens, and so was not a valid exercise of its police powers.590 Three of the 
Justices would have watered down this means-ends analysis, making it easier 
for the state to comply,591 and one Justice would have invalidated the statute 
only if it interfered with what a “rational and fair man” would have recognized 
as a “fundamental” right.592 
None of these opinions squares with anything resembling the original 
understanding of due process, whether in 1791 or in 1868. The liberty of 
contract on which the majority relies is not set forth anywhere in the 
Constitution and contradicts the uniform understanding from the Founding 
era through Reconstruction that legislatures have the authority to pass 
prospective and general legislation affecting contracts. The idea that 
individuals possess a freedom to contract with other persons to do anything 
they would be permitted to do individually may be attractive in the abstract (or 
not), but it does not appear anywhere in the Constitution. It certainly has no 
 
586.  Lochner, 198 U.S. at 53. 
587.  Id. 
588.  Id. at 57. 
589.  Id. at 57-58. 
590.  Id. at 58. 
591.  Id. at 68 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
592.  Id. at 76 (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
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basis in the Due Process Clause, which allows deprivations of natural liberty so 
long as they are achieved with due process of law, meaning proper enactment 
by the legislature and proper enforcement by the courts. Moreover, the Court’s 
limitation of legitimate state legislative authority to “police powers” has no 
textual basis. The Federal Constitution does not purport to limit the powers of 
state governments, except in specific ways. In Federalist No. 45, Madison 
described federal powers as “few and defined” and the powers remaining in 
state governments as “numerous and indefinite.”593 To restrict state legislatures 
to enacting laws “necessary and appropriate” to protect the health and safety of 
the citizens turns the enumeration of federal powers on its head. Indeed, the 
Lochner majority’s reasoning flatly contradicts the Tenth Amendment’s 
guarantee that all powers not denied to the states by the Constitution are 
reserved to them.594 The Tenth Amendment is often dismissed as a truism,595 
but Lochner is one case in which the Tenth Amendment should have provided 
the determinative rule of decision. 
Lochner’s ablest and most recent defender, David Bernstein, may well be 
right that the decision rested on sound principles of economics and liberty, that 
concepts of natural rights and liberty of contract had deep roots in political 
theory, and that the bakers’ hours legislation struck down in the case was a 
disguised scheme to favor entrenched and well-heeled special interests.596 
Conventional attacks on the underlying ideology of the decision may well be 
unfounded. But Bernstein’s argument that the decision rested on sound legal 
principles is unpersuasive, at least as an originalist matter. He relies primarily 
on precedents handed down after ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Indeed, he acknowledges that the “liberty of contract idea” did not come to 
contract law until the 1870s, and was adopted by the Supreme Court as a 
constitutional right only in the 1890s.597 The existence of these post-
Reconstruction cases may exonerate Lochner of the charge of being 
unprecedented, if such a charge has been made, but it is irrelevant to any 
argument that Lochner was consistent with the original public understanding of 
the Constitution, whether in 1791 or in 1868. 
 
593.  THE FEDERALIST NO. 45, supra note 130, at 288, 292 (James Madison) (emphasis added). 
594.  U.S. CONST. amend. X. 
595.  See, e.g., United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941). 
596.  DAVID E. BERNSTEIN, REHABILITATING LOCHNER: DEFENDING INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS AGAINST 
PROGRESSIVE REFORM 3 (2011). 
597.  Id. at 18. 
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2. Griswold v. Connecticut 
Only two years after the Supreme Court reaffirmed its abandonment of the 
Lochner doctrine as a usurpation of legislative power,598 the Court resurrected 
the substantive due process doctrine, now justifying it from the opposite 
theoretical direction: not the absence of state power but the existence of 
fundamental right. In Griswold v. Connecticut, the Court invalidated a 
Connecticut statute that prohibited the sale of contraceptives to a married 
couple.599 The Court began its analysis by restating the Court’s prior 
repudiation of Lochner, stating that the Court does not “sit as a super-legislature 
to determine the wisdom, need, and propriety of laws that touch economic 
problems, business affairs, or social conditions.”600 The Court conspicuously 
declined to base its decision on the Due Process Clause.601 It nonetheless struck 
down the Connecticut law, basing its decision on “penumbras, formed by 
emanations” of various provisions of the Bill of Rights that together imply a 
“zone of privacy.”602 The Court specifically invoked the First Amendment right 
of association, the Third Amendment guarantee against quartering soldiers in 
private homes, the Fourth Amendment right of the people against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, and the Fifth Amendment privilege against 
self-incrimination.603 It is hard to see how the Court could get from these 
provisions to the right in question. Enumerated rights of course extend beyond 
a narrow construction of the terms (free speech includes sign language), but 
interpreting the Bill of Rights to include a judicially divined “zone of privacy” 
that includes an inalienable right for married couples to purchase 
contraceptives strains any reasonable construction of the document. It would 
have been more plausible to deduce a freedom of contract in Lochner from the 
Contracts Clause, the Takings Clause, and the Ex Post Facto Clause than it was 
to deduce a right for married couples to use contraceptives from provisions 
 
598.  See Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 730 (1963) (“The doctrine that prevailed in Lochner 
. . . and like cases—that due process authorizes courts to hold laws unconstitutional when 
they believe the legislature has acted unwisely—has long since been discarded.”); id. at 731 
(arguing that the Constitution gives federal courts no power “to sit as a ‘superlegislature to 
weigh the wisdom of legislation’” (quoting Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 
421, 423 (1952))). 
599.  381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
600.  Id. at 482. 
601.  See id. 
602.  Id. at 484-85. 
603.  Id. at 484. 
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about associations, quartering soldiers, searches, and self-incrimination. The 
decision goes beyond penumbras and emanations, to pure invention. 
The Griswold Court attempted to distance itself from Lochner but wound up 
creating a mirror-image doctrine. In Lochner, the Court invalidated general and 
prospective state statutes on the ground that there were (unenumerated) 
constitutional limits on state power and that it was the Court’s job to police 
those limits. In Griswold, the Court began invalidating general and prospective 
state laws on the ground that there were (unenumerated) individual rights that 
limited state power and that it was the Court’s job to police those limits. 
The Court’s analysis in Griswold is made even more curious in light of the 
rationale it rejected. Only two years prior, in Poe v. Ullman,604 the Court had 
declined to decide the constitutionality of the same statute for lack of a “case or 
controversy.”605 Justice Harlan’s dissent in that case,606 arguing against the 
statute’s constitutionality, which he reproduced as a concurrence in 
Griswold,607 is a more persuasive interpretation of “liberty” under the Due 
Process Clause, though it is still a reach from the original understanding. 
Harlan would have invalidated the statute on the ground that it interfered with 
the freedom traditionally afforded to married couples,608 based on the actual 
practices of most of the states. (By 1965, Connecticut was an outlier—the only 
state in the Union to criminalize the use of contraceptives by married 
couples.609) He did not purport to create new rights on the basis of moral 
theory, but in effect he nationalized rights already recognized by the vast 
majority of states. Unfortunately, he did not explain what this has to do with 
due process. One of us has argued that a tradition-based analysis of 
unenumerated constitutional rights, similar to Harlan’s, is a more plausible 
reading of the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
than of the Due Process Clause and has defended the result in Griswold—but 
not the majority’s analysis—on that ground.610 
Much later, after the abortion decisions (discussed below), it looked as 
though the Court might fall back to a substantive due process analysis that 
gave constitutional status to unenumerated liberties only if they were deeply 
rooted in the traditions of the American people. For example, using this 
 
604.  367 U.S. 497 (1961). 
605.  Id. at 508-09; see U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. 
606.  Poe, 367 U.S. at 522-55 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
607.  381 U.S. at 499 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
608.  See Poe, 367 U.S. at 542-43, 553 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
609.  See RICHARD A. POSNER, SEX AND REASON 328-29 (1992). 
610.  McConnell, The Right To Die, supra note 15, at 692-98. 
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approach the Court reversed appellate court holdings that the Fourteenth 
Amendment Due Process Clause invalidates laws against physician-assisted 
suicide,611 and it invalidated a state law that authorized courts to give child 
visitation rights to third parties against the wishes of a fit parent.612 Lodged 
between the Court’s landmark abortion decisions and Lawrence v. Texas, the 
tradition-based analysis proved to be one step back in the course of two steps 
toward maximizing the Court’s legislative power. It is a more restrained and 
defensible methodology for determining the content of unenumerated 
fundamental rights, if they exist, but it does little to restore the original 
meaning of due process, which allows restraints on natural liberty when those 
restraints are imposed pursuant to law. 
3. Roe v. Wade 
In Roe v. Wade,613 the Court took a giant step beyond its prior decisions. 
The Roe decision has been so much discussed from every angle that there is 
little fresh that can be said.614 It is the most enduringly controversial opinion of 
the Court’s history. Rather than rely on penumbras and emanations from 
enumerated rights in the Bill of Rights, as the Court had done in Griswold, and 
without making any attempt to distinguish its reasoning from that in Lochner, 
the Court resuscitated the idea of substantive due process in all its uncabined 
glory.615 Unlike Griswold, which invalidated a unique, rarely enforced, and 
antiquated law, Roe and its companion case, Doe v. Bolton,616 effectively 
invalidated the then-operative laws of all fifty states, including many that had 
been recently enacted, were consistent with the reform-minded Model Penal 
Code, and enjoyed widespread democratic support. The decision could 
therefore summon no support from Justice Harlan’s tradition-based approach 
in Griswold. The Court never explained why the centerpiece of its analysis, that 
there is longstanding and deep-seated disagreement over the moral status of 
the unborn child,617 supports the conclusion that one of the two answers—the 
 
611.  See Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793 (1997); Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 735 (1997). 
For an explanation and defense of the decisions, see Steven G. Calabresi, Substantive Due 
Process After Gonzales v. Carhart, 106 MICH. L. REV. 1517 (2008). 
612.  Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 67 (2000). 
613.  410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
614.  For a sampling, see WHAT ROE V. WADE SHOULD HAVE SAID: THE NATION’S TOP LEGAL 
EXPERTS REWRITE AMERICA’S MOST CONTROVERSIAL DECISION (Jack M. Balkin ed., 2005). 
615.  See Roe, 410 U.S. at 164-65. 
616.  410 U.S. 179 (1973). 
617.  See Roe, 410 U.S. at 116. 
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one not adopted by the legislature—therefore is embodied in the 
Constitution.618 And for all its voluminous length, the Court’s opinion did not 
take the trouble to explain what any of this has to do with the requirement that 
due process of law be followed when natural liberty is infringed. Few have 
defended the reasoning of Roe in the years since, though many have celebrated 
its result, and it appears to be firmly established as precedent for the 
foreseeable future. 
4. Planned Parenthood v. Casey and Lawrence v. Texas 
To its credit, in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey619 
and Lawrence v. Texas,620 the Court abandoned the “privacy” rubric of Griswold 
and Roe and returned to the authentic language of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
“The controlling word in the cases before us,” the Court explained, is 
“‘liberty.’”621 But as we have argued, substantive due process is problematic not 
because of its capacious understanding of natural liberty, but because of its 
neglect of the words that follow: “without due process of law.” The Casey 
plurality noted that “a literal reading” of the Due Process Clause “might” 
suggest that “it governs only the procedures by which a State may deprive 
persons of liberty.”622 True: that is what the words mean, what the unbroken 
history of their interpretation meant for almost a century, and what their 
underlying purpose demands. But the Court went on: “for at least 105 years . . . 
the Clause has been understood to contain a substantive component as well.”623 
For this proposition the Court cited Mugler v. Kansas,624 the case that, in 
dictum, kickstarted the era of economic substantive due process. Given that the 
Mugler-Allgeyer-Lochner line of cases has been repudiated by the Court and is 
generally regarded as one of the Court’s great mistakes, one might think this a 
 
618.  Cf. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992) (plurality opinion) (“It 
is conventional constitutional doctrine that where reasonable people disagree the 
government can adopt one position or the other.”). 
619.  505 U.S. 833. 
620.  539 U.S. 558 (2003), overruling Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986). We take no 
position on the persuasiveness of Justice O’Connor’s opinion in Lawrence, which rested on 
equal protection instead of due process grounds. See 539 U.S. at 579 (O’Connor, J., 
concurring). 
621.  Casey, 505 U.S. at 846. 
622.  Id. 
623.  Id. 
624.  123 U.S. 623 (1887). 
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less-than-solid precedent on which to ground so broad and unchecked a 
power. 
The Court declared that it was “tempting,” but wrong, to limit the 
protections of the Clause to those liberties rooted in positive law, and 
concluded that it is an “inescapable fact” that the substantive content of 
fundamental rights must rest on the “reasoned judgment” of the Court.625 Even 
though “[m]en and women of good conscience” disagree about the “moral and 
spiritual implications” of abortion, the Court’s “obligation is to define the 
liberty of all.”626 The Court made no attempt to cabin that definition by 
reference to history, tradition, or national consensus. Instead, the Court located 
that definition in the proposition that “[a]t the heart of liberty is the right to 
define one’s own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the 
mystery of human life.”627 Ultimately, the Court rested on stare decisis, both as 
to the legitimacy of its exercise of the substantive due process power and as to 
the identification of the particular right. 
In Lawrence, the Court overruled prior precedent to invalidate a Texas 
statute against consensual homosexual sex.628 In its specific application, 
Lawrence is far more defensible than Casey or Roe: the decision probably 
accords with majority sentiment; might arguably be supported by Justice 
Harlan’s tradition-based approach, loosely and generously construed; is more 
closely connected to privacy in its ordinary meaning; and does not adversely 
affect the rights of vulnerable third parties. All three decisions, however, are 
based on an airy generality with no serious legal content, and all three assert an 
essentially unbounded power of the Court to dispense with laws the Court 
disapproves of. The rhetoric of Casey made it appear that stare decisis might be 
a serious constraint on the Court; Lawrence indicates that it is not. Our 
objection to Lawrence is not based on the merits of the right it creates, which 
we would happily vote to approve were we in the legislature, but on its 
assumption of a power not accorded the courts under the Constitution, at least 
in its original meaning. 
Somewhat ironically in light of the origins of due process of law, the 
plurality in Casey asserts that “[l]iberty finds no refuge in a jurisprudence of 
doubt”629 and goes on to create an inalienable liberty of undefined terms, 
beyond the reach of a duly elected legislature. This is precisely the opposite of 
 
625.  Casey, 505 U.S. at 849. 
626.  Id. at 850. 
627.  Id. at 851. 
628.  Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578-79 (2003). 
629.  Casey, 505 U.S. at 844. 
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due process in a system of separated powers, where a legislature has the power 
to make general and prospective laws limiting natural liberty (and to repeal 
those laws if public morality or culture changes), and where it is the job of a 
court to apply those laws to specific cases. Both Casey and Lawrence put 
lawmaking beyond the reach of the government without a sound basis in the 
text, history, or jurisprudential practice of due process of law. 
5. Rational Basis Review 
This observation applies equally to the judicial doctrine that statutes that 
the Supreme Court does not believe to be reasonable violate due process.630 By 
comparison to Lochner and Griswold, rational basis review seems innocuous; 
the Court has rarely used it to invalidate a statute, and it may seem to be a 
harmless backstop against truly reason-less legislation. But when the Court 
purports to evaluate whether a state’s interest is “legitimate” or a “justif[ied]” 
interference with a judge-made liberty, the result is no different in principle 
than in other modern substantive due process cases: it places a sphere of 
activity beyond the government’s power to regulate without any specific 
constitutional warrant. We would do well to recall the first Justice Harlan’s 
dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson: 
Is it meant that the determination of questions of legislative power 
depends upon the inquiry whether the statute whose validity is 
questioned is, in the judgment of the courts, a reasonable one, taking all 
the circumstances into consideration? A statute may be unreasonable 
merely because a sound public policy forbade its enactment. But I do 
not understand that the courts have anything to do with the policy or 
expediency of legislation. A statute may be valid, and yet, upon grounds 
of public policy, may well be characterized as unreasonable. Mr. 
Sedgwick correctly states the rule when he says that, the legislative 
intention being clearly ascertained, “the courts have no other duty to 
perform than to execute the legislative will, without any regard to their 
views as to the wisdom or justice of the particular enactment.”631 
 
630.  See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 (1938) (“[R]egulatory legislation 
affecting ordinary commercial transactions is not to be pronounced unconstitutional unless 
in the light of the facts made known or generally assumed it is of such a character as to 
preclude the assumption that it rests upon some rational basis within the knowledge and 
experience of the legislators.”). 
631.  Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 558 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (quoting SEDGWICK, 
supra note 257, at 324). 
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To reject rational basis review is not to hold that the government may pass 
irrational laws. Rather, it is to hold that laws passed by the people’s 
representatives, according to the constitutional prescriptions for enacting laws, 
are per se reasonable. Our protection against irrationality is institutional and 
democratic, not theoretical and judicial. The Constitution does not authorize 
courts to interfere with validly enacted laws that do not violate a stated limit on 
the government. 
D. Incorporation of the Bill of Rights 
There is little historical evidence to support the notion that the Fourteenth 
Amendment Due Process Clause was originally understood to apply the Bill of 
Rights’ substantive liberty provisions against the states. The Framers of the 
Fourteenth Amendment understood the Due Process Clause to ensure that the 
states would provide prevailing notions of “due process of law” to all 
persons.632 Due process of law limited a legislature’s power to provide 
alternative judicial procedures, and prohibited it from directly depriving 
persons of rights through acts that were insufficiently general and 
prospective.633 This had nothing to do with the sort of substantive rights the 
First and Eighth Amendments, for example, provide against the federal 
government. The bulk of scholarly analysis suggests that the Fourteenth 
Amendment Privileges or Immunities Clause is a more historically solid 
foundation for the “incorporation” of the Bill of Rights against the states.634 
E. Legislative Acts That Raise Due Process Concerns 
At the same time that courts have misapplied due process to prospective 
and general legislative acts, they have obscured how due process might apply 
to other kinds of legislative acts. 
1. Northern Pipeline Article III Cases 
Due process in its original form insisted that traditional procedures be 
employed in cases affecting personal rights. Those traditional procedures were, 
in almost all cases, common law proceedings in court. The Supreme Court has 
 
632.  See supra Section II.C.  
633.  See supra Sections II.A-B. 
634.  See, e.g., MICHAEL KENT CURTIS, NO STATE SHALL ABRIDGE: THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 
AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS 92-130 (1986). 
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long recognized, probably correctly, that on occasion the legislature may assign 
a particular set of issues to a decisionmaking process other than common law 
courts, provided the procedures are a fair and adequate substitute.635 The latter 
inquiry has evolved into a general balancing test.636 The question remains, 
however, whether the Due Process Clause in combination with other 
provisions, such as Article III, still requires that some traditional core of cases 
be decided in court, rather than in executive-branch agencies dressed up as 
courts. 
The landmark case is Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe 
Line Co.,637 where a plurality of the Court agreed that the Bankruptcy Act of 
1978 violated Article III by giving jurisdiction to non-Article III courts—courts 
whose judges were not insulated from the political branches by life tenure or 
irreducible salaries—over certain “private law” claims.638 Justice Brennan’s 
plurality opinion distinguished between traditional “public right” claims and 
“private right” claims, concluding that Congress may not assign the latter to 
non-Article III courts.639 Most of the Court’s opinions in this line of cases have 
turned on whether the claim at issue is based on a “public right.”640 
Most recently, in Stern v. Marshall,641 the Court determined that a state-law 
tort claim brought by a debtor in a Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceeding was a 
private right that Congress could not authorize a non-Article III court to 
 
635.  Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272, 284 (1855). 
636.  Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334-35 (1976). 
637.  458 U.S. 50 (1982). 
638.  Id. at  70-71 (plurality opinion); see also Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 50 (1932) 
(distinguishing between public and private rights); Murray’s Lessee, 59 U.S. (18 How.) at 
284 (“[T]here are matters, involving public rights, which may be presented in such form 
that the judicial power is capable of acting on them, and which are susceptible of judicial 
determination, but which congress may or may not bring within the cognizance of the 
courts of the United States, as it may deem proper.”). In Northern Pipeline, Justice 
Rehnquist, joined in a concurring opinion by Justice O’Connor, would have based the 
decision on a narrower ground: Article III prohibits Congress from giving jurisdiction over 
state law claims not governed by a federal rule of decision to a non-Article III court. N. 
Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 90-91 (Rehnquist, J., concurring). 
639.  N. Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 70 (plurality opinion). 
640.  See, e.g., Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 51-55 (1989) (holding that the 
Seventh Amendment bars Congress from depriving parties who are contesting private 
rights, but not public rights, of the right to a jury trial). But see Commodity Futures Trading 
Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 853 (1986) (“[T]his Court has rejected any attempt to make 
determinative for Article III purposes the distinction between public rights and private 
rights . . . .”). 
641.  131 S. Ct. 2594 (2011). 
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adjudicate.642 In the process, the Court rearticulated the rationale for the 
“public rights” exception. Chief Justice Roberts noted that the public rights 
exception applies especially to cases where 
“it depends upon the will of congress whether a remedy in the courts 
shall be allowed at all,” so Congress could limit the extent to which a 
judicial forum was available. The challenge in Murray’s Lessee to the 
Treasury Department’s sale of the collector’s land likewise fell within 
the “public rights” category of cases, because it could only be brought if 
the Federal Government chose to allow it by waiving sovereign 
immunity. The point of Murray’s Lessee was simply that Congress may 
set the terms of adjudicating a suit when the suit could not otherwise 
proceed at all.643 
We think that the separation-of-powers logic used by courts in early due 
process cases lends support to the Court’s reasoning, and casts the Northern 
Pipeline line of cases in a new light. The Court has leaned heavily on Article 
III’s grant of the “judicial Power” to courts whose judges have lifetime tenure 
and irreducible pay.644 What it has forgotten by neglecting due-process-as-
separation-of-powers is that Congress is likewise limited from exercising 
quasi-judicial power by Article I’s grant of only (with minor exceptions) the 
“legislative Power,”645 which includes the power only to make laws, not to 
adjudicate claims that would deprive someone of a right. By relying on the Due 
Process Clause, the Murray’s Lessee Court was referring to Congress’s lack of 
judicial power, not the exclusivity of Article III. Congress may or may not be 
able to delegate its power to make law. But it certainly cannot delegate judicial 
power that it lacks. That is, Congress may authorize courts at all only because 
the Constitution either expressly or implicitly gives it power to do so. It has no 
inherent judicial power that it may delegate to another body. The reason 
Congress may create Article III courts is because Article III says it can.646 The 
reason it may create military tribunals and territorial courts647 is because Article 
I gives Congress the powers to make rules for the regulation of the armed 
 
642.  Id. at 2601. 
643.  Id. at 2612 (quoting Murray’s Lessee, 59 U.S. (18 How.) at 284). 
644.  U.S. CONST. art. III. 
645.  Id. art. I, § 1. 
646.  Id. art. III. 
647.  N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 71 (1982) (plurality 
opinion). 
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forces,648 and to govern the territories.649 Based on the pervasively federal 
nature of these activities and the historical practice before and after the 
ratification of the Constitution, it makes sense that it would be “necessary and 
proper”650 for Congress to create tribunals to adjudicate claims arising under 
territorial and military law. We make no claim about whether the due process 
limits on Congress’s power to delegate “quasi-judicial” actions would expand 
or limit the scope of the Northern Pipeline doctrine. The original meaning of 
due process may lend credence to Justice Scalia’s clear baseline in Stern, 
however: “[A]n Article III judge is required in all federal adjudications, unless 
there is a firmly established historical practice to the contrary.”651 Based on 
due-process-as-separation-of-powers, we might suggest an amendment to 
Scalia’s qualification: “An Article III judge is required in all federal 
adjudications, unless the text and historical practice of the Constitution 
expressly or implicitly give Congress the power to authorize them.” 
2. United States v. Lovett 
In United States v. Lovett,652 the Court struggled to invalidate an act of 
Congress that named two government officials who were suspected of 
communist sympathies and effectively deprived them of their jobs. The 
Supreme Court held the statute to be an ex post facto law and a bill of attainder 
in violation of Article I, Section 9.653 This required a less-than-clear-cut 
judgment that Congress’s purpose was punitive. As a recent commentator has 
pointed out, however, that judgment could have gone either way: 
The expulsion of Communists from federal employment in Lovett can 
be seen as a nonpunitive policy reflecting a concern for filling sensitive 
positions in the American government with members of subversive 
 
648.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 14. 
649.  Id. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2. 
650.  Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. 
651.  Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2621 (2011) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
652.  328 U.S. 303 (1946). 
653.  Id. at 315; id. at 317 (“Those who wrote our Constitution well knew the danger inherent in 
special legislative acts which take away the life, liberty, or property of particular named 
persons because the legislature thinks them guilty of conduct which deserves punishment. 
They intended to safeguard the people of this country from punishment without trial by 
duly constituted courts.”). 
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organizations with ties to hostile foreign powers. Or it can be seen as 
punishment for the Communists’ political activities.654 
Lovett might have been easier to decide under the original meaning of the 
Due Process Clause. Congress deprived three government employees of their 
property in salaries they had already earned and of their liberty to continue 
working for the government by means of a legislative decree naming only those 
three individuals rather than by enactment and enforcement of a general and 
prospective rule. A general rule against employing communists in the federal 
government, and a proper hearing to determine whether those three parties 
were in fact communists, would have satisfied due process (putting aside any 
questions arising from the First Amendment). For the legislature to name them 
as suspected communists and thereby deprive them of their positions did not. 
The case is similar to the antebellum case of Hoke v. Henderson,655 where the 
North Carolina Supreme Court invalidated a legislative act depriving court 
clerks of their jobs without basis in general law. Lovett is more straightforward 
than Hoke, though, because the Lovett statute named the parties to be deprived 
of rights, instead of merely mandating turnover in a position held by a limited 
number of known parties. 
On the Supreme Court, only Justice Frankfurter acknowledged that the act 
might raise serious due process questions, and his reasoning was sketchy.656 
One of the judges on the Court of Claims, however, voted to invalidate the act 
based on reasoning closely resembling the early-nineteenth-century cases: 
I think Section 304 violates the Fifth Amendment in that it attempts to 
deprive the plaintiffs of liberty and property without due process of 
law. I recognize that the Fifth Amendment does not, like the 
Fourteenth, which applies only to state governmental action, expressly 
assure equal protection of federal laws. But a statute which selects 
persons for punitive action on a completely personal basis, with no 
 
654.  Anthony Dick, Note, The Substance of Punishment Under the Bill of Attainder Clause, 63 STAN. 
L. REV. 1177, 1191 (2011). 
655.  15 N.C. (4 Dev.) 1 (1833); see supra Subsection II.A.2.e. 
656.  Lovett, 328 U.S. at 328 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (“The other serious problem the Court’s 
interpretation of section 304 raises is that of due process. In one aspect this is another phase 
of the constitutional issue of the removal power. For, if section 304 is to be construed as a 
removal from office, it cannot be determined whether singling out three government 
employees for removal violated the Fifth Amendment until it is decided whether Congress 
has a removal power at all over such employees and how extensive it is. Even if the statute 
be read as a mere stoppage of disbursement, the question arises whether Congress can treat 
three employees of the Government differently from all others.”). 
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attempt to treat similarly other persons similarly situated, is so foreign 
to our concepts of law that it is difficult to think of it as law at all, 
though it bears the stamp of legislative enactment. If a legislature 
refuses to define the conduct which it desires to punish, if done by A, in 
such terms that B and C and D will be equally punishable if they do it, 
but instead merely provides that A shall be punished if he does it, the 
legislature engages, not in law making, but in arbitrary action.657 
3. Statutes That Are Void for Vagueness 
Since at least the mid-1920s, the Supreme Court has invalidated vague 
criminal statutes as a failure of due process of law, based on some combination 
of insufficient notice and the danger of arbitrary or discriminatory 
enforcement.658 Considerations of separation of powers help us to understand 
this doctrine. Vague statutes have the effect of delegating lawmaking authority 
to the executive. The enforcement of vague statutes may seem arbitrary, but it 
is more likely that any individual enforcement decision will be based on a 
construction of the statute that accords with the executive’s unstated policy 
goals, filling the gaps of the legislature’s policy goals. The legislature may of 
course delegate the filling of gaps to executive agencies. But for reasons already 
discussed,659 the delegation must be express and the gaps must be guided by 
clear legislative directives. As Madison commented in his Report on the 
Virginia Resolutions in the Alien and Sedition Act controversy: 
Details to a certain degree, are essential to the nature and character of a 
law; and on criminal subjects, it is proper, that details should leave as 
little as possible to the discretion of those who are to apply and to 
execute the law. If nothing more were required, in exercising a 
legislative trust, than a general conveyance of authority, without laying 
down any precise rules, by which the authority conveyed should be 
carried into effect; it would follow, that the whole power of legislation 
might be transferred by the legislature from itself, and proclamations 
 
657.  Lovett v. United States, 66 F. Supp. 142, 151-52 (Ct. Cl. 1945) (Madden, J., concurring in the 
result). 
658.  See, e.g., Connally v. Gen. Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926) (“[A] statute which either 
forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence 
must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application, violates the first 
essential of due process of law.”). 
659.  See supra Subsection III.B.2. 
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might become substitutes for laws. A delegation of power in this 
latitude, would not be denied to be a union of the different powers.660 
conclusion 
“Due process of law” is the oldest phrase and the oldest idea in our 
Constitution, but it may be the most unrecognizable in modern interpretation. 
Due process was not at all about judicial creation of fundamental rights outside 
the reach of legislative amendment, and only secondarily about notice and the 
opportunity to be heard. Fundamentally, it was about securing the rule of law. 
It ensured that the executive would not be able unilaterally to deprive persons 
within the nation of their rights of life, liberty, or property except as provided 
by common law or statute and as adjudicated by independent judicial bodies, 
and that legislatures would not be able to step beyond their properly legislative 
roles of enacting general rules for governance of future behavior. Due process 
both undergirded and gained its definition from the emerging separation of 
powers first in Britain and then in America. It is ironic that the courts, starting 
in the late nineteenth century, seized upon this principle to subvert the 
separation of powers by giving themselves a super-legislative power to change 
rather than interpret and enforce the law. There may be reasons to think this 
revisionary judicial authority is desirable, and there may be other provisions of 
the Constitution more suited to supporting it, but the Due Process Clauses, as 
originally understood in 1791 and 1868, meant no such thing. 
 
660.  James Madison, The Report of 1800, in 14 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON, supra note 295, at 
307, 324. 
